

SINGAPORE TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORT 2025



Overall Terrorism Threat Remains High



The terrorism threat to Singapore remains high, driven by a volatile global landscape arising from developments such as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and continued traction of radical narratives.

Global Islamist terrorist organisations like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks.

ISIS is resilient and remains one of the world's largest Islamist terrorist organisations; it has cash reserves of some US\$10 million (approximately S\$12.9 million) and its fighters number between 1,500 to 3,000 in Iraq and Syria alone. Since 2024, ISIS's affiliates in Africa, and Central and South Asia have also grown their operational capabilities, demonstrating their ability to conduct mass casualty attacks outside conflict zones. Meanwhile, ISIS's violent narratives continue to radicalise and inspire its supporters to conduct attacks globally.

Examples of ISIS-linked attacks and plots over the past year

July 2024:

A mass shooting by ISIS supporters near a mosque in Muscat, Oman, killed six people and injured 28 others.



August 2024:

A Syrian carried out a mass stabbing in Solingen, Germany, killing three and injuring eight others; he was reportedly radicalised by ISIS ideology.



September 2024:

Seven people – some had allegedly pledged allegiance to ISIS – were detained in Indonesia, for a failed plot to attack Pope Francis during his visit.




October 2024:

Two Afghan citizens were arrested by the US's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for plotting to conduct a terrorist attack on behalf of ISIS during the 2024 US Presidential Election.




January 2025:

A US army veteran, who was reportedly inspired by ISIS, rammed a vehicle in New Orleans, USA, on New Year's Day, killing 14 and injuring over 30 others.



February 2025:

A Syrian radicalised by ISIS propaganda online carried out a mass stabbing in Austria, killing a 14-year-old boy and injuring five others.



¹Refer to "Twentieth report of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL", 31 January 2025.

In Southeast Asia, ISIS's virtual or online caliphate poses a salient threat. Its propaganda materials are both opportunistic and localised; they are tailored to exploit

external developments, such as the situation in Gaza, and local grievances to reinforce ISIS's central narrative of armed violence.

ISIS's "Virtual Caliphate" in Southeast Asia

1 Opportunistic

Framing global incidents to further amplify ISIS's ideological messages:

September 2024: To mark the 23rd anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Indonesian ISIS supporters **created videos promoting armed jihad against "tyrants" and "disbelievers" with some threatening the US for the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza.** One Instagram user shared a video displaying imagery of the burning World Trade Center buildings and hijacked planes. Another Facebook user redistributed a poster from Indonesian pro-ISIS online media group Ash-Shaf Media about haunting America with terror until the Palestinians "feel safe".



2 "Localisation"

Regional supporters have translated original Arabic texts into Southeast Asian languages, as well as linked pro-ISIS narratives to developments/events in their home countries to enhance the reach and impact of ISIS propaganda.

January 2025: A pro-ISIS Facebook user **marked the township Pantai Indah Kapuk in Jakarta, Indonesia, as a potential robbery target for jihadists.** **The user claimed that it was permissible to kill the Chinese** and seize their wealth, citing their alleged control over Indonesian policies through wealth.



AQ's capabilities in Afghanistan have reportedly declined following the assassinations of its key leaders. However, the group could stage a revival, particularly with reports last September that Hamza bin Laden, the son of former AQ leader Osama bin Laden, is alive and leading the group in Afghanistan. According to a UN report in February 2025, AQ's de-facto leader Saif al-Adel intends to reorganise AQ's presence in Afghanistan (where it has established at least eight terrorist training camps), and reactivate sleeper cells in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Europe. These actions may be indicative of AQ's longer-term intent to carry out terrorist attacks in non-conflict zones.

Since the re-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following HAMAS's 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel, there have been incitements – including by terrorist groups like ISIS, AQ, Hizbollah and their affiliates – to conduct attacks against Israeli and Jewish interests, as well as those of countries seen as supporting Israel. These have corresponded with an uptick in anti-Semitic incidents worldwide. A discernible uptick in Islamophobia has also been observed overseas.

Examples of attacks against Israeli and Jewish interests abroad over the past year

August 2024:

Two suspects were charged for their involvement in an arson attack on a synagogue in La Grande-Motte, France. The main suspect had expressed a deep hatred of Jews.

September 2024:

An 18-year-old Austrian man opened fire close to the Israeli Consulate in Munich, Germany, on the anniversary of the 1972 Munich massacre.



November 2024:

UAE authorities arrested three Uzbek nationals for the murder of Jewish rabbi Zvi Kogan.



May 2025:

Two Israeli embassy staff members were shot and killed in Washington DC, USA.



Besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is a need to closely monitor latest developments concerning the Israel-Iran conflict that may impact our domestic security. Tensions between Israel and Iran escalated on 13 June 2025, when Israel launched a wave of airstrikes at Iran to disrupt its nuclear programme. While both countries entered a ceasefire on 24 June 2025, the security situation remains volatile.

There is currently no specific intelligence of an imminent terrorist attack against Singapore. Nevertheless, Singapore and our interests continue to be viewed as attractive and legitimate targets by terrorist and extremist elements, due to our friendly relations with Western nations and Israel, the presence of iconic structures in Singapore, and our status as a secular and multicultural state.

THE CALL TO TRUTH

In March 2025, a pro-ISIS TikTok user issued a poster titled “**The Call to Truth**”, which labelled the governments of Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia as “apostate” for oppressing Muslims. Muslims were urged to “take up arms” against the countries.

Attack plot against the Singapore Exchange

On 21 August 2024, Indonesian authorities arrested Indonesian militant Yudi Lukito Kurniawan (Yudi) in Sulawesi, Indonesia, on terror charges. A former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member, Yudi was tasked by terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2014 to lead an attack targeting the Singapore Exchange (SGX). The planned attack was intended as an indirect strike against the US, with Singapore deemed as an ally of the US and geographically closest to Indonesia.



Yudi Lukito

Indonesian militant with track record in terrorism activities

About

- Former JI member
 - **Late 1990s to early 2000s:** Underwent militant training in Mindanao, Philippines
 - **2003:** Arrested and imprisoned for illegal firearm possession
- Joined JI splinter group Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) in 2012 and travelled to Yemen to engage in armed jihad with AQAP

The AQAP attack plot and Yudi's involvement serve as a timely reminder of the continued threat posed by transnational terror networks. The incident demonstrates how radical elements in the region can serve as willing proxies for foreign terror groups seeking to harm Singapore. Yudi's actions also underscore the fluidity of terror

Yudi attempted to enter Singapore in February 2015, possibly to further the attack plot. At the time of his attempted visit to Singapore, the Singapore authorities were not aware of the SGX attack plot. However, due to his JI-related terror activities, Yudi had been placed on an entry watchlist, and was denied entry into Singapore.

2014

- Appointed by AQAP to conduct an attack against the SGX

February 2015

- Attempted to enter Singapore by sea, likely to further the SGX attack plot
- Refused entry due to previous JI-related terror antecedents and deported to Batam
- Moved around Indonesia frequently and adopted other aliases to escape detection by the authorities

2016 - 2024

- ISD first received intelligence leads on the attack plot against SGX
- ISD worked closely with liaison partners to establish the identities of those involved in the attack plot, including investigations into Yudi and his whereabouts

August 2024

- Indonesian authorities arrested Yudi in Gorontalo, Sulawesi



allegiances amongst radicalised individuals given the broad common jihadist goals of groups like ISIS and AQ. Thus, while JI's dissolution last year is a major counter-terrorism success for the Indonesian authorities, there remains a concern over JI splinter cells or breakaway groups which are willing and able to turn to violence.

The overall threat is further compounded by the increased traction of Far-Right Extremism (FRE) narratives, particularly in the online space. FRE was originally rooted in white supremacy, but increasingly, individuals from other ethnicities have been found to subscribe to FRE ideologies, fuelled by


anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and anti-Semitic beliefs. Beyond calls for violence, the ethno-supremacist goals of FRE ideologies promote xenophobia and pose a significant threat to social cohesion and racial harmony.

Self-radicalisation remains key domestic terrorism threat

Fuelled by geopolitical conflicts, external developments, and the easy accessibility of various extremist ideologies online, self-radicalisation continues to be the primary driver of the domestic terrorism threat in Singapore. 60 self-radicalised individuals (comprising 48 Singaporeans and 12 foreigners), have been issued with orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA) since 2015 until June 2025. Of them, 17 were youths aged 20 or younger.

Singaporeans continue to be vulnerable to online radicalisation by a variety of extremist ideologies. Since the issuance of the last Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report (STTAR) in July 2024, till June 2025, ISD has dealt with eight self-radicalised Singaporeans under the ISA, comprising six males and two females between the ages of 15 and 56. The radicalisation of half of them was either triggered or accelerated by the re-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023; two by pro-ISIS extremist ideologies; and the remaining two by violent FRE ideologies.

Self-radicalisation cases since 2015 (as of 30 June 2025)



The diverse profile of these cases, in terms of both demographics and triggers, further emphasises that anyone, regardless of age, gender, religion, or profession, is susceptible to radicalisation. Such radicalisation can occur in the short span of weeks from the point of imbibing extremist materials online.

Growing Diversity of Extremist Ideologies



Continued radicalising impact of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Singapore

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be an emotive issue, with Singaporeans being deeply concerned with the dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and rightly so. However, Singapore draws the line at the importation, support and promotion of extremist narratives which leverage the conflict to promote hatred and violence. This is regardless of how the violence is rationalised ideologically or where

the violence takes place. Since HAMAS's 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel till June 2025, ISD has dealt with six self-radicalised Singaporeans under the ISA who were found to support and/or make preparations to engage in armed violence in relation to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This includes the four new cases since the last STTAR in July 2024.²



**Muhammad Indra
Aqmal bin Effendy**
21 years old

In November 2024, three Singaporeans were detained under the ISA: 21-year-old lift mechanic Muhammad Indra Aqmal bin Effendy (Indra), 41-year-old digital marketing director Mohamad Latiff bin Rahim (Latiff), and 44-year-old security guard Nurisham bin Yusoff (Nurisham). All three had been self-radicalised online separately and had made preparations to travel to Gaza or the Middle East to partake in armed violence as part of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Preparations included searching for travel routes and engaging in physical training to be combat ready.



**Mohamad Latiff
bin Rahim**
41 years old



**Nurisham
bin Yusoff**
44 years old

In January 2025, 56-year-old housewife Hamizah binte Hamzah (Hamizah), was issued with a Restriction Order (RO) under the ISA. She was a staunch supporter of the Axis of Resistance (AOR),³ and was the administrator for several pro-AOR social media groups, where she made violent threats and encouraged others to engage in armed violence against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and its supporters.



**Hamizah binte
Hamzah**
56 years old

² The two prior cases are a then 14-year-old youth and An'nadya binte An'nahari (then 33 years old), who were issued with ROs under the ISA in June and July 2024, respectively. Please refer to ISD's media release dated 15 July 2024 on their cases.

³ The AOR refers to a network of Islamist militant and terrorist organisations that includes HAMAS, Hizbollah and the Houthis.

Continued lure of ISIS's propaganda

Singaporeans remain vulnerable to the radicalising potential of ISIS's propaganda. Between July 2024 and June 2025, ISD has dealt with two Singaporean youths who were self-radicalised online by violent ISIS propaganda.

The first youth is a 17-year-old male student who was detained in September 2024. He was a fervent ISIS supporter who planned to conduct a stabbing attack

against non-Muslim males at a crowded location near Tampines West Community Club during his September school holidays, using either a pair of scissors or a knife. He was arrested less than a month before the date of his intended attack, and admitted that he would have executed his attack if not for ISD's intervention. Prior to formulating his local attack plan, he also harboured the intention to travel to Syria to fight for ISIS.



After the 7 October 2023 attacks, I came across more online material on armed jihad and eventually came across ISIS-related content.

I would say that after coming across ISIS-related content, I began to sympathise with ISIS because of their aims of establishing an Islamic Caliphate... [Social media] channels were providing updates on conflicts involving jihadist groups around the world, and would often mention updates on ISIS **This led me to believe that of all the jihadist groups, ISIS was doing the most for armed jihad efforts.**

- Extract of 17-year-old ISIS supporter's statements during investigation



The second youth is a 15-year-old female student who was issued with a RO in February 2025. She is the first female youth to be dealt with under the ISA and the second youngest to be issued with an ISA order.⁴ Within weeks of consuming ISIS propaganda online, she became an ISIS supporter, taking a virtual *bai'ah* (oath of

allegiance) to an ISIS chatbot. She engaged in romantic online relationships with foreign ISIS supporters, to fulfil her aspiration of marrying an ISIS fighter and raising a pro-ISIS family. She was also willing to become a female *mujahideen* (fighter) for ISIS in Syria, and hoped to die a martyr.



I learnt about [ISIS's] methods of attacks from various online social media platforms as well as from [a pro-ISIS] website. ... **I find these attacks to be legitimate because I view such attacks by ISIS as a way to cleanse the world of *kuffar* (disbelievers) ... and further the aims of the establishment of an Islamic caliphate around the world. ... I recognise that ISIS conduct attacks outside of conflict zones and civilians are killed in the process. I find the killing of civilians in such instances is justifiable as long as ISIS "remains alive" and is "still spreading".**

- Extract of 15-year-old pro-ISIS female youth's statements during investigations



⁴ Prior to this youth, ISD has dealt with eight female Singaporeans, aged between 22 and 61 years old, under the ISA for terrorism-related activities. Three of them were detained, while the other five were issued with ROs. Currently, three remain on ROs.

The youngest person to be dealt with under the ISA is the then 14-year-old who was issued with a RO in June 2024 (see footnote 2).

Radicalised foreigners in Singapore

ISD continues to detect radicalised individuals amongst foreigners working in Singapore. In November 2024, self-radicalised Malaysian, **Saharuddin bin Saari**

(Saharuddin), who was working as a cleaner in Singapore, was arrested under the ISA for investigations and consequently repatriated to Malaysia.

Investigations found that:

- Saharuddin became a staunch supporter of ISIS after sustained exposure to pro-ISIS materials online.
- He believed that ISIS was the prophesied Black Flag Army (BFA), which would defend Muslims during the End of Times (EoT).⁵
- To raise awareness of ISIS's cause, Saharuddin actively propagated materials promoting ISIS and armed jihad on his social media accounts.
- Following the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel, Saharuddin expressed support for HAMAS and Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (AQB), which he perceived to be part of the BFA. He considered travelling to overseas conflict zones such as Syria and Gaza to engage in armed violence, but lacked the funds for his travel plans.
- However, Saharuddin had no specific attack plans against Singapore, nor had he successfully radicalised anyone locally.



⁵ EoT prophecies are eschatological prophecies that discuss apocalyptic signs, the destruction of the universe, and Judgement Day (where humans will be held accountable for their deeds by being judged by God). The BFA is a prophesied Muslim army carrying black flags led by Mahdi, the saviour of Muslims, which will emerge in a final battle with non-believers during the EoT. Terrorist groups like ISIS have misappropriated the imagery of the black flags to garner support.

Increasing traction of FRE ideologies in Singapore

Mirroring the growing threat overseas, FRE continues to find resonance in Singapore, especially amongst youths. Between 2020 and June 2025, we have dealt with four Singaporean youths under the ISA for subscribing to violent FRE ideologies. They include 18-year-old Nick Lee Xing Qiu (Lee), and a 17-year-old youth who was an online contact of Lee. They were detained in December 2024 and March 2025, respectively.⁶

While self-radicalised separately, both identified as “East Asian supremacists”, believing in the superiority of Chinese, Korean and Japanese ethnicities, and had a strong antipathy towards Malays and Muslims in Singapore. Heavily inspired by far-right terrorist and Christchurch shooter Brenton Tarrant (Tarrant), and convinced that the “Great Replacement”⁷ was happening in Singapore, the duo strongly believed that violent action had to be taken against Malays and Muslims to prevent them from replacing Chinese as the

majority race. At the point of their arrest, **both youths were prepared to mobilise to violence**. Lee was prepared to participate in attacks against Muslims in Singapore with his online far-right contacts. Meanwhile, the 17-year-old youth had made extensive preparations to conduct shootings against Muslims at five mosques in Singapore, and admitted that he would have conducted the attacks upon successful procurement of guns. The two youths had also planned to livestream their attacks to further emulate Tarrant.

To visibly showcase his allegiance to the far-right community, Lee got a tattoo on his right elbow of a *sonnenrad* (sun wheel or black sun), a popular far-right symbol which was featured in Tarrant’s manifesto and Christchurch attack. He also ordered T-shirts on an online shopping platform, which he custom-printed with the *sonnenrad* and another far-right symbol, the *Totenkopf* (skull).



Lee’s elbow tattoo of a *sonnenrad*




Lee’s custom-printed t-shirts with the *sonnenrad* and *Totenkopf*

⁶ The first two cases are (a) a then-16-year-old who was detained in December 2020; he was released from detention in January 2024 and is currently on a RO; and (b) a then-16-year-old who was issued with a RO in November 2023. Please refer to ISD’s media releases dated 27 January 2021 and 24 January 2024 on their respective cases.

⁷ The Great Replacement theory is an ethnonationalist theory by French anti-immigration author Renaud Camus that posits that white European populations are being replaced by non-Europeans through migration and demographic trends. It heavily emphasises on the narrative of an impending existential threat of white populations and the necessity of radical courses of counteraction, such as violence against immigrant and minority populations.

Brenton Tarrant and the Great Replacement Theory



Brenton Harrison Tarrant (Tarrant), aged 34, is an Australian far-right extremist and white supremacist who carried out two consecutive mass shootings on Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019, which killed 51. Tarrant, whose attacks are among the deadliest

far-right terrorist attacks in history, has been revered as a “saint” by online far-right extremists. His shootings and his manifesto, titled “The Great Replacement”, have inspired multiple copycat attacks, including the 2022 Buffalo shooting by far-right terrorist Payton Gendron (Gendron) in New York, United States on 14 May 2022, which killed 10. Tarrant and Gendron were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment in August 2020 and February 2023, respectively.

Tarrant’s attacks and propagation of the Great Replacement theory have found resonance in Singapore, and had greatly influenced all four youths who were dealt with under the ISA for FRE ideologies. **Notably, the key tenets of the Great Replacement theory were appropriated by the youths to fit the local, Asian context, and served as justifications for their use of violence against particular communities in Singapore.**



I idolise and glorify Tarrant because he was one of the few people who stood up to the problem of Islam in the western world. I view Tarrant’s actions as a sacrifice. ... **I prefer to call him a hero of the Western world. ... I wish that there were more such brave individuals who dare to do what Tarrant did.**

- Extract of Lee’s statements during investigations



In my opinion, I would say that the use of violence is permissible to achieve the greater good. **By greater good, I meant that for the Chinese to remain as the dominant race in Singapore context. If I apply this to the context of Brenton Tarrant’s Christchurch attack, the dominant race will refer to the Whites.** With the use of violence, I meant that it is okay to shoot the Muslims in the local mosque in the day, so as to inflict more casualties.

- Extract of 17-year-old FRE supporter’s statements during investigations




The hidden nature of FRE content – How can we spot them?

FRE elements often mask their extremist content online with subtle and innocuous messaging through coded language and symbols to avoid detection. They disguise their propaganda as popular culture, incorporating memes, symbols, songs, and dances that blend in with mainstream content. These coded messages serve as dog whistles, signalling

to like-minded individuals who understand their hidden significance. Deciphering these codewords and symbols requires considering the context in which they are used.

Here are some common FRE codewords and symbols, some of which have been used by the Singaporean youths who were investigated for FRE ideologies.

Symbols:



Sonnenrad (Black Sun)

This symbol was believed to have been popularised in Nazi Germany and has been widely adopted by neo-Nazi groups and far-right groups and individuals over the years, to promote ideas of an “Aryan heritage”, supremacy of the “European culture”, and belief in racial purity.”



Totenkopf (Death's Head)

This motif was reportedly used as a military emblem by the Prussian army in the 1700s. It gained prominence after being used by the Schutzstaffel (SS) in Nazi Germany as the unit's insignia, and continues to be associated with anti-semitic and neo-Nazi beliefs.



OK hand gesture/emoji

The OK emoji and hand gesture have often been used by far-right supporters to signal “white power”. Notably, it was flashed by Tarrant during his court hearing. Context is crucial in deciphering the use of the OK hand sign given its mainstream, non-ideological use.




Pepe the Frog

Pepe the Frog began as a harmless internet meme but was later co-opted by FRE groups to spread FRE ideologies, such as white supremacist, anti-immigration and anti-Semitic beliefs under the guise of humour.

Neo-Nazi Runes

Nazi Germany incorporated ancient Germanic runes in their official emblems, which were distorted to promote racist and nationalist

ideologies. Presently, many FRE and neo-Nazi groups have likewise appropriated these symbols in their logos to reflect their worldview.




Nazi Swastika



Original Swastika

Nazi Swastika

An ancient symbol with roots in various cultures, originally representing peace and prosperity. Following its appropriation by the Nazi Party as their official emblem, it is now widely recognised as a hate symbol representing white supremacy, anti-Semitism, and neo-Nazism. The Nazi swastika is distinguished from the original symbol by its 45-degree clockwise rotation.



Othala/Odal Rune

Used in Nazi Germany to represent a racially pure “Aryan” heritage, and co-opted by white supremacist groups.



SS Lightning Bolts



Lightning Bolt
Emoji

SS Lightning Bolts

The double sig-runes (victory rune), also known as the SS runes, were originally used by the Nazi SS to represent their organisation, and have been co-opted by neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups. Sometimes depicted with lightning bolt emojis.

The Government takes a serious view of any form of support for terrorism or extremist ideologies in Singapore, whether by Singaporeans or foreigners. ISD will take firm action against any individual in Singapore who supports, promotes, undertakes or makes preparations to undertake armed violence,

regardless of how they rationalise such violence ideologically or where the violence takes place. It is also critical to guard against any form of hate speech and/or divisive rhetoric that could threaten Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society.

Role of Online Platforms in Singapore's Self-Radicalisation Cases

The use of online platforms and social media continues to feature prominently in the cases of our self-radicalised individuals. As of June 2025, all eight Singaporeans dealt with under the ISA since the last STTAR in July 2024 were self-radicalised by extremist materials that they encountered online. Of concern, we have seen an **increasing variety** of online platforms being featured, especially among youths. These range from social media and messaging (e.g. WhatsApp, Telegram, X, Reddit, Instagram, etc.), gaming (e.g. Discord, Roblox, etc.), to video-sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube, Bitchute, etc.).

From our ISA cases, we have found that online platforms have been featured in terrorism-related activities in four broad areas:

- (1) as a radicalisation enabler;
- (2) as a radicalisation accelerator;
- (3) to facilitate recruitment for terrorist-related activities; and
- (4) to mobilise and prepare for armed violence.

The emergence of technological innovations, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), also risks complicating the terrorist threat globally and locally.



As a radicalisation enabler

The radicalisation of a large number of self-radicalised Singaporeans was triggered or accelerated by their exposure to extremist and radical materials online. ISD's investigations also found that many of them had first encountered extremist materials online **unintentionally**.

Extremist groups, including Islamist extremist and FRE elements, have leveraged on social media to disseminate their ideologies and target global audiences. By exploiting overseas conflicts and utilising engaging content such as memes and slang, these groups promote their radical narratives and facilitate self-radicalisation.

Misappropriation of religious prophecies on online platforms



Religious prophecies, such as narratives surrounding the EoT and BFA, have also often been misappropriated online:

- **Foreign extremist preachers and personalities** have capitalised on religious narratives to promote segregationist and pro-violent attitudes towards the perceived enemies of Islam (such as non-Muslims);
- **Geopolitical developments and issues**, such as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have been exploited to develop a sense of urgency amongst Muslims to engage in armed violence during the perceived impending EoT; and
- **Terrorist groups**, such as ISIS, have misappropriated the imagery of black flags of the BFA to garner support for their struggle for power.

Such pro-violent, extremist narratives surrounding religious prophecies have contributed to the self-radicalisation of several Singaporeans. They include Latiff and Nurisham (see page 7 for details), who were convinced through online sources that the EoT was imminent and were prepared to engage in armed violence during the EoT.⁸

⁸ Prior to Latiff and Nurisham, ISD had also dealt with Radjev Lal s/o Madan Lal (please refer to ISD's media release dated 10 May 2022 on his case) and the 14-year-old youth (see footnote 2) under the ISA, whose self-radicalisation were influenced by misappropriated, pro-violent online narratives surrounding the EoT and BFA.

As a radicalisation accelerator

Online platforms act as a catalyst for self-radicalisation, accelerating the time taken between individuals' first encounter with terrorist and radical elements, and their subscription to violent extremist ideologies. For instance, algorithms common in social media and video-sharing platforms recommend more extremist material to individuals once they view such content, resulting in a 'rabbit-hole' syndrome. Online communities, such as servers, channels, and chat groups, also serve as ideological echo chambers, consistently exposing individuals to violent extremist views, and facilitating interactions with radical elements.

As a result, the **online self-radicalisation of many recent ISA cases only took a few months**. Over the past decade, the time taken for self-radicalisation for ISA cases has essentially halved - from an average of 24 months before 2015, to an average of 12 months between 2021 and 2025. In the case of the 15-year-old pro-ISIS female youth who was issued with a RO in February 2025, her online self-radicalisation took mere **weeks**.

Radicalisation timeline of the 15-year-old pro-ISIS female youth (issued RO in February 2025)

June 2023

Encountered ISIS propaganda on social media and spent several hours a day consuming pro-ISIS materials. Consumed more pro-ISIS content and interacted with pro-ISIS online users which were recommended to her on her social media account by the platform's algorithm. Became a staunch ISIS supporter **within weeks** and supported their use of violence to establish an Islamic caliphate.



July 2023

Took a virtual **bai'ah** to an ISIS chatbot, saw herself as an ISIS member thereafter.



July 2023 - December 2024

Was in at least eight short-term romantic online relationships with overseas-based ISIS supporters.



September 2023 - April 2024

Searched for flights from Singapore to Syria, considered saving money to fund her travel.



To facilitate recruitment for terrorism-related activities

Several of the individuals recently dealt with under the ISA, such as the 17-year-old ISIS supporter (see Page 8 for details) and Hamizah (see Page 7 for details), capitalised on social media platforms to propagate extremist materials with the aim of radicalising others. The 17-year-old believed that by doing so, he was performing dakwah (proselytisation);


Hamizah viewed her actions as her “form of jihad”, given that she felt that she did not have the physical prowess and necessary resources to take up arms in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Fortunately, none of these individuals was successful in radicalising others.

17-year-old ISIS supporter detained in September 2024

The youth actively shared radical materials promoting armed jihad, including *nasheeds* (chants) by ISIS, with his contacts on various social media platforms. He stored large amounts of ISIS propaganda and materials on his personal electronic devices and sent links of pro-ISIS websites to himself to readily share them with others. The youth admitted that he wanted to convince his followers to hate non-Muslims and to believe it was acceptable to kill them.

Hamizah binte Hamzah 56, issued RO in January 2025

Hamizah actively posted violent pro-AOR content on her social media accounts to garner support for the AOR, and created new accounts whenever her accounts were banned for the violent content she posted. She took pride in being the administrator for several pro-AOR social media groups, and saw it as her responsibility to ensure that pro-AOR and anti-Israel narratives were being propagated in them. She would also promote her pro-AOR groups to her online contacts in a bid to grow the groups' memberships.



To mobilise/prepare for armed violence

Online platforms have been used by extremist elements to conduct research and planning in preparation for engaging in armed violence in Singapore or overseas. This includes identifying travel routes to overseas conflict zones, sourcing for potential targets, attack locations and weapons, and watching weapon-handling and combat footage to prepare themselves for violence. Some of them also made online searches on overseas

shooting ranges and considered visiting them with the intentions of training with real firearms.

Some local self-radicalised youths had also made use of or had the intentions of using online gaming platforms and applications to simulate terrorist attacks and role-play attacking their targeted communities. Such online gaming platforms/applications have also been used by terrorist elements to radicalise and recruit individuals.


Examples of online platforms being used in preparation for violence in recent ISA cases

17-year-old ISIS supporter, detained in September 2024

- Watched videos about various armed forces and guerrilla warfare on YouTube in preparation to fight alongside ISIS in Syria.
- Downloaded materials from an extremist magazine which contained tips on planning and conducting attacks.

Muhammad Indra Aqmal bin Effendy, 21, detained in November 2024

- Researched online on possible travel routes to Gaza to join HAMAS.
- Watched videos on YouTube to familiarise himself with close quarter battles.
- Searched online for shooting ranges in Batam, Indonesia with the intention to train with live firearms.



Nick Lee Xing Qiu, 18, detained in December 2024

- Role-played as Tarrant in a violent online simulation game, and downloaded video game modifications to recreate the Christchurch attacks on several occasions; contributed to his desire to emulate Tarrant and conduct attacks against Malays and Muslims in Singapore.
- Considered using Molotov cocktails for his attacks and enquired online on how to make them.

17-year-old FRE supporter, detained in March 2025

- Searched online for local mosques for his attacks and shortlisted those which he perceived was popular amongst Muslims.
- Conducted extensive research online on firearms; considered 3D printing firearms and ammunition.
- Was in contact with several individuals online, from whom he had sought advice and/or assistance to procure firearms for his attacks.


There is a need for increased cooperation between the public and private sectors, especially with technology and social media companies, to create a safer online environment. Technology companies have in recent years stepped up their efforts to prevent and disrupt terrorists' abuse of their platforms and services,

such as the regulation and removal of egregious content on social media platforms. However, technology companies could continue to explore further efforts in this area, including collaboration with religious and community organisations, to guide users in navigating the digital space and positively influence the online discourse.

Evolving technologies leveraged for terrorism-related activities

Even though there is no indication that evolving technologies, such as AI and 3D printing, have been used in any terrorist attack plot in Singapore, we are seeing an emerging trend of evolving technologies featuring in local youth self-radicalisation cases. For instance, the 17-year-old ISIS supporter detained in September 2024 had used an AI chatbot to generate a *bai'ah* to ISIS, and a declaration of armed jihad against non-Muslims to inspire other Muslims in Singapore to

engage in armed violence. In the case of the 17-year-old FRE supporter detained in March 2025, he had searched for instructions on an AI chatbot about producing ammunition, and considered 3D printing his own firearms for his local attack plans. Given the increased sophistication and ease of access to emerging technologies, terrorists can be expected to exploit evolving technology to facilitate terror activities and plots.



Youth Radicalisation a Pressing Concern



There has been an uptick in the number of local self-radicalised youths dealt with under the ISA. Half of the eight Singaporeans dealt with under the ISA since the last STTAR in 2024, till June 2025, involved youths


aged 20 or below. This brings the total number of youths dealt with under the ISA since 2015 to 17, with more than two-thirds (12) identified in the last five years.

Singapore's trend of increasing youth radicalisation cases mirrors a global trend. In 2024, several Western countries reported that one in five terror suspects are under the age of 18, while European countries reported that nearly two-thirds of ISIS-related arrests had involved teenagers.⁹

In August 2024, three youths, aged 17 to 19 years old, were detained for plotting to **attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna** over a messaging app. One of them pledged allegiance to ISIS, and at least two of them had consumed ISIS propaganda materials.

In July 2024, a **14-year-old stabbed a 22-year-old man in the neck on the campus of the University of Sydney**. The youth was described by Australian police as being motivated by a "salad bar" of mixed ideologies¹⁰ and had allegedly planned to carry out a Christchurch-style attack in September 2023.

In May 2024, an **18-year-old was arrested in France for plotting an Islamist-inspired attack** during the football games of the Paris Olympics. He was reportedly communicating with terrorist handlers on instant messaging platforms.



In the case of the local self-radicalised youths, their relatively young ages neither deterred them from making extensive preparations nor dampened their willingness to conduct attacks in Singapore. Nine of the 17 youths dealt

with under the ISA since 2015 had aspired to conduct attacks in Singapore, mostly wanting to use simple and easily available weapons such as knives.

⁹ Source: "Global Terrorism Index 2025", Institute for Economics and Peace, March 2025.

¹⁰ Salad bar ideologies in the context of violent extremism, are belief systems where individuals pick and choose elements based on personal preference from various extremist ideologies, which can be conflicting or incompatible with each other, rather than adhering to a coherent or unified worldview. For instance, concurrently subscribing to tenets of Islamist extremism and FRE.



As for the weapons to be used in the attack... grab some kitchen knives as they are easily available.

I have thought about throwing a Molotov cocktail ... The ingredients in a Molotov cocktail are fire, glass bottle, cloth and flammable liquids such as petrol, which I can get the petrol at a petrol station or very strong alcohol....

- Extract of FRE supporter Nick Lee Xing Qiu's statements during investigations



I planned to carry out my knife/scissors attack plan during the school holiday in mid-September 2024... but unfortunately, I was arrested by ISD before I was able to carry out my attack.

- Extract of 17-year-old ISIS supporter's statements during investigations

- Photos of the knife or scissors which the 17-year-old ISIS supporter had intended to use in his attack plan

To me, since I have not managed to obtain any gun, it will be difficult for me to carry out such attack. If I already have a gun, I think that I can carry out the attack any moment.

[H]ad I not been arrested, I might have acted on my thoughts [and] committed the attacks eventually.

- Extract of 17-year-old FRE supporter's statements during investigations



ISD's investigations indicate that these youths were particularly susceptible to extremist ideologies due to their fluency with online platforms and the significant time they spent online. Many of them also presented with non-ideological issues including a propensity

for hatred and violence, lack of critical thinking and information evaluation skills, low self-esteem, poor social support, and a lack of a coherent sense of identity which rendered them vulnerable to radicalisation.



I took such claim by ISIS [on being the Islamic Caliphate] to be true at face value because I did not put much thought into it. I saw ISIS's use of violence as permissible in establishing the Islamic Caliphate at that time because I thought they knew what they were doing and assumed that ISIS had done their research on the topic since they claimed to be an Islamic Caliphate. Since violent acts such as beheadings seemed to be normal to ISIS, I assumed that it was permissible in Islam to kill the enemy.

- Extract of 15-year-old pro-ISIS female youth's statements during investigations

Whole-of-Society Efforts to Counter Extremism



Singapore adopts a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to countering violent extremism (CVE), combining preventive measures which include public outreach, with a holistic rehabilitation and reintegration programme for those who have become radicalised.

Public outreach

ISD works with other Government agencies, grassroots and community partners to conduct counter-radicalisation outreach across different segments of society to raise public awareness on the threat of terrorism and online radicalisation.

For instance, ISD works closely with the Ministry of Education (MOE) to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation workshops for youths, educators, and other school staff, to sensitise

them to the tell-tale signs of radicalisation and the need to report at-risk individuals early. ISD also works with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)'s SGSecure Programme Office (SSPO) and the People's Association (PA), to conduct counter-radicalisation briefings and workshops for Community Response Roundtables (CRRTs). Such upstream CVE efforts are critical in preventing extremist ideas from taking root in our society.

Rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalised individuals

ISD adopts a comprehensive and holistic approach to the rehabilitation of radicalised individuals, fine-tuned over the past two decades to stay ahead of the ever-evolving terrorism threat. Individuals who are issued with ISA orders undergo **psychological, social, and religious rehabilitation**. Since 2002, ISD has partnered with

volunteers from the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) and Inter-Agency Aftercare Group (ACG) to grow an eco-system of care and supervision for detainees and RO supervisees, to support their eventual rehabilitation and reintegration into society, and to ensure they do not re-engage in terrorism-related activities.



Psychological

Detainees and RO supervisees have regular visits with ISD's psychologists, who provide psychological counselling and address their propensity for hatred and violence, and vulnerability to radical influence. The psychologists also help them to reframe the problematic reasoning that underlie their radical beliefs.

Social

Detainees are granted weekly family visits to preserve their connection to their family units as much as possible. ISD also works with community partners such as the ACG to provide social and financial support to detainees, supervisees and their families, when necessary.

Given the rising number of youth cases, ISD introduced a mentoring programme in 2016, where youth detainees and supervisees are assigned a mentor to guide them in developing pro-social skills to aid with their reintegration. Youth detainees are also given support to continue with their education while in detention.



Religious

Detainees and supervisees attend religious counselling sessions at least once a month by a religious counsellor from the RRG. These sessions provide them with the proper religious teachings and interpretations to counter the radical ideologies they had imbibed from online and other sources.

Since 2002, almost 85% of Singaporeans detained under the ISA have been released after making good progress in their rehabilitation. ISD has issued ISA orders against **148** Singaporeans for terrorism-related conduct (inclusive of the youth cases mentioned above). **102** of them were issued with OD while **46** were issued with ROs. Of the **102** who were detained, **85** have been released. Of the **46** who were issued with ROs, **39** have had their ROs lapsed. Most of them have also embarked on pro-social pursuits, such as upskilling themselves or taking up stable employment since their release.

Example: A then-20-year-old self-radicalised Singaporean who intended to carry out armed violence in Singapore and overseas, detained in 2021

- He underwent regular religious counselling, which helped him improve his religious knowledge and adopt a pro-social understanding of Islamic teachings. He no longer believes in armed jihad, and is instead focused on caring for his family. Additionally, his psychologists also helped to educate him that while it is acceptable to sympathise with innocent civilians suffering in a conflict, one should never resort to or advocate for violence as a solution.
- He was released on an RO in 2023, after making good progress in his rehabilitation. Upon his release, he expressed his ambition to pursue a career in the culinary field and thus, ISD assisted him in enrolling in a part-time diploma course to acquire the relevant skills while he concurrently worked part-time in an F&B outlet.



For youth detainees and supervisees, arrangements are also made to ensure that there is minimal disruption to their education. This helps to support their educational development and reintegration into society upon release from detention.

Example: A then 16-year-old Protestant Christian youth who was the first Singaporean to be self-radicalised by violent FRE ideologies, detained in December 2020

- Engaged by a Christian pastor, and underwent psychological counselling to address his permissive attitudes towards violence and non-ideological factors which contributed to his radicalisation, such as his low self-esteem.
- ISD worked with his school and arranged for him to continue his education while in detention, where he received weekly lessons from at least five tutors, including RRG volunteers who were MOE-trained teachers.
- Retook his GCE 'N' Levels and sat for the GCE 'O' Levels while in detention. Performed well in his examinations, and is currently pursuing further studies at an Institute of Higher Learning after being released from detention in January 2024. He is currently on a RO.



Efforts to enhance counter-terrorism capabilities

ISD works closely with the various Home Team agencies to ensure preparedness against evolving terror threats by continuously enhancing our counter-terrorism capabilities.

Response capabilities

To maintain operational readiness, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) collaborates with key stakeholders, such as the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), as well as community and industry partners from the Safety and Security Watch Group (SSWG), to conduct counter-terrorism and emergency preparedness exercises.

SPF's Special Operations Group, which should attain full operational capability by end 2025, would integrate its three elite Special Tactics Team – Special Operations Command's Special Tactics and Rescue Unit, the Police Coast Guard's Special Task Squadron, and the

Gurkha Contingent's Gurkha Special Action Group, to allow for clear commands to be issued during complex public security incidents, leveraging the teams' unique strengths and expertise.

SPF's counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems' (UAS) ability to combat rogue UAS will also be enhanced with the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore's (CAAS) new regulations for Unmanned Aircrafts (UA). Further, SPF is also expanding its sensemaking and investigative capabilities for both terror threats and crime by expanding its Police Cameras (PolCam) network across the island.

January 2024 - March 2025

More than 20 exercises were conducted with SSWG members, including a large-scale counter-terrorism exercise, codenamed 'Exercise Heartbeat', held in the vicinities of One Punggol, ITE College West, and Marsiling Mall Hawker Centre.



December 2025


CAAS will require all registrable UA weighing over 250 grams to be equipped with Broadcast Remote Identification (B-RID) when operating, unless they are already sharing positioning information through the CAAS centralised flight management system.

The B-RID utilises Wi-Fi and Bluetooth technology to transmit vital information including the UA's location, serial number and operator's details and allows for the identification of UA being operated outdoors.



Mid-2030s

The PolCam network will be strategically deployed in areas with high footfall, such as commercial centres and public transport nodes. It is expected to comprise over 200,000 cameras by the mid-2030s and will significantly bolster public safety and security across Singapore.



Border security

As the first line of defence against security threats, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) has continued to strengthen its capabilities at Singapore's borders. Following the transfer of protective security functions from SPF at land checkpoints in January 2023, ICA has enhanced its operational coordination and command and control in border security incidents, with regular exercises conducted to ensure the Home Team's readiness to respond to major security incidents occurring at our borders.

Since May 2024, ICA has implemented the New Clearance Concept (NCC), making automated immigration clearance the norm at passenger halls at checkpoints. The NCC features contactless clearance, allowing eligible travellers to clear immigration without presenting their passports, thanks to the use of facial

and iris recognition as primary biometric identifiers. The concurrent employment of both iris and facial scans enhances the security and accuracy of identity verification, bolstering border security. Additionally, the NCC enables the application of data analytics to advance information gathered, generating risk profiles to support officers in assessing traveller risk.

As part of the NCC for cargo, ICA has optimised cargo clearance procedures and will further enhance its screening capabilities by utilising AI technology to identify anomalies in the scanned images of cargo, parcels and baggage. This AI-powered screening will improve the detection of potential security threats, enabling ICA to intercept suspicious items before they enter Singapore.



Community response to the threat of terrorism

The SGSecure movement was launched in 2016 to sensitise, train and mobilise residents to play a part to prevent, respond to and bounce back from a terror attack and safeguard our way of life. Together with partner agencies, SGSecure equips members of the public with core skills and knowledge, such as how to spot suspicious behaviours and signs of radicalisation, and how to respond if caught in a terror attack (see Annex for details of SGSecure's latest

programmes). By empowering communities to stay alert and respond effectively, SGSecure reinforces the key message that safety and security is a shared responsibility.

From March to May 2024, MHA conducted a national-level survey to gauge public perception and sentiments towards the terrorism threat, as part of the SGSecure movement.

Results of National-Level Survey

52%


of respondents believed that Singapore is a target for terrorist attacks.



88%

of respondents said that they would contact the relevant authorities if they spot suspicious behaviours or items in a public space.

Only about 38% would contact the authorities if they believed that one of their loved ones (e.g., family, relative or friend) was displaying signs of radicalisation.



97%

of respondents saw themselves as having a role to play in preventing and dealing with a terror attack.

93%

of respondents were also willing to help other Singaporeans affected by a terrorist attack.



90%

of respondents believed that all Singaporeans would stand united regardless of race or religion should a terrorist attack happen in Singapore.



Importance of early reporting

Public vigilance is critical to combatting the terrorism threat. If you suspect that someone around you might have become radicalised, quickly alert the authorities. Family and friends are best placed to notice early signs of radicalisation and suspicious changes in behaviour.


Early reporting helps the radicalised individual receive timely help in the form of ISD's comprehensive and holistic rehabilitation programme, and maximise the chances of the individual's successful rehabilitation before he or she becomes more deeply rooted in radical ideologies.

Possible tell-tale signs of radicalisation include, but are not limited to:

Displaying signs or symbols of extremist/terrorist groups (e.g. displaying ISIS flag as one's social media photo).



Posting/sharing extremist views on social media platforms like expressing support/admiration for terrorists/terrorist groups as well as the use of violence.



Frequently surfing radical websites.



Sharing extremist views with friends and relatives.



Inciting others to participate in acts of violence.

Making remarks that promote ill-will or hatred towards people of other races, religions, or communities.



Expressing intent to participate in acts of violence overseas or in Singapore.



Early reporting by members of public, families and friends have allowed several at-risk individuals to receive timely intervention against potential self-radicalisation:

- A then-21-year-old individual was reported by a member of public for posting an allegedly pro-militant image on social media. Investigations later surfaced that he had previously considered travelling to Syria to join the militant group Free Syrian Army whom he felt was defending the oppressed Muslims in Syria. However, he gave up the idea after his mother advised him against doing so. ISD arranged for him to undergo religious counselling with a RRG volunteer, who corrected his religious misconceptions and helped him to recognise the dangers of radicalisation. He later expressed gratitude for ISD's interventions in preventing him from progressing down the path towards radicalisation.
- A then-25-year-old individual was reported by someone close to him for allegedly possessing a gun. The gun was later established to be a replica. Nonetheless, he was found to harbour sentiments supportive of militancy and the

AQB's violent actions. While assessed to not pose an imminent security threat, he was found to be vulnerable to being influenced by radical rhetoric. He subsequently underwent religious counselling to address his religious misconceptions and vulnerabilities to radical influences, and has not attracted further security attention since.



ISD urges family members and friends to seek help from the authorities early if they suspect that somebody close to them might be radicalised. Doing so allows the suspected radicalised individual to get the help they need, and keeps our society safe.

Countering terrorism is a fundamental responsibility shared by everyone to protect our way of life, our values, and the safety of every citizen. Singapore remains an attractive target for terrorist activities. The ever-evolving threat of terrorism is real and

demands unwavering vigilance, cooperation and resilience from every sector of society. Every action taken, every report made, and every initiative launched, brings Singapore one step closer to a safer, more united nation.



ISD Hotline: 1800 2626 473



ISD Email: isd@mha.gov.sg

Speaking at a doorstep media interview on two self-radicalised Singaporean youths on 2 April 2025, Mr K Shanmugam, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs said:

“

...as I keep saying, we have to get it right every time ... Those who are either on the far-right, or with tendencies towards extremism on the Islamic side, have to only get it right once and they will kill some people ...

So... we have to ask friends, families of people, to alert us - when you see someone consuming material which is radical, going online, talking to you in very radical terms - it is good to tell Ministry of Home Affairs. We will investigate. We can guide them. Really, we are here to help them in many ways. It stops them from harming themselves and others. They receive help. We are actually able to rehabilitate them in many cases, and then they can go back to their previous lives.



Mr K Shanmugam


Coordinating Minister for National Security
and Minister for Home Affairs

”

SGSecure Movement

Social media outreach

The SGSecure Instagram account (@SGSecureOfficial) was launched in July 2024 to raise awareness and educate the community on how everyone has an active role to play in safeguarding Singapore from terrorism and extremism.



Multiple short videos were released on TikTok and Instagram to highlight the evolving threats of terrorism, promote vigilance and unity, and educate the public on the dangers of spreading misinformation. Scan the following QR codes to watch some of the short videos.



<https://go.gov.sg/earlyreporting-tt>



<https://go.gov.sg/spreadingmisinformation-tt>



<https://go.gov.sg/projectdynamics-knifeattack>



<https://go.gov.sg/couplegoals-bombattack>



<https://go.gov.sg/fitcheck-carrammingattack>

Members of the public are encouraged to follow the SGSecure Instagram account (@SGSecureOfficial) to learn how they can keep themselves, their loved ones and our community safe from terrorism.

Strengthening Preparedness

Community Response Roundtables

The Community Response Roundtable (CRRT) initiative was introduced in 2019 under the SGSecure movement to enhance community-level preparedness against terror threats. CRRT members play a crucial role in disseminating critical information and supporting residents during a crisis. CRRT members also receive regular briefings on terrorism and security trends, allowing them to support residents during crises. For example, the Tampines CRRT came together to review their emergency response plans and roles after ISD's media release on the 17-year-old youth planning a knife attack near Tampines West CC. To

date, 40 CRRTs have been rolled out across Singapore.

CRRTs also engage in collaborative projects with community partners to promote community security and cohesiveness. Following the announcement of the foiled Tampines West CC attack, the Tampines Unite! project brought representatives from various religious groups together to stand united and offer a silent prayer for blessings of peace, harmony and unity for the residents of Tampines.



Tampines Unite! on 27 October 2024

Engaging Youths

The Daily Ketchup podcast

MHA collaborated with The Daily Ketchup for an interview with Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) Co-Chairman, Dr Mohamed Ali, touching on the topics of radicalisation and rehabilitation of radicalised individuals in Singapore. The podcast aired has garnered over 52,000 views since its release on 19 August 2024. Scan the following QR code to watch the interview.



<https://go.gov.sg/dailyketchup>

Collaboration with Ministry of Education and Institutes of Higher Learning

MHA and MOE have partnered to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation workshops to sensitise students, educators and other school staff to the terrorism threat, including tell-tale signs of

radicalisation and the importance of early reporting. Around 2,000 participants attended close to 50 outreach events in 2024.



Counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation workshops in schools

MHA also partnered with Singapore Polytechnic, Temasek Polytechnic and Ngee Ann Polytechnic to set up an SGSecure booth at their annual CCA Carnival/ Fiesta in April 2025, reaching out to around 6000 youths. The booth featured interactive activities,

including a quiz to raise awareness about SGSecure messages such as recognising signs of radicalisation. Student leaders and volunteers were also trained as SGSecure advocates to engage their peers and encourage participation in the event.



Sharing of SGSecure messages at CCA Carnival/ Fiesta in polytechnics



29 July 2025



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