




BUILDING RESILIENT SOCIETIES.

FORGING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS.

Edited by Susan Sim



BUILDING RESILIENT SOCIETIES. FORGING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS.

ESSAYS FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION CONFERENCE 2011

ORGANISED BY THE
NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL

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FOREWORD

S Iswaran

*Minister in Prime Minister's Office and
Second Minister for Home Affairs and Trade & Industry*



Minister S Iswaran (right) with NCPC Council Vice-Chairman Eric Low

THE NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL: 30 YEARS OF HARD WORK AND DEDICATION

This year marks the National Crime Prevention Council's 30th anniversary.¹ It is a non-profit organisation that works with the Singapore Police Force to raise public awareness of crime. I congratulate the Council on its excellent work in mobilising the support of the business sector, schools and local communities to work with the Police to prevent crime. One of its most successful initiatives is the popular television programme Crime Watch, which has been enjoying high viewership since 1986 when it was first broadcast.

I am encouraged by the NCPC's continuing efforts to make Singapore safe, and look forward to the Council's continued partnership in the years to come.

¹ This Foreword is adapted from Mr S Iswaran's keynote address at the opening of the International Crime Prevention Conference 2011 on 15 November 2011. The original text can be found at http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=MjE5MA%3D%3D-6Yh7rCEvz%2F4%3D

BUILDING RESILIENT SOCIETIES, FORGING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

The theme for the International Crime Prevention Conference 2011 - "Building Resilient Societies. Forging Global Partnerships" - succinctly captures the central tenets that underpin our policing strategy – community and global partnerships.

Singapore is one of the safest cities in the world with a low crime rate of 653 per 100,000 of population in 2010. The Police Force was able to achieve this commendable result with a lean police to population ratio of 259 per 100,000 of population.

This did not happen by chance. It is the result of the strong partnerships forged over the years with the local population and overseas counterparts. The close trust and understanding built up has translated into enhanced crime-fighting capabilities. Last year, 4 out of 10 crime cases in Singapore were solved with the assistance of members of the public.

COMMUNITY POLICING

We must seek ways to consolidate and build upon these outcomes. The Singapore Police Force is currently developing its Next-Generation Frontline Policing Model. The new model will enhance the way in which the Police Force works in, with and through the community. These changes will allow the Police to better fight complex crimes, and raise its crime-fighting abilities to the next level. Policing strategies must evolve in tandem with changes in the community in order to remain relevant.

CRIME PREVENTION IN SINGAPORE

Crime prevention is core to our policing strategy. Policing is not just about reacting to, and solving crime. We want to fight crime upstream - to prevent and deter crime before it occurs.

The NCPC is a key in this strategy. Working through NCPC's dedicated volunteers, the Police is better able to reach out to the community, and encourage every individual to do his or her part to reduce the possibility of crime occurring.

Besides engaging the public, the Police also works with the business sector through the Safety and Security Watch Groups to formulate initiatives and strategies that can better help industries and the public prevent and fight crime. For example, information on crime trends and the description of suspects, if any, are shared within business groups to prevent others from falling prey. Such Police-community partnerships are crucial to the efficacy of our policing efforts.

FORGING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

The Police also values the strong partnership and cooperation it has with the international community.

With economies becoming more closely linked, crime has taken on a transnational character. Many activities such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime and terrorism-related activities are no longer confined within national boundaries.

It is, therefore, important for countries to respond in unison, with purpose and conviction, to effectively curb the growth of transnational criminal groups. Exchanging intelligence, establishing a comprehensive legal system, forging bilateral agreements and forming networks to create effective solutions are indispensable to fighting crime today.

Singapore is no stranger to international collaborations. We work closely with our foreign counterparts to deal swiftly and resolutely with threats. For example, Singapore is the lead shepherd for cybercrime amongst the ASEAN countries, and has been active in various programmes to develop cybercrime investigation capabilities in member countries.

We are also an active member state of INTERPOL. I am happy to note that Singapore will host the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI), which is slated to be ready in 2014. As criminals take advantage of new technology and the anonymity that the virtual world affords, it is crucial for Police to stay one step ahead by having real-time access to information beyond their borders. A key focus of the IGCI will be on cutting-edge research to identify crimes and criminals especially in cybercrime and digital security. This Complex will also enhance our ability to tap on international law enforcement networks, and enable us to share intelligence and professional knowledge with our foreign counterparts.

CONCLUSION

Crime prevention is an important strategy that can only be sustained if there is strong support from the community. In this regard, NCPC will continue to play a key role to enhance police-community partnership to combat crime. International collaboration is equally important to this effort, given the transnational nature of crime in the globalised economy.

During ICPC 2011, a distinguished group of industry leaders and experienced law enforcement practitioners spoke on a wide range of topics, from trends in transnational crime, to the changing nature of community policing, and to the use of new media to fight crime. The conference served as a useful opportunity for the exchange of valuable insights and best practices in the fight against crime. I am confident this book will do the same.

PREFACE

Tan Kian Hoon JP, BBM, PBM
Chairman, National Crime Prevention Council



ICPC 2011 WAS THE HIGHLIGHT of a series of initiatives to commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC). It was a rare and valuable platform for crime prevention and security practitioners to exchange ideas and share useful experiences. At the same time, I was glad that old friendships were renewed and many new ones forged.

More than 300 local and international delegates from 18 countries from as far as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States attended the four-day conference. The successful organising of ICPC 2011 would not have been possible without the contribution of NCPC's key partners, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore Police Force, and People's Association. My heartfelt thanks also to all the distinguished speakers and guests who made every plenary session informational, engaging and memorable.

It was, through ICPC 2011, heartening to see the strong spirit of collaboration by various organisations – a true reflection of the positive partnerships that have enabled Singapore to make impressive progress in crime prevention in the last 30 years. Indeed, the crime rate in 2011 was an all-time low in 20 years.

As we came together for ICPC 2011 and also to celebrate NCPC's 30th Anniversary, I was reminded of the strong foundation my predecessors and past Councils had laid. I am grateful to our Council member Ms Susan Sim, Chairperson of Research Committee, for her strong support in ICPC 2011 and her effort in creating this e-book. In addition, I would like to record my sincere thanks to Mr Eric Low, Vice Chairman of NCPC and Chairman of the ICPC 2011 Organising Committee. The conference would not have been possible without his leadership, foresight and passion.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

EDITOR

Susan Sim is Chairman of the Research Committee of the National Crime Prevention Council of Singapore and author of *Making Singapore Safe: Thirty Years of the National Crime Prevention Council* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2011). Currently Vice President for Asia of The Soufan Group, she has extensive experience in law enforcement, intelligence analysis, journalism, and diplomacy. A former Inspector of Police, her career highlights include serving as Head of Counter-terrorism and Counter-espionage Research at the Internal Security Department of the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia Bureau Chief of The Straits Times, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Singapore Embassy in Washington, DC, and Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. She also founded Strategic Nexus Consultancy, a boutique research firm specialising in home front security and counterterrorism issues. A graduate of Oxford University, UK, Ms Sim is an Adjunct Lecturer at the Home Team Academy of Singapore and Consulting Editor to the *Home Team Journal*. She also teaches at the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, Turkey, and is on the Editorial Board of *Police Practice & Research*, an international journal that presents current and innovative police research as well as operational and administrative practices from around the world.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

Louise Almond is Director of the Centre for Investigative Psychology at the University of Liverpool, UK. She graduated with a PhD in Investigative Psychology (2006). Her PhD thesis investigated the characteristics and behaviour of youths who are sexually harmed. She is a chartered forensic psychologist at the Centre for Critical Incident Research (CCIR). She is a forensic and investigative lecturer and is the programme director for the M.Sc. Psychology of Investigation. In 2001, she carried out a project commissioned by the Home Office into arson and arsonists. She has taught research method and statistics both at undergraduate and post-graduate level. In 2006, she worked on a project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, which examined the content of offender profiles and behavioural investigative advice in addition to how such advice is interpreted and used.

Ian Blair, Lord Blair of Boughton, QPM, is the Non-Executive Chairman of Blue Light Global Solutions. He formerly served as the 24th Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police from 2005 until 2008. Elevated to the House of Lords in 2010, he continues to teach in the Police Executive Programme in the United Kingdom. He was a police officer for more than 34 years and held a number of senior positions, including Chief Constable of Surrey Police from 1998 to 2000 and the Deputy Commissioner of the Met from 2000 to 2005. His experience includes work in both uniform and detective roles. As commissioner, he had ultimate responsibility for the UK's law enforcement approach to counterterrorism. He commanded the Met through the London bombings of July 2005. His main reputation is as a reformer: first, he was a major force in reform-

ing the response of UK police to rape and serious sexual assault. Secondly, he transformed the police workforce by introducing a new grade of uniformed police patroller, the Police Community Support Officer. This permitted the largest ever expansion of community policing in London and had a massive and beneficial effect on recruitment from minority communities. Lord Blair's previous academic appointments include Visiting Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford, 2001 to present; Honorary student, Christ Church, Oxford 2005 (lifetime appointment); Honorary Professor, Thames Valley University, 2007; Research Associate, Centre for Criminology, Oxford, 2009.

Chia Tze Yee is Group Director (Engagement Programme Cluster) with the People's Association (PA) of Singapore. He holds a Master in Business Administration from Brunel University, UK and a Bachelor degree in Science from National University of Singapore. He has been with PA since 1993, where he leads a Cluster of Divisions to provide, coordinate and review engagement programmes in seven areas to help build social capital: (a) Active Ageing; (b) Family Life; (c) Integration; (d) Emergency Preparedness; (e) Involving Youths; (f) Engaging PMETs and (g) Community Sports.

Paul Evans is Director for Risk Consulting at KPMG. He was formerly Executive Director Strategy and Prevention of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, UK, where he served for six years. He brings industry leading experience in the Security Intelligence and Law Enforcement sectors to his new role at KPMG. With nearly 30 years of experience in Counter Terrorism, Organised Crime, Intelligence and Cybercrime and Law Enforcement, he has also led major modernisation and reform programmes in these areas, with a proven track record of improving outputs of major government departments. His wide ranging experience resulted in him being selected to provide specialist advice to a number of high profile committees and panels, including the European Union Committee on Internal Security and the World Bank President's Advisory Panel.

His experience also includes Executive Director-Intervention, Serious Organised Crime Agency (2005-2011); Chief Investigation Officer, HM Revenue and Custom (1995-2005); British Intelligence (SIS) (1982-1999).

Taisuke Kanayama is Executive Director of the Organisation for Small & Medium Enterprises and Regional Innovation, Japan. He was formerly Director of the Police Policy Research Centre, Tokyo. He received his L.L.B. from Tokyo University and joined the National Police Agency (NPA) in 1980. He was also a visiting professor of Public Safety Policy at Hitotsubashi University and a lecturer at Tokyo University and Kyoto University. He served as the commissioner of prefectural police at Tochigi (2007-2009) and Yamanashi (2002-2004). Between these posts, he undertook a research project on the US criminal justice process as a visiting scholar at Harvard University. He also served as the chief of the International Firearms Office, NPA (1998-2000), and participated in the elaboration of the UN convention against transnational organised crimes. He served in various fields of police work such as white-color crime, scientific investigations, counter terrorism, education and training. Besides police organisations, he also worked at the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok as a first secretary (1991-1994) and the Office of National Security Council as an assistant councillor (1991-1993). His current writings include *Statistical Evaluation on the Crime Reduction Policy of Japan*; *Rising Crime and Crime Reduction Strategies in 21st Century Japan*; *Transparency of Criminal Investigations in the US and Japan*; and *Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations in the US*.

Mick Keelty is Adjunct Professor with Australian National University. He was the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) from 2001-2009. His career highlights include Inaugural Chair, Australian Crime Commission Board comprising each Australia State/Territory police commissioner and the heads of ASIO, Customs and the Attorney General's Depart-

ment (2003-09); Co-chair, Asia Group on Money Laundering comprising 32 member countries (2003-09); Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National University; Adjunct Professor, Australian Graduate School of Policing, Charles Sturt University, undertaking research into policy implications of social networking for covert operations by police and security agencies (2009-current). He undertook the official inquiry into bushfires in Perth, West Australia, for the WA Government culminating in a report titled A Shared Responsibility. He is also a current member of the World Economic Forum's Global Council on Organised Crime. He has received numerous awards in recognition of his work. He is the recipient of the Australian Police medal (1996); the Nintang Bahyangkara Utama medal, Indonesia's highest police medal presented by the Presidents of Indonesia (2003); The Singapore Distinguished Service Order, Singapore's highest civilian award presented by the President of Singapore (2008); The Timor-Leste Medal of Merit, Timor Leste's highest civilian honour presented by the President of Timor-Leste (2009). He was made an officer of the Order of Australia in 2011.

Khoo Boon Hui is the President of Interpol. He graduated with a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, and a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Engineering Science and Economics from the University of Oxford. He attended the Advanced Management Program at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania (2002) and has received numerous international honours and local awards. He has more than 30 years of police experiences as well as recognised expertise in organisational management. He began his career in the Singapore Police Force in 1977 and served 13 years as Commissioner of the Singapore Police from 1997-2010. His previous positions include Deputy Commissioner of Police, Director of the Criminal Investigation Department and Police Chief of Staff. On 1 Feb 2010, he was appointed the Senior Deputy Secre-

tary of the Ministry of Home Affairs to oversee the strategic development of the Ministry's regional and international collaboration and capacity development initiatives and projects across the Home Team departments.

Lum Hon Fye has served as a Board Member of the National Crime Prevention Council since 2005 and currently chairs the Infocomm Technology Committee. He previously served many years in the senior ranks of the Singapore Police Force. His portfolios included Head Contingency Planning, Commander of Traffic Police and Tanglin Division. As Director Technology, he oversaw the development of mega technology projects in the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 1998, he joined the private sector. Since then, he has acquired extensive experience in the telecommunication, IT and consumer market. From 2001 to 2004, he was the Executive Vice-Chairman of the largest mobile operator in Thailand. Subsequently as Chief Global Business of the biggest IT company in Singapore, he was responsible for international operations in China, Hong Kong, Australia, South East Asia and Middle East. He is now working as a General Manager in an international retail operation.

Masagos Zulkifli is Minister of State for Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. He graduated with a Bachelor of Engineering Honours joint degree from the Nanyang Technological University and National University of Singapore in 1988, and has a Master in Electrical Engineering from the National University of Singapore (1994) and an MBA (IBEAR) from the University of Southern California (1995). Member of Parliament for the Tampines Group Representative Constituency, he won his first election in 2006. He was previously CEO and Vice President of Singapore Telecommunications Ltd (Sing Tel Global Offices).

Majeed Khader is Director of the Home Team Behavioural Sciences Centre, Home Team Academy, Singapore. He holds a Masters Degree (with Distinction) in Forensic Psychology and a PhD in Psychology (specialising in crisis and personal-

ity). He is a pioneering forensic psychologist in Singapore and is the Chief Psychologist at the Police Psychological Services Division. He has overseen the development of psychological services in the areas of stress counselling, resilience, personnel selection, leadership, negotiations, profiling, and crisis psychology in law enforcement settings. For his work in the psychology of terrorism, he was awarded a Public Administration Award (Bronze). He is presently an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Nanyang Technological University where he teaches forensic and criminal psychology. He is a registered Psychologist with the Singapore Psychological Societies. He is presently also Asian Director for the USA-based Society of Police and Criminal Psychology (USA).

Carolyn Misir, Jansen Ang, Leung Hoi Ting & Nur Izyan are with the Singapore Police Psychological Services Division.

Ng Joo Hee was appointed Commissioner of Police and took command of the Singapore Police Force on 1 February 2010. He joined the Singapore Police Force when he was awarded the Singapore Police Force Overseas Scholarship in 1985. He graduated with Honours in Engineering Science and Economics at the University of Oxford in 1988, and also has an MBA from the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore (1998) and a Masters in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (2001). His public service career has been spent in increasingly responsible positions in the Police, ISD and other government ministries. In 1992-1993, he served as a police monitor with the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia. From 1993-1996, he helped to establish and then led the STAR Unit, the Police's elite hostage-rescue outfit. From 2001-2003, he commanded Central Police Division. He has also previously been Deputy Director, CID and Director of the Police Intelligence Department. He was appointed Director of Prisons on 1 November 2007. Mr Ng was absorbed into the Singapore Administrative Service in 1999, and has served stints in both the Ministry of Home Affairs and the

Ministry of Trade and Industry. He currently sits on the board of the Casino Regulatory Authority, and is a member of the Probation Committee and the National Crime Prevention Council.

Nancy Ng is Director for Central Youth Guidance Office, Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, Singapore. She graduated with Honours in Social Sciences from the National University of Singapore, and became a counsellor with the Singapore Armed Forces Counselling Centre for six years. In her quest for self improvement, she completed a Masters in Social Work in Minnesota, USA. Her time spent in the United States gave her the opportunity to work with the victims and perpetrators of family violence. She also spent five years in some of the most remote areas of Alaska, working with the Yup'ik Eskimo communities. Returning to Singapore in 2000, she joined the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports and undertook the portfolio of policy development for protection and rehabilitation of children, youth and family. In 2005, she assumed the position of the Chief Probation Officer. Subsequently, she headed the Social Sector Planning unit. The Central Youth Guidance Office that she now leads is an inter-Ministry Office that maintains an overview of the entire youth offending spectrum across agency boundaries, identifying service and intervention gaps, while focusing on upstream efforts.

Ng Kok Hoe is currently pursuing his doctoral studies in Social Policy at the London School of Economics.

Ronald Noble is the Secretary General of Interpol. He earned his Juris Doctorate degree from Stanford Law School and Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Business Administration from the University of New Hampshire, both in the USA. He was first elected on 3 November 2000 by INTERPOL's General Assembly. Following a successful second mandate, he was re-elected by an overwhelming majority to serve a third five-year term in 2010. Prior to being elected Secretary General, he oversaw four of the then-

eight-largest law enforcement agencies in the United States: the US Secret Service, the US Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation Division. He began his career in law enforcement as a federal prosecutor specialising in organised crime, drug trafficking, fraud and corruption cases. He obtained a 100 percent conviction rate on cases that went to trial. He is also a fully tenured Professor at New York University School of Law. Under his leadership, INTERPOL developed the I-24/7 secure global police communications network, the first of its kind in the world. It enables National Central Bureaus in all member countries to communicate in real-time and to access INTERPOL's tools and services. He also spearheaded the creation of the only global database of stolen and lost travel documents and the MIND/FIND technical tools that put this and other INTERPOL databases directly into the hands of frontline officers. The organisation has further boosted its investigative and forensic support to member countries through the development of global databases of suspected terrorists, DNA profiles and fingerprints.

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Asia-India Defence Relations in the Changing Regional Security Landscape (New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), and *Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction* (Singapore: McGrawHill Education, 2007; Second Edition, 2011).

Ali Soufan is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group LLC. He also serves as the Executive Director of the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS). A former FBI Supervisory Special Agent who instigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, he is regarded as a leading national security and counter-terrorism expert. His book, *The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al Qaeda*, was on The New York Times bestsellers list, and has been recommended as one of the most important books on the terrorist group. Mr Soufan has received numerous awards and commendations for his counter-terrorism work, which include the Director of the FBI's Awards for Excellence in Investigation, the Respect for Law Enforcement Award for "relentless pursuit of truth and bringing terrorist subjects before the bar of justice", and a commendation from the U.S. Department of Defense that labeled him "an important weapon in the ongoing war on terrorism". In 2005, he was hired by the former Mayor of New York, Rudolph W. Giuliani, to serve as the Chief Operations Officer of the International Division of Giuliani Security & Safety LLC, a division of Giuliani Partners LLC. He has also been a Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Mr Soufan is an Honors graduate from Mansfield University of Pennsylvania where he received undergraduate degrees in International Studies and Political Science. He is Magna Cum Laude graduate of Villanova University where he received a Master of Arts in International Relations.

Stephen White is a former chief officer in the British Police Service. He spent 26 years in a variety of command positions, mostly in North-

ern Ireland but he has also provided advice and served in a number of international roles – most notably when he served with the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority as Director of Law and Order, Southern Iraq from the summer of 2003 to January 2004. Departmental roles which he held in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Police Service of Northern Ireland included Head of Community Relations and Community Policing, and, Programme Director for the Change Management Team which planned and implemented wide scale police reforms following Northern Ireland's political agreement of 1998 and the subsequent peace process. In 2004, on retirement from policing, he took up positions with the Council of the European Union as Special Adviser to the Secretary General and High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Javier Solana) and Head of Mission for the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX). Since 2010 he has been a freelance consultant and also Vice President for Europe of The Soufan Group where his work has included research on countering violent extremism on behalf of the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies. Mr White holds a Bachelor of Social Science honors degree in Business Administration and a post-graduate diploma in applied criminology. He also obtained Masters degrees in Organisational Development from Queens University, Belfast and Criminology from Cambridge University. He was appointed an officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his services to policing in 2003 by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth. He also received the prestigious International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Webber Seavey Award for excellence in police leadership and law enforcement in 2008.

Lena Zhong is Assistant Professor at the City University of Hong Kong. She obtained her PhD. in criminology from the University of Hong Kong in 2003 and underwent post-doctoral training at University of Rochester in New York with a scholarship from the US National Institute of Health (2002-2004). Dr. Zhong has been an assistant

professor at the Department of Applied Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong since 2005. She has been involved in teaching criminology and sociology courses and supervising graduate students at CityU. Her research interests include crime prevention, Chinese policing (public and private); social control in China; cocaine abuse and quantitative analysis of crime data. Her book titled *Communities, Crime and Social Capital in Contemporary China* was published by Willan/Routledge in 2009. The book explores the theoretical and empirical dimensions of community crime prevention in China, examining in particular the role of social capital in a rapidly modernizing economic, social and political context. It provides a vivid picture of contemporary crime and crime control in China as well as analysing the very particular Chinese approach to community crime prevention.

1. INTRODUCTION

SUSAN SIM
CHAIR, RESEARCH COMMITTEE
NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL



THE CLEAR AND PRESENT THREATS

If 9/11 was the defining threat of the last decade, the next begins consumed by fear of a cyber 9/11. Both threats – one a virulent terrorism that revels in mass casualties, and the other an evolving cyber threat that runs the gamut from scams targeting vulnerable individuals to warfare waged by states – require resilient societies and global partnerships to counter and mitigate their consequences.

When the National Crime Prevention Council of Singapore decided to convene its second International Crime Prevention Conference (ICPC) in November 2011, the idea was to celebrate the spirit of community activism in working with the Police to keep communities safe and resilient. In an era of global travel and instant digital communication, it was also timely to remind ourselves that our public-private partnerships in fighting crime also need to transcend national borders.

Police forces have INTERPOL to bring them together to share expertise, pool resources and information, and coordinate joint operations. For volunteer-run, non-government organisations, forging global partnerships is a lot more woolly, more concept than practical. Most of our priorities are local, with local causes and local solutions; we are dependent on inspiring our local volunteers. But the intractable problems are increasingly transnational, and intractable because they are transnational. We cannot eradicate a crime that is planned and initiated thousands of miles away, even if the victim is in our midst.

As global citizens, we have crimes in common to battle. But being united in a cause does not give us a monopoly to do good nor the expertise for global governance even if we are not usually encumbered by the constraints of state sovereignty or national interest.

What we do best is to learn from each other, to create networks of trust, to create the illusion of an international movement of people united in

helping to uplift the vulnerable segments of our societies, and mobilised to help the good guys force the bad guys out of business.

International terrorism and cybercrime are two nightmares of our epoch that operate best in the interstices where national forces cannot reach. Unless national forces work together and in partnership with the communities they police.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001 forced a moral clarity on all of us. It was a “We are all Americans” moment, when a shocked world stood in solidarity with the victims of an audacious assault by a group of terrorists few had hitherto heard of. Yet few policy makers in the West, wrapped in the anguish of loss and anger, understood that the rest of the world saw the geopolitical shift that 9/11 heralded not just in “you are with us or against us” terms, but also that every nation state was equally vulnerable. As Ian Blair, a former Commissioner of New Scotland Yard, writes in this volume:

I, along with many others, initially framed this as an act of war, in our time and our watch, against the West and its values. ... the idea that 9/11 represented an assault with implications specifically for the West lingered with me for too long. I do not think I was alone. However, I was wrong.

New York and Washington DC were followed by Bali, Istanbul, Jakarta, Manila, Madrid, Khobar, Moscow, London, Amman, Sharm el-Sheikh, Algiers, Islamabad, Mumbai. ... The honour roll of cities struck by terrorists keeps growing.

But everywhere, the remarkable resilience of citizens has allowed good to triumph over fear. Everyday heroes have emerged to help neighbours survive, to rally their communities back to lives of normalcy.

This spirit of self-help is what drives many volunteer groups like National Crime Prevention Councils in many countries. Our *raison d'être* is

fighting crime. But in the post-9/11 world, all of us have become our brother's keepers; keeping our societies safe also means keeping out violent extremists from within and without.

Of course, not everyone agrees. The debate over how the "war on terror" should be waged continues even as, Ali Soufan reminds us, many national governments, working in partnership with their own communities and collaboratively with other countries, have over the last decade succeeded in thwarting many terrorist plots by al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates.

As the essays in this volume show, the possibility of cyber attacks now keeps many of our policy makers awake at night. Terrorism by organised groups can be fought. But the nature of the cyber threat is even more amorphous.

Al-Qaeda is estimated to have spent almost US\$500,000 on planning and carrying out the 9/11 attacks on the US that killed nearly 3,000 people. The estimated toll on human life in terms of earnings lost and insurance compensation was US\$24 billion. The cost of replacing destroyed and damaged property was US\$31 billion. Estimates of the economic impact range from US\$40 billion to US\$122 billion.

The New York Times calculates that the US has since 9/11 spent US\$3.3 trillion to beef up homeland security and funding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Put it another way, for every dollar Al-Qaeda spent to pull off the Sept. 11 attacks, the cost to the United States was an astonishing \$6.6 million."¹

The impact of cybercrime may perhaps be even more insidious. It is a clear and present threat. According to a survey cited by Adam Palmer in his presentation, 50,000 people fall prey to cyber criminals every hour. They lost a total of almost US\$274 billion in one year alone.

1 David Sanger, The Price of Lost Chances, *The New York Times*, September 8, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost.html?_r=1



It is up to us to figure out how to build these new partnerships.

We have not begun to calculate the cost of the cyber defences governments are being forced to put in place to protect critical infrastructure from attack, whether from criminal hackers, terrorists or enemy states. Yet it is clear policy makers fear these defences are barely catching-up with the technologies that can cause catastrophic harm to our economies, infrastructure and modern life as we know it.

StuxNet may be the face of the new asymmetric warfare being waged by states, but as Interpol President Khoo Boon Hui warns us, there are many less complex viruses targeting the ordinary consumer, and these malware are growing ever more sophisticated.

But precisely because cybercrime touches all of us in so many ways – whether it is email spam carrying viruses or offering scams, or the hacking of subscriber databases to steal credit card details, or the easy availability of child pornography on the Internet – there is a unity of purpose that allows for the forging of truly global partnerships to deal with this growing threat.

The INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation being built in Singapore will, Interpol Secretary General Ron Noble promises us, "present a great opportunity for all of us to work closer together, establish new partnerships, and act in a more effective and decisive way to keep our citizens safer than otherwise would be".

It is up to us to figure out how to build these new partnerships.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

ICPC 2011 gathered in Singapore a number of current and former police chiefs and leading criminologists as well as successful grassroots practitioners. Their presentations have been turned into essays for this volume.

The practitioners – police chiefs and civilians – spoke from their personal experiences. Many of their essays retain their first person voice – authoritative in their analysis and powerful in their insights and policy recommendations. The academics gave us the objectivity of theory and empirical testing. Their strong theoretical and conceptual treatments of the topics they addressed give the book a balance between practice and research.

ICPC 2011, however, offered few grassroots perspectives from the bottom-up. In hindsight, we should perhaps have devoted one or two plenary sessions to case studies of effective partnerships and discussions of the challenges faced by fellow national crime prevention councils in the region and elsewhere. As the member of the organising committee responsible for the programme, this failure is, of course, mine alone. Fortunately, fellow NCPC Council member Lum Hon Fye redeems this omission somewhat with his discussion of how the NPC Infocomm Committee developed and implemented a game to promote habits of cyber wellness among school children in Singapore. Despite the strong support NCPC usually receives from government agencies, getting on the school curriculum is very challenging, as he notes.

This book is structured into five sections.

The first on **Policing Global Threats** addresses the two defining threats of our time – terrorism and cybercrime. Khoo Boon Hui, President of the world's largest policing organisation, INTERPOL, reminds us why crime prevention now requires a global strategy with an overview of the new threats we face, especially in cyberspace. INTERPOL Secretary General Ron Noble then maps out how the INTERPOL Global Complex that will

open in Singapore in 2014 will not only develop innovative public-private partnerships to fight cybercrime, but also train police forces to deal with traditional crimes like corruption.

Ali Soufan and Adam Palmer then discuss the nature of the threats and predict their trajectories. Soufan, a former FBI supervisory special agent who investigated the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole and interrogated many leading AQ members, describes how the group has evolved over the years. AQ 3.0 is now focusing on local causes to recruit and stay relevant. Any successful strategy to deal with such extremism must thus lie in working with local communities, he argues.

In laying out the human scale of cybercrime, Adam Palmer, the lead cyber security advisor at Norton, cites survey results to show how most of us are still not taking adequate measures to protect ourselves online. Meanwhile cyber criminals are moving on to abuse social networks and attacking mobile devices while law enforcement officials struggle to keep up.

The second section, **Building Resilient Communities**, contains five essays dealing with the various aspects of the security-resilience nexus and how they are operationalised in different countries. Bilveer Singh sets the stage by explaining how the concept of resilience has jumped the disciplinary barrier from clinical science to being today's buzzword in national security studies. He goes on to explain how Singapore's innate internal and external vulnerabilities have led it to premise its national security policy on the need to develop and strengthen resilience.

Ian Blair, speaking of his own experiences leading the New Scotland Yard, discusses how fighting terrorism can lead to a crisis of police legitimacy if efforts are not continually made to remind the public that "the police are the anvil on which society beats out its abrasions, inequalities and fears".

This theme of building public trust and confidence are further expounded on by Taisuke Kanayama and Stephen White, drawing on their personal experiences with developing community policing in their own countries and elsewhere. Although the Japanese koban system is the model on which many other police forces, including Singapore, based their community policing strategies in the 1980s, Kanayama tells us it was not considered successful in Japan until revised significantly to keep up with changes in Japanese society.

For White, who not only specialised in community policing in Northern Ireland, but also helped implement community policing in Mongolia and in Iraq post-invasion, policing in partnership with the community is even more important in conflict zones and during troubled times, but only if the role of the police in society is clearly defined from the beginning.

One key aspect of the community policing approach is encouraging public cooperation, whether in terms of calling the police when they see a crime in progress and providing information, or helping to stop the crime. Sociologists call this a form of informal social control and it is usually strong in resilient communities.

But as Lena Zhong shows from a study of two communities in China, a high crime rate and fear of crime can inhibit bystander intervention.

The third section in the book turns to **The Singapore Story** with three essays describing the country's efforts in building a resilient crime resistant society to deal with traditional and emerging threats. It begins with an essay by Singapore Police Commissioner Ng Joo Hee who explains the drivers behind Singapore's obsession to keep already falling crime rates even lower. Ng gives credit to the strong partnerships the Singapore Police has developed with community groups, including the NCPC, for an activist culture of self-help in preventing crime. If there is a metric for measuring public spiritedness, the fact that public assistance has

accounted for four out of 10 arrests made in the last decade or so, may be one.

Chia Tze Yee's account of how the People's Association helps communities to build social capital picks up where Bilveer Singh's more conceptual treatment leaves off. The People's Association, Chia says, believes that generating social capital – defined in terms of trust in public institutions like the Police, confidence in systems of governance, networking and reciprocity among neighbours – will help to further build a resilient community based on mutual trust and understanding.

Lum Hon Fye, as described earlier, provides an example of how a volunteer group like the NCPC can be a bridge in helping the Police reach out to vulnerable segments of society, in this case young school children who may fall prey to predators on the Internet. By emphasising cyber wellness, the NCPC's Cyberonia project projects a less threatening face to a wider effort to prevent cybercrime.

The fourth section, **Use of "Old" and New Media**, reminds us not to forget more traditional tools like letter writing even as we take crime fighting to cyberspace. Paul Evans, formerly of the Serious Organised Crime Agency in the UK, provides serious insight into how organised crime has evolved even as he tells us entertaining war stories about how a letter writing campaign he orchestrated led to almost two-thirds of individuals involved in cocaine trafficking syndicates in the UK stopping their criminal activities.

But it is a different story with organised crime syndicates that are leveraging on the Internet. Bindu Sharma, from the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, describes how the Internet has allowed purveyors of child pornography to grow their customer base. Demand is so high that the number of children being victimised has increased too. "Policing the online environment is still in its early stages. In the case of online commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse, the "criminal" activity can be hosted in one country, the victims can be in another country, while

the offender accessing or purchasing such illegal images could be in yet another country.” Her group uses its networks of national centres around the world and partnerships with banks to follow the flow of funds and stop payments to the illicit enterprises. There have been successes, but more creative, non-traditional regulatory coalitions are required, Sharma concludes.

Nick O’Brien, a former senior British intelligence officer and Mick Keelty, formerly Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, look at the increasing prevalence of social media and how it can affect undercover police work. Citing the results of a survey they conducted, they show that the identities of police and intelligence officers engaged in covert work risk being compromised by private Facebook or blog postings. Indeed some recent cases in Australia have shown that defence lawyers are starting to troll the Internet for information about police officers testifying against their clients at trial. But social networking sites like twitter clearly do have a useful role to play in providing information to large groups of individuals quickly, whether for crime prevention purposes or in emergency situations. Police forces, however, have to establish clear rules on use of social networking sites by their staff.

The last section in the book – a special focus on **Tackling Youth Crime** – is an issue of grave concern to many societies. In Singapore youth gang activity occasionally roars into the media lime-light when fights lead to deaths or serious injury, resulting in a public outcry about the state of youth delinquency. In a keynote address at ICPC 2011, Minister of State for Home Affairs Masagos Zulkifli provides a sobering assessment of the scale of the problem and measures being taken to curb the problem.

The Singapore Police Psychological Services Division, led by Majeed Khader, provide a useful summary of the theories used to explain youth crime, in particular the risk and protective factors that work in concert to ameliorate or enhance youth offending behaviour. They caution

that without understanding these factors, certain intervention programmes might be counter-productive.

Investigative psychologist Louise Almond adds another warning: treatment and intervention programmes can be a public relations disaster when the public is more concerned with reducing their own chances of being a victim. But research has shown that punishment and deterrence approaches are not effective. Based on research into youths-at-risk of sexual offences, she argues that a needs-led assessment approach with tailored interventions may achieve better results.

And finally, Nancy Ng, who runs Singapore’s Central Youth Guidance Office, and Ng Kok Hoe discuss the welfare-oriented approach that Singapore has traditionally taken in youth rehabilitation with a comprehensive review of the principles, policies and practices.

NOTE OF THANKS

This book could not have been completed without the support of the contributors, who turned their presentations into essays; my research associate Jasminder Singh, who transcribed speeches; and NCPC Project / Administrative Executive Joanna Loke and Police intern Felicia Yue, who helped with copy-editing. Harish Kumar Janak Shah and Nash Tan of SCORE Digital Media were most patient as they supervised the design layout of this ebook.

I also owe much to Benny Lim, formerly Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs and now PS in charge of National Security and Intelligence Coordination, among other jobs, Interpol President Khoo Boon Hui and Singapore Police Commissioner Ng Joo Hee for their strong support of ICPC 2011, and especially for introducing me to many of the distinguished speakers.

And to all my fellow NCPC Council members, past and present, I am grateful for their encouragement and always inspired by their example of active citizenry in action.

The background features a light gray world map at the top. Below it is a large graphic consisting of several concentric circles. A thick white line forms a semi-circle on the left side of the circles. A vertical white line bisects the entire circular graphic. The text "POLICING GLOBAL THREATS" is centered horizontally across the middle of the circles.

POLICING GLOBAL THREATS

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF A GLOBAL STRATEGY IN CRIME PREVENTION

KHOO BOON HUI
PRESIDENT OF INTERPOL



CYBER ATTACKS FROM STUXNET

The Iranian nuclear programme is in the news again. The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finding, released in November, has indicated possible weapon development. Yet, it was only in January last year, when the IAEA investigators, having just completed an inspection at the uranium enrichment plant outside Natanz, Iran, realised that something had gone wrong. In the clean rooms where thousands of centrifuges were enriching uranium, Natanz technicians were scrambling to haul out centrifuges one by one, eventually replacing approximately 1000 of them.

What the inspectors did not realise was that the cause of the failures was deep in the memory of Natanz's computers. Months earlier, someone had secretly unleashed a sophisticated and destructive malicious software, or malware, that had been designed to sabotage the country's uranium enrichment program and prevent it from developing a supposed nuclear weapon.

It took months before dozens of computer security researchers around the world finally concluded that this was the most complex malware ever written. It made history as the world's first cyber weapon – Stuxnet. Stuxnet had been designed, not for espionage as everyone had initially believed, but for physical sabotage. The researchers were stunned. It was the first time anyone had come across the virtual world being used to physically destroy something in the real world. However, I don't think many of us here would be quite as surprised as Hollywood had already imagined such a scenario years earlier in a Die Hard movie. Reality had simply caught up with fantasy. Stuxnet was the virtual world's equivalent of the dreaded Predator - a surgical strike weapon that achieved its goal of delaying Iran's nuclear programme. There are secrets of Stuxnet that have yet to be discovered and this has got national security agencies worried about the vulnerability of their critical infrastructure.

So what has all this got to do with us – ICPC delegates, members of the law enforcement community and the wider public deliberating on the theme of Building Resilient Societies, and Forging Global Partnerships.

... TO SPY EYE

Well, Stuxnet was used in a very sophisticated cyber attack possibly initiated by a state actor. But today, criminals already have access to less complex viruses that are able to siphon money out of Internet bank accounts. You might recall the recent warning issued by the Singapore Association of Banks in September, when the malware SpyEye was discovered to be making its rounds here. The specially modified Singapore version of the SpyEye Trojan targets local online banking applications, by attempting to create a fraudulent third-party beneficiary to facilitate fund transfers.

Banks in Singapore are increasing their vigilance and monitoring of suspicious online activities, and have issued appropriate advice to the public. These include the need to regularly update anti-virus software and avoid using public terminals, such as at cybercafés, for transactions. Should customers suspect something amiss they should immediately close their web browser and contact their bank. The Singapore government has also announced that to enhance the security of electronic transactions, it will offer citizens upgraded security tokens for free for use at participating agencies and banks. Other banks have also announced intentions to upgrade their existing authentication systems.

SpyEye is a nasty piece of malware as it can harvest credentials from online accounts and also initiate transactions much faster than an average person manually can on the website. As a person is logged into his infected account, he can literally watch his bank balance drop by the second. I understand that banks around the world are now

SpyEye is a nasty piece of malware as it can harvest credentials from online accounts and also initiate transactions much faster than an average person manually can on the website.

analysing how a customer uses a site, looking at behaviours such as how many pages a person looks at on the site, the amount of time a person spends on each page, and the time it takes a person to execute a transaction. All these are being studied in order to block suspicious transactions more effectively.

THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF CRIME

But if open Internet sources are to be believed, SpyEye's authors are now trying to mimic how a real person would navigate a website to avoid suspicion. Interestingly, the SpyEye creators are also apparently designing countermeasures to defeat the efforts of SpyEye Tracker, a website dedicated to gathering statistics about this malware. As of early November, according to the SpyEye Tracker, 482 SpyEye command-and-control servers have been tracked with 204 online, a huge increase from just 20 active servers 6 months ago. We therefore need to continually educate the public on the latest trends and threats, so that they do not fall prey to such crimes.

The world is changing, and with it the way crime is being committed. Crime is becoming increasingly transnational. And now we have to deal with cyberspace where notions of physical and national boundaries have not been adequately sorted out and where criminal activity is increasingly rife. At the same time, we see the age-old problems associated with the illegal movements of people and goods across countries.

Law enforcement needs to keep pace and develop new means to tackle both these emerging and familiar threats. Technology is an enabler, and this is as true for criminals as it is for law enforcers, businesses and individuals. Are law enforcement agencies doing their utmost to maximize the advantage of technology?

THE ROLE OF INTERPOL

INTERPOL has identified potential gaps in our harnessing of technology and the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore expects to devise cutting-edge solutions to better address threats to our societies. The new complex aims to raise international police cooperation to the next level. Innovation and the deployment of modern technology, combined with capacity building involving non-traditional and traditional policing skills, will make a significant difference to the capabilities of all our police forces. The Secretary General Ronald Noble will be talking about INTERPOL's initiatives in this area and I will leave it to him to provide further details. (See Chapter 3.)

At the same time, INTERPOL remains committed to tackling all forms of transnational crimes with its current suite of tools and expertise, and working with various stakeholders. In 2011, INTERPOL co-ordinated a global exercise with 81 countries and international organisations to target the sale of counterfeit and illegal medicines on the Internet.

Operation Pangea aimed to not only disrupt the online criminal networks but also raise public awareness of the health risks linked to purchas-

ing medicines online. The operation focused on the three main components misused in the illegal website trade: the Internet Service Provider (ISP), the electronic payment system and the delivery service. There were dozens of arrests and the seizure of over 2.4 million potentially harmful medicines worldwide worth USD 6.3 million as a result of the operation. This is a good example of the collaboration needed between law enforcement, industry and NGOs. The crime was transacted over the Internet, but the execution involved a whole spectrum of supply chain players, and an intimate understanding of the movement of goods and services from warehouse to the consumer.

I am also glad to learn that this Conference is addressing the increasing involvement of youth in crime, and how social media can be used to counter crime. These days, give any young child a mobile phone and you will notice that he would start tapping and swiping it. For them every mobile phone is a smart phone; one that will open the doors to interesting games and innovative applications. For some of these youths, hacking could well be perceived as nothing more sinister than another online game.

For example, in June this year, a 19-year old boy was arrested for hacking into the UK national websites for law enforcement and music. He had formed alliances with a well-known hactivist group and conspired to commit virtual vandalism, from the comfort of his bedroom. He may have gotten away scot-free, if a rival group had not posted his details online in retaliation. A few weeks ago, the FBI arrested a bunch of Anonymous hackers for disrupting certain financial payment services. Among those arrested were a number of youths in their early 20s, and one below 18. Left unchecked, they could have been easily recruited into organised crime syndicates or turn into syndicate leaders themselves. Educating young users not only on how to prevent crime but also on how to stay away from crime is therefore of utmost importance.

In conclusion, crime prevention requires an increasingly global perspective, with the need for global partnerships at the government to government level, as well as public-private sector collaboration. Crime prevention is not only about awareness and education or learning how to use tools well, but also about developing new global solutions, anticipating new global threats and keeping pace.

At INTERPOL we recognise the new threats confronting our increasingly connected world. The global crime prevention perspective is also embodied in our vision and the new IGCi in Singapore is a clear indication of INTERPOL's global strategy to connect police for a safer world.

3.

THE INTERPOL GLOBAL COMPLEX: PAVING THE WAY FOR FUTURE POLICING

RONALD K. NOBLE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF INTERPOL



THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

In early 2014, the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation will be one of Singapore's new visible landmarks, whose purpose will be to identify cutting-edge ways in cyber security, capacity building and training, and in specialised crime projects to make the world a safer place.

Thanks to Singaporean authorities, this new INTERPOL facility will be located in a prime area of the city and benefit from top-level architectural design. I must say that I and all of INTERPOL's staff have been extremely impressed with the proposed design and so it is with great anticipation and enthusiasm that we are looking forward to 2014 for the opening of this new INTERPOL complex.

The INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation will not only be an architectural landmark, but first and foremost a law enforcement landmark – a landmark for crime prevention, crime fighting, and for a safer world.

Our world is changing at a speed that is difficult for human beings to comprehend.

One prime manifestation of our fast-changing world is the rise of the Internet and advancements in technology, which have resulted in most of us now carrying a mini-computer in our pockets or briefcases and in our having access to 'cloud computing', which breaks down data into billions of fragments dispersed in servers around the world.

Exciting new possibilities offered by this technology are revealed almost daily. But the very nature and pace of these new possibilities make it a gigantic challenge for law enforcement to combat the new crime possibilities opened by these same technologies.

I am sure that you remember the Mumbai attacks of 2008, whose third anniversary will be celebrated in less than two weeks, and that saw terrorists murder 164 innocent individuals and wound 308 others. Those attacks were coor-

minated through mobile messaging technology completely invisible to police at the time.

Ten years ago, only 8 per cent of the world population had access to the Internet — about 360 million individuals. Today, they exceed two billion. In 15 years, both the world population and the cyber population will grow by one billion more.

Think about the size and complexity of the invisible, intangible population of three billion that will stealthily cross borders undetected. These virtual travellers will fuel international trade, build new kinds of solidarity, enhance global awareness. But they will also spread scams, compromise sensitive data, sell illicit products, and share images of child sexual abuse.

This is just a small hint at the challenges that lay ahead of us to keep our citizens secure.

It is believed that the losses resulting from cybercrime are already bigger than the global black market for marijuana, cocaine and heroin combined.

Tomorrow, the anonymity in the cyber world will be both the promise of greater freedom and a global threat to prosperity and freedom.

Just last week, in an operation called Ghost Click, the Estonian police, in cooperation with the FBI and private company Trend Micro, reportedly cracked an Internet fraud ring that infected four million computers in approximately one hundred countries worldwide. The virus was redirecting web surfers towards websites selling unlicensed products and containing advertising for illicit product items such as fake medicines and fake anti-virus software, thus placing innocent persons at risk and damaging the interests of legitimate businesses.

THE FUTURE OF POLICING

The scope of this reported operation illustrates what I believe is the future of policing – international police cooperation in collaboration with the private sector.

And this is exactly what the Innovation, Research and Digital Security component of the future INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation will do – develop innovating partnerships across the public and private sectors to fight cybercrime.

Making significant advancements in securing the cyber world will be one of the primary challenges of this century. And for our efforts to be successful, we will need not only close cooperation among law enforcement, but also with the private sector.

At the core of this challenge will be the enormous task of rethinking identification. As traditional police tools such as pictures, fingerprints and DNA are ineffective in the cyber world, new ways will have to be developed to identify those who threaten others' freedom and security.

The immense challenges we face and the limited resources we have at our disposal make it an absolute necessity to be creative, to innovate, work closer together than ever before, and to adopt an open multisectoral approach.

While we are getting ready to face the challenges posed by cybercrime and cyber security, more traditional forms of crime are becoming increasingly difficult for police to address due to the ever more transnational nature of organised crime and terrorism.

That is why we are determined to continue developing the international cooperation capacity of police around the world.

For this purpose, the future INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation will also include a Capacity-Building and Training component.

The dedicated Directorate will boost training for INTERPOL National Central Bureaus and make use of new technologies to efficiently and widely share knowledge and best practices in police training and international police cooperation among the global law enforcement community.

But most importantly, the future Capacity-Building and Training Directorate will work at strengthening police capabilities where needs are the most pressing and where gaps in international police cooperation pose serious threats to regional and global security.

Take the example of Libya.

The country is just recovering from a civil conflict and has entered a very delicate democratic transition process.

It is not INTERPOL's business to get involved in political matters. But politics sometimes have important consequences on security and it is crucial that we remain vigilant in the wake of major geopolitical developments.

It is becoming every day more apparent that the civil conflict in Libya has led to an increase in weapons being made available to groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

It is also a known fact that Libya occupies a natural geographical bottleneck on migration routes from Eastern Africa to Southern Europe.

Terrorists and organised criminals take advantage of the absence of law and exploit countries with weak institutions as safe havens for their criminal activities, engendering further instability and threatening well beyond that country's borders.

In the case of Libya, it is urgent to assist the new Libyan authorities in rebuilding their law enforcement capability to enable them to fulfil their mission by efficiently and securely sharing information with police worldwide, including about the disseminated weapons and situation of foreign migrants in their country.

INTERPOL will create a dedicated Anti-Corruption Training & Integrity in Sport wing in the future INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation.

If one considers, following the NGO International Crisis Group, that there are approximately 70 areas of current or potential conflict around the world today, and that conflicts have an ever greater impact on regional and global security, one understands how critical it is to enhance global efforts in building capacity of police in countries recovering from conflicts or suffering from political instability and weak institutions.

Finally, capacity building and training are also crucial in addressing a crime that undermines the very fabric of our society – I am speaking of the crime of corruption.

INTERPOL has targeted one area of corruption with its historic agreement with FIFA. INTERPOL is designing a 10 year and 20 million Euro training programme for integrity in sports. Thanks to FIFA's donation, INTERPOL will create a dedicated Anti-Corruption Training & Integrity in Sport wing in the future INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation.

This new programme will undertake anti-corruption training initiatives aimed at improving awareness and understanding of corruption, including strategies used by perpetrators and methods to detect and counteract them. The programme will also focus on enhancing integrity in sport through prevention, education and training.

NEW PARTNERSHIPS

With the creation of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, we have truly exciting times ahead of us.

This Complex for Innovation, placed right here in Singapore, will present a great opportunity for all of us to work closer together, establish new partnerships, and act in a more effective and decisive way to keep our citizens safer than otherwise would be.

In the months to come, we will work at further defining its content. This will be the occasion for you to share with us your needs and ideas with regards to the activities that it will undertake in the near future.

INTERPOL is your organisation and, as such, so will be the future INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation.

With the new crime threats and age-old crime threats in front of us, it is essential that we build a collaborative global response, as only such a response will ensure the global security necessary for our development to continue.

In this regard, INTERPOL and its Global Complex for Innovation stand ready to work shoulder to shoulder with you for our common and collective well-being.

4.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: FROM THE BLACK BANNERS TO THE ARAB SPRING

ALI SOUFAN



THE EVOLUTION OF AL-QAEDA

What I would like to do today is to discuss the evolution of international terrorism, over the last ten years, covering how tactics and strategies used by the groups have changed, and how our policies similarly need to change. In the process I will also discuss the changing Middle East and Arab world, the so-called Arab Spring, and what this means for us today.

I was recently in Washington D.C. for a conference on the Middle East and after hearing some of the debates going on there, debates which are mirrored around the globe, I was reminded of a story that a U.S. senator liked to tell of a man who fell from the 30th floor of a skyscraper. As he tumbled through the air, down from the 30th floor, screaming, arms and legs waving furiously in the air, he passed a friend of his, who was on the 6th floor. As he passed, his friend shouted, “don’t worry, you’re ok so far.”

The senator was talking about economic policies and it is a lesson Europe and most of the world probably should have heard a few years ago, but I think it’s a story that equally applies to international affairs and international terrorism.

Let us take a closer look at the most notorious terrorist group of the last decade – al-Qaeda. While the al-Qaeda network that attacked on 9/11 was not a state, in many ways it acted like one. It had a highly-centralised command and control element and a defined territorial sanctuary.

After 9/11, we responded decisively. Hundreds of al-Qaeda leaders, operatives, and supporters, were killed or apprehended and its havens for training and planning were destroyed. With devastating swiftness, we effectively dismantled what was then considered al-Qaeda’s “center of gravity”.

However, the terrorist network adapted. A new al-Qaeda emerged, and with it, new strategic and tactical risks came to sight. Instead of the centralised command and control that had been its

trademark prior to 9/11, the al-Qaeda leadership switched its emphasis, from being the “Chief Operator” to taking the role of “Chief Motivator”.

It utilised new technologies, the Internet, videos, and the various productions of its media arm - al Sahab - to provoke and advocate its propaganda and rhetoric. The terror network’s focus turned to manipulating regional, local, tribal, and sectarian conflicts, to promote its interests.

It also “franchised” the al-Qaeda name. It began to encourage other terrorist groups, in places such as North Africa, South East Asia, and in the Middle East as well as those that emerged later, in places like Iraq, to operate under al-Qaeda’s Black Banners.

The death of Bin Laden changed al-Qaeda again. Bin Laden was al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda was bin Laden. Not only was he the leader, but he manifested its members’ belief that their version of Islam was correct, that terrorism was the right weapon, and that they would ultimately be victorious. It was his personal appeal that was central to al-Qaeda’s recruitment and fund-raising.

Ayman al-Zawahiri is a very dedicated individual, but he does not have the charisma, nor the personal story, nor the nationality, to really fill in for bin Laden. As an Egyptian, he is not going to be able to unify the Arabian Peninsula members of al-Qaeda under him.

The rivalry, and dislike, is intense. Al-Qaeda members I interrogated, for example, told me that Egyptian al-Qaeda members, and those from the Gulf, would not even play on the same soccer team together. That is a sign of the challenge Zawahiri is up against.

It is also interesting that Zawahiri’s promotion, announced on June 16, 2011, came via “al-Qaeda’s General Command” rather than just from “al-Qaeda”. This is something few people have paid attention too, but it is very significant. It reminds me of Palestinian groups; when they

Bin Laden's death also came at an especially bad time for al-Qaeda as it was already weakened by the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, during which citizens of countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, challenged their rulers to varying degrees of success.

used to splinter, one of which would be the "general command". Under Bin Laden we never heard of such divisions. This too gives you an idea about where al-Qaeda is today.

Bin Laden's death also came at an especially bad time for al-Qaeda as it was already weakened by the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, during which citizens of countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, challenged their rulers to varying degrees of success.

I was in the Middle East during that period, and one of the most striking things about the protests was the absence of al-Qaeda rhetoric among the demonstrators.

Al-Qaeda differs from many other Islamic extremist groups, in that its leaders urge people to focus on the United States - what they call the far enemy - rather than the rulers of their own countries - what they call the near enemy.

Bin Laden had been very successful in convincing other groups to ally with al-Qaeda and focus on the United States, claiming that was the best way to topple the regimes they opposed. But the Arab Spring showed that, contrary to al-Qaeda's narrative, hated rulers can be toppled peacefully, without engaging the United States. The Arab Spring made people realise that they can change their own destiny without blowing up embassies or taking hostages or killing innocent people, and when they do that, the West will also support them.

That was a very strong message.

It also became apparent that those rulers used the threat of al-Qaeda to justify to other nations their oppressive reigns, and to settle scores with other countries, and opponents. But the reality was very different and the veil of deceit was lifted.

The Arab Spring does not, however, mean that the future is looking good for our interests in the Middle East and bad for al-Qaeda, or other extremist groups based there.

We often hear the Arab Spring being compared to the birth of a new Middle East. That may well be true but we are yet to see what the baby will look like and I advise caution.

TWO BATTLING IDEOLOGIES

There are two types of ideologies on show, battling, in the Middle East. There is the mainstream that is usually the silent majority. They are mostly Muslims. They believe in Islam that is compatible with life, that wants to live peacefully with others, that teaches prosperity and the well-being of the community as the true earthly dimension of believing in God - the true religion of the Prophet.

But then there is a second Islam, one put forward by extremes, al-Qaeda on the Sunni side, and the clerics in Iran on the Shi'a side.

It is my belief that Islam itself was hijacked long before al-Qaeda hijacked planes. I trace the history of this "hijacked" version of Islam in my book, "The Black Banners", from Sayiid Qutb, right through to Ayatollah Khomeini, and bin Laden.

We are yet to see what the outcome of the Arab Spring will be, and which version of Islam will dominate in places like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

If the extremist groups that are trying to capitalise on the changes in the Middle East are successful, it will be bad news for those countries, bad news for the region, and bad news for all of us.

Back to al-Qaeda - where does all of this leave the group today?

While bin Laden's death and Zawahiri's promotion weakened al-Qaeda, neither event killed the group. Some of al-Qaeda's leadership council members are still at large. They command their own followers and are trying to launch operations to prove al-Qaeda's continuing relevance.

And with al-Qaeda on the decline, regional groups that had aligned themselves with it, may return to operating independently. And at a minimum we're seeing al-Qaeda splinter into regional groups, with differing command structures, aims and ways of running the group. This in many ways makes them deadlier, as they are harder to monitor, and have a wider scope of operations.

In this region, for example, you used to see al-Qaeda central work with elements of JI. Hambali, representing JI, working with Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, gave baayat, the oath of allegiance, to Osama bin Laden. Today, the allegiance of local groups, like JI, is no longer to al-Qaeda central, but to regional causes.

Let us explore this further and take a look at this new al-Qaeda, that we can call al-Qaeda 3.0 - the regionalised al-Qaeda. There is, for example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Qaeda in Iraq. And their focus is on their regions, and local issues.

This is a very different message from the message of the global jihad that was promoted by Osama bin Laden in 1996, which continued to be the slogan of al-Qaeda until 9/11. That focused on attacking the far enemy, namely America and

the West, rather than tackling local grievances first. Al-Qaeda of course has always raised local grievances as a way of recruiting people. It recruits based on local reasons, and then indoctrinates people, convincing them that the way to get their local aims is by focusing on the global jihad, steering them away, from the "near enemy" to the "far enemy", namely America and the West.

In a study we conducted at the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies – QIASS – we traveled round the world looking at how terrorist groups recruit. And just like they say in politics, that all politics is local, so too in terrorism.

TERRORISM STARTS LOCAL

All terrorism starts for local reasons. In fact, even Osama Bin Laden started with local reasons too. The title of his 1996 Fatwa, in which he first announced to the world his evil intentions, was about the occupation of Saudi Arabia, his country.

It always starts local. So too when we spoke to people connected to al-Qaeda in South East Asia. They were Jemaah Islamiyah, JI, operatives who were recruited because of the traditional local issues, such as the alleged attacks on Muslim villages by Christians in Indonesia, or establishing an Islamic nation in South East Asia and then al-Qaeda succeeded in switching them to the global jihad, to the "far enemy".

This, incidentally, is why many regional terrorists groups disliked al-Qaeda, because al-Qaeda would try and poach their operatives, taking them from the domestic focus to the global focus.

Today, it is different. With al-Qaeda 3.0, the regionalised al-Qaeda, while they're recruiting on local grievances, they're maintaining a focus on local and regional issues, and not switching, as before, to the global jihad. At least not yet.

And that is why we are seeing differences between these regional al-Qaeda factions. They operate differently, with different goals. It's no

longer a monolithic organisation that it was under bin Laden.

Look into al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for example. Its creation is actually a result of the successes the Saudi security services had in fighting al-Qaeda in the kingdom. Many al-Qaeda operatives escaped Saudi Arabia and went to Yemen and joined the al-Qaeda branch in Yemen, which incidentally is the closest to bin Laden's version of al-Qaeda, and they put together al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

But unlike bin Laden's al-Qaeda, if you look at al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, they have been totally focused on regional issues, on problems in Saudi Arabia, trying to assassinate Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, trying to take control of cities in the South of Yemen, trying to basically present themselves as part of the wider Yemeni opposition in order to hijack the perhaps legitimate causes of the opposition for their own sake. Something al-Qaeda did successfully in Iraq in the Sunni triangle and that they continue to do successfully in the tribal areas in Pakistan.

The South of Yemen, which has played second fiddle to the North since the civil war, under the reign of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, has been demanding equality, such as fairer political representation and they are also asking for help with economic development. Many of their demands are legitimate, as people in the south believe they have been mistreated. The Yemen government responded to protests in the South with force, pushing opposition groups that previously had not worked together, closer to each other.

This also gave al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula an opportunity to make their mark by seizing on the local grievances. Operating under the name Ansar al-Sharia, they have focused on religious and social services, making themselves both appealing and necessary. Their focus on the local grievances has been working, and it has brought people to their side.

A tribal leader, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Jifri, was asked why he was sheltering al-Qaeda fighters. He explained, and I quote: "The government agreed to send us six teachers. Fahd brought sixteen." Fahd is Fahd al Quso, who was involved in the USS Cole bombing team. Quso, who used to focus on the global jihad, trying to blow up a U.S. warship, is for now focusing on local grievances, and building up al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

If you look at al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, it is a totally different organisation from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and people join for different reasons. There, in the Maghreb, you have remnants of Islamic extremists groups in Algeria who were able to escape from Algeria. Now they've moved south and they operate on the border areas, with Niger, Mauritania, and Mali, mixing with some tribal elements there. This is a new development as far as authorities in the region are concerned, and now they are starting to pay more attention. Just on Sunday, the deputy Algerian foreign minister announced that intelligence reports show coordination between the Nigerian Islamist group, Boko Haram, and the regional branch of al-Qaeda - al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

We have been seeing the influence of al-Qaeda on how these local groups operate. Boko Haram, as you will recall, claimed responsibility, for the August suicide bomb attack on the U.N. building in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. Suicide bombings are new to Nigeria but not to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

These new regionalised al-Qaeda's operate differently, are aligning with local groups, and even the way they fund themselves is very different. In the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda is funded primarily through donations. But in the Maghreb, they do not have a lot of donations. They raise money through hostage taking.

And what these different regional al-Qaeda's are trying to do is different too. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, for example, is trying to cause chaos and a Sunni-Shia civil war and they are turning to people in

the Gulf to fund them, claiming that they are fighting for Sunni Islam and to protect the Gulf from Iranian influence in Iraq.

Because there are many different al-Qaeda's, we need different strategies to combat them. We need to develop unique local and regional strategies for local problems. There is no cookie cutter approach that can be imported from one country and used successfully in another. What works in Northern Ireland will not work in Tripoli. And what works in the North of Yemen, will not work in the South. And so on, often right down even to different areas in a single city.

LOCAL STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Just like extremist groups understand that different areas have their own factors that appeal to people to join groups and that sustain terrorism, so too we need to develop individual solutions, tailored to the uniquely local economic, social, political, and tribal incubators.

What does this change in how groups operate mean for us? Is it good or bad news? The answer is that it is a little bit harder to combat terrorism now, because we need to create more individual strategies.

But, at the same time, on the positive side, as their focus is more regional and less global in nature, it means that we know where they are targeting and recruiting, and what the trigger issues are. That, at least, is easier to predict, and good news for our counterterrorism efforts. So we need to have regional strategies, and within regions, within towns, and even within different communities, within the towns, we need to adapt our tactics and message, just like al-Qaeda's regional groups are doing.

A key component for any government, intelligence, or law enforcement, entity, to succeeding in carefully adapting the right local tactics and messages, and to neutralising local

threats, lies, of course, in successfully working with local communities.

Local communities are important for many reasons, as we all know, stemming from the fact that they are our frontline. They are the first who will notice when something changes, when people are being more extreme, or when a new tactic or new rhetoric by extremist groups are being used. We need them to alert us, and help us combat it.

At the same time, in the same vein, they will also see what is effective in cancelling that message, in combating the recruitment efforts of groups, in bringing people back into the mainstream, and diverting those misled back onto the right path.

Local communities can be our eyes and ears, and allies. If we work with them, understand their concerns, and help them too, it can be the most effective team, and what al-Qaeda, and other extremist groups most fear.

If you look at many of the best counter-terrorism successes around the globe, whether thwarted plots intended for the streets of New York, or plots in Iraq, our victories have come when we have worked with local communities.

Almost 10 years ago, the Singaporean authorities uncovered a local cell planning devastating attacks. Not only did they take the correct counter-terrorism measures, effectively dismantling the cell and tracking those involved, but the country also turned to combat the incubators, bringing in the local community to help deal with the underlying factors that gave fuel for the extremists to recruit and operate.

It is important for any policymaker trying to understand how to act, and what to do, to remember that the same lessons apply to all terrorist groups, whether in the Middle East, Africa, South East Asia, or Europe.

One group that because of the recent changes in the Middle East, is getting a second wind, and gaining in influence and power, is the Muslim Brotherhood. How the Brotherhood acts long

term, in places like Egypt, is key to whether the countries are peaceful, or take a turn for the worst.

Other violent groups, like the Haqqani network, which has gained a large amount of press coverage recently, are rising in prominence, as regional dynamics shift too. The Haqqani Network is led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, and operates on both sides of the Afghani-Pakistan border. While many in the West are just learning about the group now because of their involvement in attacks against NATO targets, the group has been around and active for decades, with links to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. They were involved, for example, in the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and after the Taliban came to power, Haqqani was given a cabinet post as Minister of Tribal Affairs. After the U.S. invasion, and the toppling of the Taliban, the group fled into the Pakistani tribal regions, regrouped, and then started attacking again.

When thinking about how to deal with a group like this, we need to understand the regional dynamics as well as local factors. The Haqqani Network has powerful supporters in the Pakistani government and intelligence services. The reason for this is that many in Pakistan view the group as key to defending its interests in Afghanistan. They know that once the U.S. withdraws, as it is set to do, other neighbouring countries like India, Iran, and Russia will seek to gain influence.

Developing a relationship with the Haqqani network, which is likely to be influential in a post-U.S. and NATO Afghanistan, is their way of ensuring this. So any strategy to deal with the Haqqani network needs to deal with the understandable Pakistani fear of what happens next door, after the U.S. leaves.

Local reasons, local incubators, local fears, and local histories, all need to be taken into account with whichever group authorities are facing, whether Boko Haram, the Haqqani Network, or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY

As I finish, I'd like to share a final observation. One of the most remarkable things in this war with al-Qaeda is how long it has lasted for.

There were 400 al-Qaeda members on 9/11. How has a group that size lasted longer than the 1st world war, the second world war and the Vietnam war?

To answer that question, we need to understand what we are up against. A vital strategic objective in asymmetrical warfare is for the terror network to win the hearts and minds of potential sympathisers and supporters, thereby gaining financial and logistic support, safe haven, and the ability to recruit new combatants. No asymmetrical organisation or movement can long survive, much less achieve its objectives, without a significant outside support system.

The actual bomb placers, and suicide bombers, are a small invisible and covert minority. They, however, are dependent upon the outer ring of supporters for money, supplies, safe houses, travel documents, transport and other services.

Supporters are drawn to the terrorists because they perceive them as champions of a pure Islam, warriors against the unjust. And also appealing are the social services they provide which are otherwise scarce or absent. As are the financial benefits they give, and so on, as we have seen being provided in Yemen, for example.

Our strategy should aim at decreasing the radius of this outer-ring of supporters as the most effective route to combating the ultras at the center. The smaller the ring is, the more successful we are.

Unfortunately, the wrong strategy or events can increase the size of this outer ring, leading to additional sympathisers, support and thus, recruits for the terrorists.

We will succeed only when we fully understand our enemy, how they operate, and why they have successes.

So it is said that if you know your enemies
and know yourself, you will win a hundred
times in a hundred battles

There is a story I tell at the start of my book, “The Black Banners”, that when the radio was first introduced in Saudi Arabia, conservative Wahhabi clerics denounced it as “the devil hiding in a box ” and the clerics demanded that King Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabia’s founder and ruler, ban the radio and behead the Westerners who had brought it into the country.

The king relied on the clerics for domestic support and could not just dismiss their demands. “If what you say is true,” he told them, “then we must ban the devil’s work, and we will behead those behind it.”

“And so,” the king said, “we will hold a public trial tomorrow about this devil box, and it will be brought before me.” The king then secretly told the engineers working on the radio to make sure that the Quran was playing at the time of the trial.

The next day, with the clerics present, the king ordered the radio to be brought before him. “Turn this box on,” he ordered and as it was switched on, passages from the Quran were heard. The king, pretending to be confused, turned to the clerics and asked: “Can it be that the devil is saying the Quran? Or is it perhaps true that this is not an evil box?”

The clerics conceded that they had been mistaken and there was no more labeling of the radio as the devil’s box.

As Sun Tzu wrote in the *Art of War*:

So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will win a hundred times in a hundred battles.

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5. **THE SCALE OF CYBERCRIME & HOW WE CAN FIGHT IT**

ADAM PALMER



THE VICTIMS OF CYBERCRIME

What is the threat of cybercrime? At Symantec, where I am the lead cyber security advisor, we did a survey and made some predictions based on the data that we saw in 2010. We have the largest global intelligence network that looks at data we made some predictions about the threats that we have seen and the threats that will emerge in the coming year. While we also talk about problems, we also have to talk about solutions. So I will talk about the programme that I manage which is completely free and designed to try and support and help global law enforcement to fight cybercrime.

A couple of the key trends that I will describe are based on a survey we conducted in 2010 of 24 countries and over 12,000 people. It was conducted by an outside independent agency with the goal that we wanted to get the most accurate

picture of the impact of cybercrime possible and we did not want it to be exaggerated. We wanted to get honest feedback from people of how they have been affected by cybercrime and what the cost to them was. So the results that I am showing you are the results from the survey that was just conducted.

The scale of cybercrime is what was most shocking: Over one million victims every single day. We identified them as **millennial males** – males aged 18 to 34 years old who use the Internet the most and maybe engage in some behaviour which puts them most at risk are most likely to be victims of cybercrime.

There are twice as many cybercrime victims every single day as there are newborn babies. There are almost 70% of people in our study globally who reported that they were affected by or were a victim of cybercrime.



Figure 1. The Human Scale of Cybercrime

Here in **Singapore**, 80% of the people reported that in their lifetime they had been a victim of cybercrime with 66% of people in Singapore reporting in our study that they had been a victim of cybercrime just in the last 12 months alone.

How did the global numbers breakdown and what does it really mean in reality? If you do the math, this translates to 50,000 victims every single hour, 820 victims every minute or 14 victims every second.

What are the financial costs? The financial cost was also shocking. The illegal drug trade that we estimated worldwide of heroin, cocaine and marijuana is roughly equivalent to US\$288 billion. The total cost of cybercrime that we calculated based on our survey is almost US\$100 billion dollars more at US\$388 billion. Almost US\$274 billion was total loss in cash as a result of cybercrime.

Figure 2 shows the breakdown annually by country, in billions of US dollars.

Here in Singapore, 80% of the people reported that in their lifetime they had been a victim of cybercrime with 66% of people in Singapore reporting in our study that they had been a victim of cybercrime just in the last 12 months alone.




Figure 2. The Financial Cost of Cybercrime

In Singapore the estimated annual loss due to cybercrime is approximately one billion Singapore dollars. You can see a comparison where the countries fall with the US currently leading with the largest loss due to cybercrime at US\$32 billion.

Figure 3 shows the responses that we received from emerging markets.

And as you will see again, Singapore with 80% of the respondents in our survey reporting that they had been a victim of cybercrime in their lifetime was among the top six victims of cybercrime out of 24 countries that we surveyed around the world. What is also interesting is that 85% of

people in our study of China reported that they were a victim and 80% from Brazil.

I think what you are seeing are two interesting facts. One is that **cybercriminals are victimizing their own people**. They may not be projecting crime from certain countries but they are also equal opportunists and victimizing their own citizens as seen in the high number of reported victims in these countries. What is the importance and what does this mean to people? About 41% of people in our study reported that they need the Internet in their everyday life and they are detached from their social network if they cannot use the internet.




Figure 3. Percentage of Respondents who were Victims of Cybercrime in Emerging Markets

Again, who are the victims of cybercrime?




Figure 4. Use of Internet by Baby Boomers vs Millennials

Based on our study, the most likely victims are millennial males. These will be males between 18 to 34 year old as opposed to their parents' generation, which is what we refer to as the baby boomers generation. The reason for this is that they use the Internet slightly more (see Figure 4) and they are likely to be a victim not only because they are online more often, but also because they are more likely to engage in some high-risk behaviour that may expose them to becoming a victim (see Figure 5).

The high-risk behaviour that I am describing might be looking at an adult pornography site or engaging in online gambling, which again might be the type of behaviour cybercriminals might target. Why does this happen? It is because the criminals understand that these victims will be less likely to report so they target sometimes this behaviour to launch their attack because they know the victim may not want to report that they were looking at adult content or they were gambling online. They might not even want to tell their family or make a report to the police. So it is a good victim and a victim for the criminal who is less likely to report if they themselves have been victimized.




Figure 5. Use of Internet - Male Behaviour vs Female Behaviour

PROTECT YOUR MOBILE DEVICES TOO

Sometimes Symantec is accused of exaggerating this threat. So I have described to you what some of the responses are which we believe are honest responses. But I think it is also striking that people ask is the threat increasing or decreasing. From 2009 to 2010, we tracked almost 100% increase – 93% to be exact – in web-based attacks. So we are seeing an almost annual doubling of malicious content online.

Interestingly about seven in ten people think they are more likely to be a victim of offline crime or physical crime. However we found in our responses they are three times more likely to be a victim of crime in cyberspace. What is happening in cyberspace that is being reported is a reality?

Going back to how criminals are reaching their victims, what we are now seeing is an **increased trend moving away from traditional attacks using personal computers to mobile phones.**

Mobile devices should be the term used. It includes tablets and phones. All these devices are targets for criminals. All the personal information is stored on phones. People are using phones to connect to the Internet; almost half of the people reported they use their mobile phones to connect to the internet.

Very few people have Internet security on their mobile devices. Less than a quarter of all people in our study reported that they have any type of security on their mobile devices. So even if they are getting the message to start using security on their personal computer, they are not thinking about security on their mobile devices but the bad guys definitely are because in our survey 10% of people have already been a victim of a mobile cybercrime.

In Singapore, unfortunately that number has doubled. 20% of people in Singapore from our

survey reported that they had been a victim of mobile cybercrime. So a mobile device is a very good target for cyber criminals. When you look at all the information – it stores not only our personal but also business information – and how many of us use a mobile phone or tablet computer not only for personal use but also for business use, **it provides an access point for an attack on an enterprise as well.**

Last year we saw a 42% increase in threats against mobile devices. About almost 40% of people reported that they had lost their mobile phones. So with all the personal information and all the information stored on these devices, not just educating people about a cyber threat is important, but also trying to help people to secure their devices so that when they are stolen, they can wipe out the data or have it secured.

This is an example I want to show you of an actual malicious application. This is an Android application that can be downloaded onto a phone or a tablet device. It is actually a game called Tap Snake. You pay US\$5 to get it and what it basically does is it turns your phone or tablet into a probe. You actually pay five dollars to play this game and every 15 minutes once it is downloaded onto your phone or tablet, it uploads your location to the cyber criminal and the only way you know this is if you see your wireless device being activated and sending a signal. This is a threat in many ways. If you are an executive, the criminals can track your location every 15 minutes. It puts in danger your physical safety and maybe your home could be robbed while the criminal knows that you are gone, that you are at the restaurant and they are able to track you by being able to track your mobile device which you have with you.

Case Study: Location Trojan Disguised as a Game

- **Name:** Tapsnake
- **Platform:** Android
- **Timeframe:** Aug. 2010
- **Security Issue:** Game app silently transmits GPS location without permission
- **Threat Description:** A few people noticed that the satellite indicator would pop-up when playing Tapsnake. Tapsnake is a Trojan that silently uploads data every 15 minutes to a remote server. A second paid app called 'GPS Spy', which costs \$4.99, can use the GPS data to monitor the location of the phone without the knowledge of the user.
- **Implications:** An attacker could know where you were, the exact location and time, at all times with Tapsnake.




Figure 6. A malicious application designed for tracking mobile devices

PREDICTING THE FUTURE CYBER THREAT

Where are we heading? Recently in Washington DC I attended the 30th anniversary of the birth of dot com. It was a celebration to celebrate the birth of the Internet. Some of the founders of the Internet were there and they were talking about the fact that right now the domain name system – the infrastructure for the Internet – receives about 10 million queries per second or nearly one trillion per day. There was a comment made that probably within the next year or two, because of increases in Internet traffic, that it is going to increase 10-fold up to 10 trillion queries per day. So I asked the question, do you believe we have secured the existing infrastructure and are willing to increase all this traffic and all this information by 10 times. It is a wonderful thought of a connected world with greater communication and certainly technology is not bad. Computers do not commit crimes but people do so; technology is not bad but it is being abused and that abuse is increasing.

Next year if you are unaware and do not follow it, we are going to see what has been called by some of the pioneers of the Internet industry one of the biggest changes to the Internet since its development with the release of probably dozens or hundreds of new top level domains. These are like dot com. You are going to see the release of all kinds of domain names spread all around the world and again it may be a good thing to increase communication, but it also a new landscape that will probably and potentially be exploited by cybercriminals.

Malicious activity continues to **take root in some of the emerging countries** such as Brazil, China and some of the countries shown before. The targeted attacks are focusing on enterprises and we are seeing attack kits which are making it easier for novices to use, as well as people willing to sell their capability to cybercriminals who will use those attacks.

There has been **no recession in the global underground economy for cybercrime**. This is still very good business for cybercriminals. Social networking plus social engineering equals a security nightmare.

We are now seeing great success by cyber criminals in **abusing social networks**. 73% of threats show urls. These are addresses people might click on and were malicious. They were clicked on 11 or more times. That is a significant successful attack when you have at least 10 victims clicking on. Your URL going to your website and you are going to infect that computer and ultimately steal that person's personal information or access their bank account.

We have seen attacks like Stuxnet that was mentioned earlier. This was the virus that was used to attack the and potentially attack the Iranian nuclear engineering facilities and nuclear engineering controls. **Stuxnet had a lot of unique advanced tools** that were part of that attack. We are now seeing variations of that in the wild potentially being used either by new states or cyber criminals who are using those same configurations now that we have seen in Stuxnet an ability to launch new attacks and potentially against new targets.

The average data breach in 2010 cost over US\$7 million, and about 85% of identities exposed in those companies attacked were customer data. (See Figure 7.) Over half of all phishing targets were banks. These are some statistics from the underground economy showing this continues to be good business for the criminals which again is bad news for law enforcement.




Figure 7. Cost of Data Breaches in 2010

There really has not been a recession in the underground economy. In fact the other economy that we are seeing emerge is not just selling banking credentials but actually selling the skill sets to launch these attacks. It is very good money if you have the skill set and you are willing to sell this to a criminal to use. I was recently at a law enforcement demonstration at a conference where within one hour they showed how you might do it. Within one hour you could set up your own botnet or pay people to do it for you. You literally pay every single part of that attack to be set up for you and launch it if you just had the most basic computer skills that you could pick up.

Within one hour you could set up your own botnet or pay people to do it for you. You literally pay every single part of that attack to be set up for you and launch it if you just had the most basic computer skills that you could pick up.

Figure 8 shows the top selling stolen items in the cyber black market.




Figure 8. The top selling stolen items in the cyber black market

PREVENTING CYBERCRIME: TRAINING, AWARENESS AND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

So what are people doing to prevent some of these attacks?

It is a shocking statistic for us that globally 41% of people do not use any type of security software which again might be the most basic step like using a safety belt in a car if you are concerned about an accident.

In Singapore that number is 43%. 43% of people in Singapore apparently, at least based on our study, do not take the very first step or the basic fundamental step to keep themselves secure online. Most of the attacks that we see like the viruses, malware and even some of the social engineering attacks could all be preventable.

That is the good news. It could be preventable if we had better education like good practices in safety and also having people use some basic tools to prevent cybercrime. The cyber criminal still likes an easy target. About 90% of people think we are letting cybercriminals get away with it.

I will tell you a story. A director of a European law agency said to me. He said the cybercriminals think that we are a joke. I think that is really shocking. It was said to me by a senior director of a major European country law enforcement group that he believed that cybercriminals think that the police are a joke and that there is little or

no consequence for what they are doing. I think the police are doing the best they can and doing a great job at many levels but the criminals are also making a lot of money. I am not sure if they feel significantly threatened yet on a global level and if there is police action or consequence to the crime.

I want to say that there is a solution. One of my favorite quotes is from the US industrialist Warren Buffett and he says predicting rain does not count but building an ark does. You can talk the bad about the rain but you have to find the solution.

With this in mind I want to describe something that we launched two years ago called the Norton Cyber Security Institute. This is the programme that I manage on a global level. It is completely free for law enforcement and it is designed because we know that you ultimately are the solution for fighting cybercrime and in making these criminal stop and feel like there is a consequence to their actions and it is not free money. The goal of this programme has been to create the leading anti-cybercrime programme **to train law enforcement to defeat cybercriminals** and to **raise awareness in education of the public about best practices and safety steps online**.

I want to emphasise this is not just a US programme. In fact the first training we held was in Colombia. About five months ago we hosted an event in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for over 120 police officers from 30 countries and often this is fully funded for the ones that attend with the idea that they will share their training and approve the programme.

I am also working on some data sharing projects. I actually share an office with some of the lead FBI cybercrime investigators back in the United States to pool our efforts. We are also working with some European law enforcements.

Last year we funded six European law enforcement officers to come to the United States for three months to work as a team along with the

FBI on specific cases. I am told there is great success as a result of that cooperation. But we want to make sure this is **a global effort**. We are partnering with non-profit agencies around the world to try to make this successful in not just training investigators but also training judges, prosecutors, investigators and to provide the data that can help you to be successful when you have good cases.

These are the partners that we are working with right now and you will see that there is an unfortunate 'hole', which I am hoping to correct by being at ICPC 2011 in Singapore. We do not really have a significant presence or very little from the Asian region and you are an important partner and valuable to us and that is what we wanted to show when we went to Malaysia a few months ago. I really want more Asian countries to become part of this programme and also you can find out how you can attend some of our training to support your efforts and how we can help you and your country to improve your fight against cybercrime.

Ultimately we want to stop cyber criminal groups from victimizing the people around the world and here in Singapore and as well as the Asian region. There are ways to stay informed and in contact with the programme. We have a free tool – the Cybercrime Index – where you can access a lot of data which is free and we also have blogs and our website where you can see different cybercrime threats. We did a full White Paper on the Stuxnet virus where you can read all the information about it and also about the variations that we are now seeing as a result of that.

At Symantec, we are working with you to stop the problem because ultimately you are the solution.

The background of the page features a light gray world map at the top. Below the map is a large graphic consisting of several concentric circles. A thick white line forms a semi-circle on the left side of the center. A horizontal white line and a vertical white line intersect at the center of the concentric circles. The text "BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES" is centered over this intersection.

BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES

6. **THE RESILIENCE - SECURITY NEXUS: THE CASE OF SINGAPORE**

BILVEER SINGH



INTRODUCTION

Resilience is a resource. If mined effectively, it can become a power multiplier. At the national level, it is the sum total of a state's tangible and intangible elements of power. Resilience reflects a kind of state power, if and when it is mobilised for a specific purpose, be it in a crisis or non-crisis, thereby enhancing a state's capacity in overcoming general or specific challenges. Though difficult to measure and quantify, it is something that, over time, can be identified as part of a state's DNA and hence, its power. A state, its leadership and people that are continuously prepared for the worst and never takes the 'good time' for granted, partly reflects this sense of 'resilience', largely accounting for, first its success, and second, when faced with challenges, the propensity to overcome them.¹ As was stated by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's former Prime Minister, "you must have a certain bounce, certain resilience, and a certain optimism that you can overcome these problems. Otherwise, you will give up".² Against this backdrop, this paper will analyse the concept of resilience and how it has been approached and mined with reference to developments in Singapore's security landscape.

1 For links between resilience and national unity in Singapore, see author's "Oneness in Many: national resilience in Singapore", *Biblioasia*, Vol. 7, No. 2, July 2011, pp.1-9. Some parts of this paper are also produced in this paper.

2 See *The Straits Times*, 21 June 2004

WHAT IS RESILIENCE?

Even though the concept of resilience has been long associated with clinical science, its conjunction with national security is relatively new, largely a post-911 development.³ However, in a generic sense, in Southeast Asia, President Suharto, through what has been dubbed the Suharto Doctrine, introduced the concept of National and Regional Resilience as one mechanism to ensure regional peace and security.⁴ However, in present-day usage, especially in the context of national security, it remains a highly underdeveloped, at times, contested concept. The rise in frequency and intensity of challenges, both natural and man-made, has compelled policy makers to think through not just how to prevent and pre-empt such disasters but even more importantly, how best to safeguard societies and key infrastructure so that the state bounces back to its pre-crisis situation quickly and resumes its functions in totality.⁵ This is the essence of resilience which defines the process of preparing and responding to threats that may eventuate.

In this context, resiliency is a multi-faceted concept. It is about distributing risks to avoid total paralysis if a disaster, say a terrorist threat, succeeds. It is also about absorbing natural and non-natural disturbances while preserving the functions, structures and identity of the sys-

3 See Anne Speckhard, "Civil Society's Responses to Mass Terrorism: Building Resilience", in Rohan Gunaratna, *Combating Terrorism –Military and Non-Military Strategies*, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004)

4 See Bilveer Singh, "Indonesia's Approach to Resilience", in *Resilience and National Security in an Uncertain World*, (Singapore: Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2011), pp. 82-90.

5 See Elgin Brunner and Jennifer Giroux, *Examining Resilience: A Concept to Improve Societal Security and Technical Safety*, (Zurich: Crisis and Risk Network, Centre for Security Studies, 2009), pp.6-11.

tem.⁶ In short, resiliency is about adaptability and preserving the essence of a society's identity and functions especially following stresses and traumas, whatever may be its cause, such as the Fukushima tragedy in 2011 in Japan. It also encompasses the notion that while it is imperative to prevent an attack from taking place; but if this fails to be foiled, it is equally vital to imbue a high degree of resilience in a society so that the government and people can continue to function and bounce back following a tragedy.

Nevertheless, resilience has emerged as an overarching concept that connects the social and natural sciences, on the one hand, and the academic and policy-making world on the other. It is highly complex, defying simple descriptions and explanations and yet has become vitally important for national security in all its domains. Increasingly, with wide-spread crises encompassing almost every facet of human existence, the term resilience has come to define a capacity that is able not just to withstand threats but probably more importantly, to recover following a disaster to a particular system, be it political, economic, social-cultural and even security system.

This is clearly reflected in the various dimensions of resilience one can glean from academic literature.⁷ In the field of geography, sociology and anthropology, the term 'community resilience' is often used. In computer science and engineering, one is familiar with infrastructural resilience. In biological sciences, resilience in biological and ecological systems is often discussed. In economics, economic resilience is

usually discoursed. In both economics and business studies, corporate resilience is increasingly focussed upon. In military and security studies, security resilience has become the buzzword. In developmental studies, livelihood resilience is the key focus. In geography and earth sciences, resilience in the face of natural disasters is the primary preoccupation. In psychology and clinical sciences, psychological resilience is the primary concern.⁸

In this connection, while the term first was used with reference to a child's response to traumatic events, eventually, it came to be generically used with reference to every sub-system's response to various traumas, be they in the political, economic, social-cultural or security systems.⁹ In view of the broadened use of the term resilience, it has increasingly come to dominate discourses on how both to conceptualise and navigate through various political, economic, social-cultural, environmental and security systems and the various challenges facing such systems. In this connection, experts have tried to identify what would constitute a resilient society, with various elements being discussed that would constitute the existence of a resilient security ecosystem.

6 See Ingrid Schoon, *Risk and Resilience: Adaptations in Changing Times*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.7; Gary Hamel and Lisa Valkangas, "The Quest for Resilience", *Harvard Business Review*, September 2003, pp. 62-75.

7 A good survey of these ideas can be found in Jonathan Rigg (ed.), *Resilience: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue*, (Singapore: School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, 2011).

8 Neil W. Adger, "Social and Ecological Resilience: are they related?", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2000, pp.347-364; G. Gallopín, "Linkages between vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity", *Global Environmental Change*, Vol. 16, 2006, pp. 293-303; C.S. Holling "Resilience and stability of ecological systems", *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 1-23; S.B. Manyena, "The concept of resilience revisited", *Disasters*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2006, pp. 433-450; Donald R. Nelson, W. Neil Adger and Katrina Brown, "Adaptation to environmental change: contributions of a resilience framework", *Annual Review of Environmental Resources*, Vol. 32, 2007, pp.395-419; C.L. Redman and A.P. Kingzig, "Resilience of past landscapes: resilience theory, society and *longue duree*", *Conservation Ecology*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2003, pp. ; G Wilson, "Multifunctional quality and rural community resilience", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 35, 2010, pp. 364-381.

9 S.B. Manyena, "The concept of resilience revisited", *Disasters*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2006, p. 433.

One of this is the 5Rs approach that analyses resiliency from the angle of robustness, resourcefulness, rapid recovery, remembrance of past lessons and re-visioning the future.¹⁰ The 4Rs framework is another that examines resiliency in terms of robustness, defined as the ability to resist or forestall a catastrophe; redundancy, with a society being able to provide alternative processes for its functioning; resourcefulness, where a society responds tenaciously to tragedies; and rapidity, being the ability to restore the ecosystem quickly.¹¹ There is also the 4Es concept of national resilience involving engagement between government and people, education of the people, empowerment which permits a society to react without necessarily being dependent on the government, and encouragement, where the people are prompted to do more for themselves rather than being always dependent on local and national authorities.¹²

While one may continue to debate how to define resilience, what is even more critical is the assumption that much needs to be undertaken to instil certain values and characteristics in a society so that when a tragedy happens, there is no paralysis, but a sense of unity and more important, a sense of purpose in getting back to normalcy in the quickest manner so that the society can re-function again. In short, resiliency is

10 Elgin Brunner and Jennifer Giroux, *Examining Resilience: A Concept to Improve Societal Security and Technical Safety*, (Zurich: Crisis and Risk Network, Centre for Security Studies, 2009), p.7.

11 See Michael Bruneau and K. Tierney, "Resilience: Defining and Measuring What Matters", Multidisciplinary Centre for Earthquake Engineering Research; and M.A. King and C.W. Zobel, "Applying the R4 Framework of Resilience: Information Technology Risk Management at Northrop Grumman", Southeast Decision Sciences Institute Annual Conference. Cited in Elgin Brunner and Jennifer Giroux, *Examining Resilience: A Concept to Improve Societal Security and Technical Safety*, (Zurich: Crisis and Risk Network, Centre for Security Studies, 2009), p.7.

12 See Charlie Edwards, *Resilient Nation*, (London: Demos, 2009), p.8.

about developing a capacity and power to forestall disasters, be they natural or man-made as well as to bounce back to a functioning system. The key challenge is not simply to securitize resilience but probably more difficult, how to socialise it. This is clearly borne out in the manner resilience has been operationalised in various settings. For instance, in the US National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism that was released in June 2011, the document argued that "to pursue our CT objectives, we must also create a culture of preparedness and resilience that will allow the United States to prevent or—if necessary—respond to and recover successfully from any potential act of terror directed at our nation".¹³ In this connection, the document stated categorically that:

*Al-Qa'ida believes that it can cause the United States to change course in its foreign and national security policies by inflicting economic and psychological damage through terrorist attacks. Denying success to al-Qa'ida therefore means, in part, demonstrating that the United States has and will continue to construct effective defenses to protect our vital assets, whether they are critical infrastructure, iconic national landmarks, or—most importantly—our population. Presenting the United States as a "hardened" target is unlikely to cause al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents to abandon terrorism, but it can deter them from attacking particular targets or persuade them that their efforts are unlikely to succeed. The United States also contributes to its collective resilience by demonstrating to al-Qa'ida that we have the individual, community, and economic strength to absorb, rebuild, and recover from any catastrophic event, whether manmade or naturally occurring.*¹⁴

13 See US National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: Dept of Homeland Security, 2011), p. 8.

14 Ibid

In the same vein, Philip Palin argued that a working definition of resilience could entail the following: “(1) the ability of a system to absorb or buffer disturbances and still maintain its core attributes; (2) the ability of the system to self-organise, and (3) the capacity for learning and adaptation in the context of change.”¹⁵ In terms of operationalising this in practical reality, Philip argued that some of the attributes that may encompass ‘resilience in practice’ are broad-based participation, collaboration, and deliberation; multilayered and polycentric organisational structures; networked organisational structures with mutual accountability built into how the network functions; content-rich and meaningful interaction regularly occurring across the network; and facilitative and/or catalytic leadership (in sharp contrast with authoritative or control-oriented leadership)”. These components are said to be fundamental to the implementation of any effective resilience strategy and only when most of these attributes are reflected in strategy, operations, and tactics will one’s homeland security generate dividends and long-term comparative advantage.

THE RISE OF RESILIENCE AS A SECURITY CONCEPT

While the term is relatively new, it is also clear that big or small states, particularly those confronting various vulnerabilities, have historically proved successful due to resilience. This refers to a special innate capacity to overcome challenges and more importantly, make it part of its national socio-political make-up and political culture, thereby enhancing its chances of all-round success and survival. This largely explains the success of states such as Israel, Switzerland and Singapore to immunise themselves from various internal and external challenges as well as to leverage on their various strengths, manage their weaknesses and come out stronger following a

danger.¹⁶ In a way, societies that psyched themselves to living in an environment of perpetual insecurity tend, over time, to develop a capacity that is highly responsive and adaptive to vulnerabilities, thereby enhancing their survival quotient.

An important feature that has developed is the transformation of a state’s approach to acquiring security. Historically, the time-honoured approach was to adopt a highly robust resistance strategy, which, following the recognition of a perceived threat, to develop defensive and response counter strategies to prevent the threat from eventuating. However, with the complexity of new threats, arising from conventional and non-conventional sources, the resistance approach is no longer tenable, as evident from the United States’ inability to prevent the 911 attacks. Instead, the new strategy is premised on resilience, involving a whole array of counter-measures that includes prevention, response and recovery. In the new complex and uncertain security setting, the new strategic doctrine assumes that it is not always possible to prevent threats and traumas, and it would be more prudent to develop strategies that would be able to absorb the threats and recover following it. As such, in terms of resource allocation, it is equally as important to invest in threat prevention as in quick recovery, with national security now premised on both prevention and recovery.

16 For example, see Bilveer Singh, “A Small State’s Quest for Security: Operationalising Deterrence in Singapore’s Strategic Thinking”, in Ban Kah Choon, Anne Pakir and Tong Chee Kiong (eds.) *Imagining Singapore*, Second Edition, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp.114-115.

15 Philip Palin, “Resilience: The Grand Strategy”, *Homeland Security Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 January 2010, p. 10.

THE RESILIENCE-SECURITY NEXUS IN SINGAPORE

Unlike many other newly independent states, in approaching how to organise the state, its people, community and eventually nation, Singapore made special efforts to ensure that national accommodation was achieved by leveraging upon its populace's diversities as well as imbuing a sense of 'oneness in many'.¹⁷ Through concerted efforts and socialisation, national resilience in Singapore is about developing an enduring capacity to cope with acute challenges and more importantly, to recover, bounce back and come out even more enduring than it was prior to the crisis.

While Singapore is not the only heterogeneous state in the world, yet by many counts, it is one with deep, acute and dangerous fault lines, which, if not carefully managed, can easily destroy the nascent state with less than 50 years of national independence. On racial, religious, language, cultural, economic and even historical grounds, the differences among Singaporeans cannot be sharper than they are. For many, Singapore will always remain an artificial construct as the pulls and pushes of differences and diversities have made the task of nation building an onerous one. Not only are racial and religious differences sharp, even more critical is Singapore's limited geographical space with almost zero natural resources and being located in a perpetual border pressure zone between two large but not necessarily friendly Malay neighbours, Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the south. Singapore is also highly dependent on the outside world for its basic resources, including water, not to mention the trading state's investments and markets. With multiracialism, meritocracy and equal opportunities as the key paradigm and bedrock of societal management, Singapore

stands out as a world-class successful 'Chinese Island' in a 'Malay Sea', making geopolitics an extremely important determinant in national and international relations.

With multidimensional crises a perpetual feature that the political leaders and people have had to face since the Second World War, peace and prosperity are not features that anyone in Singapore can take for granted. The difficult and dangerous past is a constant reminder that challenges, many of which can happen quickly without warning, are just looming over the horizon. To survive, the political leadership and people have developed 'special genes', defined today as national resilience, if Singapore is to continue not just as a prosperous state but even to preserve its statehood. History is littered with examples of not just dysfunctional and failed small states but also how many have disappeared, being absorbed for one reason or another, by their larger neighbours. Hence, the unstated motto of 'against all odds' that not just conjures the dangerous past but even more important of what could happen if the political leadership and people failed in overcoming the many 'black and white swans' that can emerge to challenge the Republic's prosperity and sustainability.

LEVERAGING RESILIENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Ascertaining from various challenges in the past, in 1984, the Singapore Ministry of Defence introduced the concept of total defence, which later permitted the easy inter-face of national resilience to be adopted and adapted as an important ingredient in enhancing national security. Learning from the experience of countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and Israel, there was a clear realisation that both traditional and non-

17 See Bilveer Singh, "Oneness in Many: national resilience in Singapore", *Biblioasia*, Vol. 7, No. 2, July 2011, pp.1-9.

Psychological resilience literally underpins national resilience as modern warfare, especially terrorism, is essentially psychological in nature.

traditional security threats could undermine the security of a state. Thus, it was not sufficient to be militarily strong but the nation's racial, religious and cultural cohesion, and economic power were also invaluable security assets. In this regard, total defence encompassed military, civil, economic, social and psychological defence, representing the five critical sectors of any society. In some ways, these were both the hard and soft critical infrastructure of the Republic and strengthening them required a whole-of-government and whole-of-society collaboration.

As resiliency is more about traits, grit and determination of individuals and groups in a society, this easily dovetailed into psychological defence under the concept of total defence. However, following the outbreak of the Asian and Global Financial Crisis, the terrorist threat and SARS, resiliency was widened to encompass various key elements of society, with the main focus being on social, psychological and economic resilience as military and civil defence were strongly embedded and in place. Social, psychological and economic resilience were spotlighted as a nation that is strongly imbued with these elements will permit it to bounce back quickly in terms of identity and a functioning entity.

Psychological resilience literally underpins national resilience as modern warfare, especially terrorism, is essentially psychological in nature. This requires individuals in a society to maintain a sense of personal control and to take ownership of their lives. This also involves the maintenance of strong links and ties with other people in a society as well as society's causes, ideals and

beliefs. In short, psychologically, one must never give up. While it is difficult to measure how psychologically resilient a society is, nevertheless, looking at the recent Japanese attitudes towards the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster, it involves an individual's confidence in weathering crises, being ready for crises, a particular mental toughness as well as responsible social behaviour. At the wider societal level, this would involve mining a state's social capital, sense of community spirit, volunteerism and making sacrifices for others, as was demonstrated by the nearly 50 workers at the Fukushima nuclear reactor complex who continued working despite being exposed to radiation, in order to secure northern Japan from radiation exposure.

Linked closely to psychological resilience is the ascending importance of social resilience. This is premised on the notion that for a state to overcome a crisis and bounce back from tragedies, the people must remain united. For Singapore, being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, this is all the more challenging in view of past experiences as well as the continued efforts to build inter-communal harmony and trust. Social resilience will be achieved as long as cohesion among the various racial and religious groups is maintained, which in the end, will ensure national resilience. In this regard, especially following the discovery of terrorist cells in the Republic in 2001, various efforts have been undertaken, including the launch of the Community Engagement Programme, Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles, Harmony Centre, National Security Comic Book and National Resilience Proficiency Badge. There are also concerted

efforts to engage the nation's youths mainly to inculcate sensitivities about each other so that bonding of the nation begins in a bottom-up way and in the long run, builds a cohesive nation that did not experience the challenges of the 1950s and 1960s. Schools also celebrate Racial Harmony Day annually to imbue the value of racial and religious understanding and tolerance.

Equally important, as Singapore is essentially a trading nation and without any natural resources, sustaining the economy, especially in a crisis, is vitally important for its survival. Here, economic resilience becomes an important element of national resilience. Aside from the government, though an important player in the national economy, the role of the private sector and business community is important in ensuring Singapore remains a resilient nation all the time. In this regard, Singapore's economic well-being has been maintained by investing in various security hardening measures as well as formulating policies to ensure business continuity in times of crisis. A number of initiatives have been introduced including the launch of a Safety and Security Watch Group, an Industry Safety and Watch Group, Corporate First Responder, Project Guardian and Business Continuity Management. The goal of all these initiatives is to ensure that economically, the Republic remains resilient even if there are natural or man-made disasters, able to keep the wheels of the national economy functioning.

At the same time, through a whole-of-nation approach, education, mass media, housing policies and community leaders have been mobilised in such a manner as to positively function so that a 'one heart beat' culture can emerge. This is a very challenging endeavour due mainly to the immense diversities that are obtained in the Republic, something further aggravated by the liberal migration policy that Singapore adopted in the last decade and a half. Most importantly, the schools have been mobilised in order to imbue national values that will help to bond the

nation, with national education as the key pillar in this regard. Today, almost every aspect of the school curriculum is in one way or another linked to national education, and the learning outcome following 10 years of basic education is an individual who is socialised and sensitised about the highly diverse people and vulnerabilities that are being confronted by the state. Probably more important in this regard, especially once an individual is inducted for National Service, is the question of not what the country can do for you but what you can do for your country. This is the beginning of how seeds of national resiliency are being planted for the long-term resilience and survival of Singapore. This is further underpinned by the government's tough policies of policing society to ensure racial and religious harmony is maintained. This is pursued through an unstated philosophy of 'uniting what can and should be united, and not trying to unite what cannot and need not be united'.


RESILIENCE AS THE BEDROCK OF NATIONAL SECURITY

It has become increasingly evident, especially in the post-Asian Financial Crisis, post-SARS and post-911 era that enhancing national resilience to man-made and natural calamities has become a dominant, if not, the key theme in operationalising a national security strategy. This partly stems from the realisation that a society might be unable to safeguard itself from the various multifaceted threats and as such, it should develop resiliency to overcome a trauma, as and when it is hit by one. In short, in addition to robust resistance strategies, it also develops defensive mechanisms to prevent, respond and recover from potential threats. As has been argued by various analysts, the rising focus on resilience "marks a shift from resistance strategies focused solely on the anticipation of risk and the mitigation of vulnerability to more inclusive strategies that integrate both resistance (prevent, protect)

and resilience (respond, recover) in the face of disasters”.¹⁸

Thus, it is not sufficient to focus attention and resources on the government alone but also on the communities within a polity in order to ensure the emergence of a resilient state. This has led to efforts, not just to ‘hardening’ of critical infrastructure but also to ‘social and community building’ in order to ensure that the sum total of a state, namely, the people are united in the face of internal or external threats.

In the Singapore context, while traditionally, the government had assumed almost total responsibility for national security, with the launch of total defence and its widening, through resiliency-based approach, a whole-of-society pillar has been added to the whole-of-government approach. While the government can undertake ‘hardening’ of critical infrastructure to ensure that key identifiable systems are protected from attack, at the same time, by ‘hardening the populace’, the ‘soft anchor’ of society - namely the people - national resilience will be ensured. The aim is simple – the government will try to resist any threat from surfacing – yet, when it does eventuate, the society will also have to partake in managing it as only then will the state be able to recover and bounce back. This has led to emergence of a national security approach that is fundamentally premised on national resilience.



This has led to efforts, not just to ‘hardening’ of critical infrastructure but also to ‘social and community building’ in order to ensure that the sum total of a state, namely, the people are united in the face of internal or external threats.

18 See Patricia H. Longstaff, Nicholas J. Armstrong, Keli Perrin, Whitney May Parker and Matthews A. Hidek, “Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for Assessment”, *Homeland Security Affairs*, Vol. 6, No 3 (September 2010), p. 2.

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7. **CRIME, TERRORISM AND POLICE LEGITIMACY: THE UK EXPERIENCE**

IAN BLAIR



9/11 WAS AN ASSAULT ON ALL OF US

I have a particularly acute memory of where I was during the afternoon of September 11th, 2001, which was in the underground control room of the UK government, known as COBR. In that room, I saw the towers of the World Trade Centre crash to the ground one after the other and it was there that I then learned of the attacks on the Pentagon and the downing of Flight 103, as they happened.

I should add that I was also there for a never to be forgotten moment when we were informed that there were a number of airliners coming in to UK airspace from the Atlantic, displaying distress signals. A few minutes later, it turned out that these were the British aircraft which had been turned round in mid-Atlantic by the US authorities. However, it gave many of us in the room enough time to consider, at that particular moment as the airliners headed towards us, whether sitting somewhere very near 10 Downing Street was entirely sensible.

From the very beginning, it was obvious that this was the most audacious terrorist attack in history. It was also one of the cleverest, in that it was launched against a visible and potent symbol of Western power, part of the capitalist dream. As has been said, it was an assault on “a monument to faith in the civilising magic of affluence”.

The result was that I, along with many others, initially framed this as an act of war, in our time and our watch, against the West and its values. It certainly looked like it. That position did not last long, as it rapidly became apparent that the concept of a “war on terror” was deeply unhelpful in the UK, whatever resonance it had in the US, because it gave the undeserved status of soldiers to criminals, many of whom were British subjects, against whom war by their government is meaningless.

Nevertheless, the idea that 9/11 represented an assault with implications specifically for the West lingered with me for too long.

I do not think I was alone. However, I was wrong. I was in India when Osama bin Laden was killed. A great deal of the reporting in Europe and the US of bin Laden’s death suggested that, while it represented the end of an epoch and raised many questions, bin Laden himself and, indeed, the organisation of which he became the symbol, had for a long time been of little significance. One major London magazine had on its front cover, under a photograph of bin Laden, the sub-heading “Why Al-Qaeda was already dead in the water”. Inside, writers declared that bin Laden had long been irrelevant and, while acknowledging that “attacks will be carried out and his fans will try to keep the flames alive”, the Arab Spring had by-passed AQ and all that it stood for.

I was again in India on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, this last September. The anniversary brought more wall-to-wall coverage splashed across the world. The US President did say that AQ still represented a threat to the United States – but then what else could Obama say, as had he said anything else and there had been an attack on the anniversary inside the US, he would have lost all credibility. However, most western coverage did not take that line, seeing the anniversary, first, through the lens of personal accounts of loss on that terrible day, then of the wars it spawned and their consequences for the US and its allies, and then through the developing story of the Arab Spring. Just as in May, al-Qaeda was represented as having been largely defeated. In effect, the message was that Osama bin Laden is dead. It is 10 years since 9/11. The West thinks it is nearly over and that the fat lady is coming on to sing, apparently in Arabic.

That was not at all how the picture appeared from India, either in May or September. I doubt it does from Singapore or anywhere else in this region.

I can tell you that the Arab Spring – the overthrow of tyrants in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and the unrest in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen – does not register very strongly on the Indian sub-continent. Furthermore, many there believe that Jihadism, as they term it, has both the resilience to survive and, indeed, to prosper from the death of its founder. Al-Qaeda means *the foundation*, in the sense of the base from which an edifice is built up.

THE VIEW FROM INDIA

As you all know – and I only use them as an example – the Indians have troubles very particularly of their own: Kashmir remains inflammatory; a long-running and not so low-intensity conflict with Maoists in its central states rumbles on with many deaths, while largely tribal insurgents battle the Union government sporadically in Assam and the North East. None of these are considered as significant a threat, however, as the developing cohesion of different strands of Jihadism, particularly if that coincides with one of their own indigenous conflicts.

And it does over the issue of Kashmir, as part of the larger picture of relations between India and Pakistan.

It is a good place from which to see the wider global pattern of international terrorism. From India, the Middle East and even Palestine/Israel are certainly of less importance than Afghanistan and, even more so, Pakistan: indeed, as being not much more significant than the collapsing states around the Horn of Africa. From a perspective somewhere around the Indian Ocean, the epicentre of terrorist activity swings East and, in the middle of the pattern, is the reality and the influence of AQ.

And what India knows is that AQ is an inspiration not only to its subsidiaries, such as Al-Shabab in Somalia, but also to groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba the Taliban just over its borders, who share little of its ideology but deeply admire both the cruelty of AQ's search for mass casualties and its worldwide reach. As Audrey Cronin remarks in her recent book, *How Terrorism Ends*: "No previous terrorist organisation has exhibited quite the elasticity, agility and global reach of AQ, with its fluid operational style based increasingly on a common mission statement and brilliant media campaign, rather than on standard operating procedures and a pervasive operational structure."

It is different. As Cronin's language implies, al-Qaeda is the worldwide terrorist brand and worldwide brands prosper.

In India, it is consequently commonplace to describe the many terrorists antipathetic to its policy and sometimes existence, those who claim to represent one or other of the plethora of groups operating out of the Afghan/Pakistan borders – with a bewildering range of acronyms – simply as **Al-Qaeda/Taliban**. That was the very description used in connection with the 18-hour attack and gun battle, little noticed in the West, in late May 2011 on the Pakistan Naval Air Force base at Mehran near Karachi. The attack was claimed to be in revenge for the death of bin Laden on the base previously thought to be entirely secure.

The Indians fear that the next attack may be on one of Pakistan's nuclear facilities, military or civil – or one of their own. They know that AQ has inspired both the Taliban and the Kashmiri terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. They know that Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami, the group that claimed to have attacked and caused many deaths at the High Court in Delhi in September 2011, seems to have recently merged with al-Qaeda, as well as having close links with Lashkar-e-Taiba. And they also knew, before it was revealed in the Headley trial, that Lashkar-e-Taiba, originally a separatist group concerned only with Kashmir, had planned

attacks as far away as Denmark, let alone Mumbai and Delhi.

For India, bin Laden is not a shadow but a malign presence. Many, many informed Indians to whom I have spoken see what is happening in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan as the direct result of incompetent and unnecessary western foreign policy and intervention and they bitterly but quietly resent it. However, they now fear, most of all, that the West will use both bin Laden's death and the 10 year anniversary of 9/11 to declare "Mission Accomplished" again and leave the sub-continent to deal with the dragons' teeth sowed by "the war on terror". I am sure that this view has resonance throughout this region.

So why am I telling you all this, some of which you will recognise immediately. Because I think there are some lessons from the 10 long years the west – not forgetting Bali and many other atrocities here – have endured and I thought I might set them out.

THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

The first is that we all need sometimes to say more loudly that **policing is important**. An effective and impartial police service is a fundamentally necessary underpinning of an effective democracy.

All over the world, the police are the principal agency empowered to use force against the citizens of the nation. Just as in the case of the rule of law, the absence of a properly functioning police service is an indication of a failed state. A police service that serves only one political party or politician is the emblem of dictatorship. As a great predecessor of mine, Sir Robert Mark, once remarked:

The police are the anvil on which society beats out its abrasions, inequalities and fears.

And, in our time, the greatest of those fears, across the world, is that of terrorism. And the main point of this paper is concerned with the

interface and connection between, on one hand, the work of police agencies in countering the many different faces of terrorism and, on the other, the potential impact of such work on the very legitimacy of those agencies.

During my service, I saw the reputation of Scotland Yard torn to shreds, at different times, by corruption and by racism. And I have seen that great force haul itself back to legitimacy, as it attempted, slowly but largely successfully, to overcome those two great aberrations.

But each generation faces new threats and it has fallen to us, it seems to me, to confront a new twist. Corruption and racism are simply wrong and can have no place in a modern police service. But in our time, we are struggling to contain a monster called terrorism, in a new and terrible guise. I believe that our challenge is that **our efforts to overcome terrorism** contain within them an element which, unless its toxic nature can be properly treated, **can threaten the very legitimacy of the agencies involved in the struggle**.

All over the world, democratic states are struggling with the tension between civil liberties and the first duty of any state – that of protecting its citizens from death and serious harm.

In Britain, that debate is cast as one between those who uphold those fundamental freedoms, to privacy, to a family life and to the right to a fair trial, among others, which are enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, which the British largely wrote and have fully adopted, and those who argue that the overriding right must be to stay alive, free, as far as possible, from the risk of being blown up.

In Britain, as elsewhere, different political parties adopt different and sometimes confusing positions on this issue, with the traditionally right wing British Conservative Party now adopting a more liberal, libertarian position than that of the normally left wing Labour Party. Newspaper commentators proclaim from both positions and **the public itself is divided**.

Politicians and commentators are not in the position, however, of the police. The police are the anvil. They are at “the hot gates”, as the poet T. S. Eliot once put it, referring to the ancient battle of Thermopylae, where the Spartans held the pass against all odds. Thermopylae means “hot gates” in Greek.

What the police actually do in terms of terrorism and how what they do is circumscribed and described actually matters. And it matters because of this.

In 1984, the Irish Republican terror group, the Provisional Irish Republican Army or PIRA, tried to kill the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, at the annual Conservative Party conference. They failed, although they killed and maimed others.

Afterwards, an anonymous spokesman for PIRA said something which, to my mind, has forever defined the **essential dilemma of combating terrorism**. Admitting the failure to kill the Prime Minister, he said this:

You have to be lucky all the time; we only have to be lucky once.

The debate over liberty and security is not a new one. One of the towering figures of the American Revolution in the late 18th Century, Benjamin Franklin, remarked that:

Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and will lose both.

Nearly a century later, an even greater American, Abraham Lincoln, faced by the dilemmas of the American Civil War, disagreed; he commented that:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.

I am with Lincoln primarily because, while both of our nations have faced terrorism for many years, the gravity of the threat we face at present means that “our case is new” and we must both “think and act anew”.

I want to illustrate this by comparing the British experience of combating Irish terrorism during the later decades of the 20th century with the reality being faced today in terms of international terrorism.

“THE RULES OF THE GAME HAVE CHANGED”

There are a number of differences between what were rather quaintly called “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland, which, despite the name, led to the deaths of more than 3500 people and spilled on to the British mainland, as opposed to the threat currently posed by international terrorism. In my view, they are these:

- 1 With rare exceptions, Irish Republican terrorists (and their less effective Loyalist opponents) **did not seek to die** in the attacks they were planning.
- 2 They **did not normally seek mass casualties**, let alone think in terms of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material. They only tried to bomb the London Underground once, rather half heartedly.
- 3 Most of the time, they **gave warnings** of attack.
- 4 Especially towards the end of the campaign, their organisation was almost entirely **penetrated by British intelligence**.
- 5 A **negotiating position**, however unpalatable, was available: PIRA were bombing their way to the table, not just blowing it up. And
- 6 Their quarrel was of almost **no interest to anyone else**.

This last point is of real significance. To most people outside the areas in which specific nationalist terrorist groups operate, the quarrels of Basque separatists or the arcane distinctions of South Ossetia or the nationalist aspirations of the Tamil Tigers are opaque and very specific to their locality. So too with the quarrel in North-

ern Ireland. In 1919, Winston Churchill, writing after the end of the horrors of the First World War, described what then happened, in what was still the whole of Ireland under British rule, in the following terms:

But as the deluge subsides and the waters fall short, we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions that has been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world.

No one else cared, except the Irish diaspora abroad and the British who did not know how to answer the agony for more than a century. But what we all face now is very different from this, something not seen in the long history of terrorism, and then not on such a scale, since the anarchist movements of the early 19th century. We face **a global and nihilist threat**.

For instance, central al-Qaeda has suffered many reverses, one very recently: its leaders are in hiding, those that survive, but its inspiration and its message remain vibrant and universal. Its message resonates across an interconnected world, across continents and through national borders. It can reach not only its adherents, not only those criminally attracted to extremism and violence, but also some of the lonely and the unbalanced, using new methods of communication, outlining new causes for anger and despair, suggesting new dreams of fulfilment and offering new tools of attack.

And AQ is an inspiration not only to its subsidiaries, such as Al-Shabab in Somalia but also to those sometimes affiliated and sometimes opposed groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba the Taliban and, indeed, to those groups who share none of its ideology but deeply admire the cruelty and violence.

A month after the bombings of July 2005 in London, the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, remarked that **"the rules of the game have changed"**. That view would have been echoed in

Madrid and Bali, Casablanca, Istanbul and Mumbai, even before the awful events of November 2008 and even more strongly thereafter. All over the world, democratic governments have tried to strengthen their defences against terrorism, both in terms of new and adapted laws and in the increase in the capabilities and indeed numbers of agencies designed to defend their citizens.

But all of their efforts took place under the shadow of the "War on Terror" announced by the then US President, George Bush. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the twin towers, that did not look unreasonable.

But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed outraged many, not only in the Islamic world. Rightly or wrongly, a pervasive sense has developed in the West of citizens being misled on the route to wars, which themselves are not capable of successful closure. In many other places, the voices of dismay are much louder. It should never have been described as a war. Such a war would never really end and would involve fighting one's own people. **Terrorists are criminals, not soldiers**.

But as a result of terror being defined through the prism of war, particularly an unpopular war, everything that we as police did to combat those who would attack our public is seen by many in a much wider context, as aiding an attack on Islam or, at the very least, as unnecessarily giving up long cherished and hard fought for liberties and therefore helping the terrorists to degrade our democracies.

I will not try to unpack further the reasons for those views but now consider the impact of them on the police, which I see like this. While we see ourselves as trying desperately to defend the public, the public are not sure. Certainly in Britain and I would suggest elsewhere, the police's very legitimacy is under question because of public scepticism over the tactics the police believe they need to use and the changes in law which they have supported.

And the terrible problem is that what is involved here is not the kind of extreme repressive response to terror, which all terrorists hope to provoke from governments. This is not about responses, including arbitrary and unlimited detention without trial, the authorized or accepted use of torture, the use of government death squads and the setting aside of the rule of law. These are ostensibly well thought through measures being put forward by democratic governments yet widely regarded as illegitimate by a considerable proportion of the public and intelligentsia. The key is found in an examination of the nature of police legitimacy.

THE NATURE OF POLICE LEGITIMACY

Dr Justice Tankebe is an expert on post-colonial policing in Ghana, now working at Cambridge University. His work makes clear that the legitimacy of the police is not based solely on their adherence to laws but on a **delicate balance between police behaviour and public acceptance**. Drawing on the work of Jean Marc Coicaud, currently Director of the United Nations University in New York, Justice Tankebe puts forward the view that:

Police legitimacy is the recognition of the moral rightness of the police's claim to authority.

He further argues that that recognition by the public is always conditional and can be either nourished or squandered. It is nourished both by conformity to rules of procedure and by the justifiability of the rules, in terms of shared beliefs between police and public.

Perhaps the most striking validation of his proposition is supported by two studies in 2001 in New York by Professors Sunshine and Tyler. Their first research, conducted in the early part of the year, found that trust in the worthiness of what police were doing was almost entirely controlled by a belief by the public that the police followed the rules and that the rules were fair. Then 9/11 hap-

pened, so the researchers repeated the study in the following months and, fascinatingly, found no difference.

If that is not enough proof, then it should be noted that nine years later, in 2010, Tyler and others repeated the study again, this time only with Muslim New Yorkers, long years after the “War on Terror” was unleashed with all its consequences, and again found no difference in respondents’ views. The key to police legitimacy and therefore to our effectiveness clearly seems to be a set of **shared beliefs between police and public**.

In Britain, in the face of the London bombings of 2005, which killed 52 innocent people and injured hundreds more and which themselves were both preceded by and followed by a series of other plots – including failed suicide bombings, an attempt to use the poison ricin, a conspiracy to kidnap and behead a British Muslim soldier on leave from Afghanistan and then post a recording of the beheading on the Internet, and a further plot to blow up simultaneously a number of American transatlantic airliners with the potential of causing many thousands of deaths – the British police were reeling at the magnitude of the threat. They were pleased – and said so publicly – when the Government of the day brought forward legislation to extend the length of police detention of terrorist suspects and other measures, including the introduction of stop and search powers without direct suspicion to deter terrorists from reconnaissance.

But a considerable group of the public saw all of this as being part of an unwanted and inappropriate war. The opposition sensed this and condemned such measures. The until then very popular Prime Minister, Tony Blair, took a 90 day period of pre-charge detention forward into Parliament in November 2005 and lost his first vote after eight years in office.

By chance, one of a regular series of meetings of senior members of the British Cabinet with police chiefs and the heads of the security services happened to be scheduled for the next day. As

The Prime Minister asked, perhaps partly to himself: “How can we persuade people of the seriousness of the situation?” The Home Secretary – the British Minister of the Interior – looked at him and said: “Perhaps we could broadcast that briefing?”

usual, the meeting began with an assessment of the terrorist threat from the British Security Service. Quite simply, this was the bleakest summary of a threatening situation I had ever heard, made worse by the clear acknowledgement by the BSS that this was unlikely to be the whole picture and there were almost certainly further plots which had not yet been detected. The Prime Minister asked, perhaps partly to himself: “How can we persuade people of the seriousness of the situation?” The Home Secretary – the British Minister of the Interior – looked at him and said: “Perhaps we could broadcast that briefing?”

I tell that anecdote only to illustrate one of the ways out of the dilemma I am describing. Not that I am suggesting that we should broadcast intelligence briefings but that the provision of information to the public is the fundamental clue to helping the police retain a compact with the public about what measures are necessary in the face of an unprecedented threat of mass casualty terrorism, together, of course, with scrupulous fairness in carrying them through.

But in Britain it proved extremely difficult to get such messages across. The police have been a traditionally silent service and all this had become a very political and media driven argument. I am no shrinking violet but I was very surprised by the ferocity of the attacks on me and other colleagues when we attempted to put forward the case for strengthening the legal provisions about terrorism. The intellectual case was clear. We were no longer facing the IRA. We were facing a threat many times worse.

In relation to periods of extended pre-charge detention, others and I thought we were presenting a clear-cut, operational and balanced case, which went something like this. On discovering a suspected plot, because of what we knew from earlier cases about the dreadful gravity of the terrorists’ intentions, police had to act earlier than we might have wished in terms of gathering evidence. We could not risk waiting: the airliners plot I mentioned earlier was a case exactly in point. What this meant, however, was that we had to arrest everybody who seemed to be involved rather than being able to concentrate on the ringleaders; we therefore had to sort out who was really involved and who was not. We faced difficulties with languages, often dialects, and we faced encrypted computers that had to be broken and we always needed to make international enquiries in every case. We needed more time. Those were our dilemmas – you will have your own.

It proved impossible to make that case and those opposed to the measures denounced the police in the most strident and often partisan terms. In many other times, I think the general public and media view would have been in support but, in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, these were no ordinary times.

I have no doubt that this controversy damaged the reputation of the British police for fairness, especially among the Muslim population. Our very attempts to protect the citizenry were alienating them. There was a strain in the shared belief between police and public.

I have told this tale at length because it is the dilemma of our times for our profession and I would only urge on you the desperate need to understand the delicacy of the legitimacy of our work and to do what you can, whenever you can, to provide the most detailed rationales for the way you work and especially for any changes in legislation and practice you believe necessary to tackle terrorism in our midst.

I should add that, facing these difficulties, our next response was to return to our roots and massively expand our community policing endeavours, in order to demonstrate our support to all communities, including Muslim communities who saw themselves as being unfairly under collective suspicion. That would be another lecture but, like the effort again and again to explain what we sought to do to strengthen our defences against terrorism, it is an attempt to get alongside the public.

After all, Sir Robert Peel, who founded the British police in the early 19th Century – and inadvertently gave them their historic nickname of Bobbies, which is a shortened form of Robert, said that:

The police are the public and the public are the police.

And after all this time, he has to be right, doesn't he?

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8. **BYSTANDER INTERVENTION AND FEAR OF CRIME IN GRASSROOTS CRIME PREVENTION IN CHINA**

LENA ZHONG



THE LITERATURE ON BYSTANDER INTERVENTION

There are two perspectives on bystander intervention. The first is bystander intervention as prosocial behaviour. The second is bystander intervention as informal social control. I guess most people have seen these pictures and heard about the stories.

Picture 1 shows a woman who was stabbed to death in 1964 in New York City. No one came to help her or did anything to intervene while she was being killed. Nearly 50 years later in 2010 a very similar case occurred in New York City. A man called Mr Tale-Yax died on a sidewalk in New York City and dozens of people ignored him while he was lying on the street. (See Picture 2.)

Since the 1960s a lot of studies have been conducted to investigate bystander intervention. The notable researchers are two social psychologists: Latane and Daley. They developed a 5-stage model of bystander intervention:

First, you notice the event.

Second, you interpret it as an emergency.

Third, you assume personal responsibility for the event.

Fourth, you feel competent to help, and

Finally, you offer help.

In this model there is also an important concept – bystander effect. This concept means someone is less likely to intervene in an emergency situation when other people are present (and thus able to help) than when he or she is alone. That means the number of bystanders present in the emergency is one of the situational factors identified in the studies since the 1960s.

There are various situational factors including the ambiguity of the situation, the cost involved in the intervention, the severity of the victim's distress, the victim's level of dependency, the style of the request for help, the degree of threat presented by the situation, and the physical attractiveness of the victim. In terms of the situation factor of



Picture 1. Kitty Genovese. "Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police", *New York Times*, March 27, 1964



Picture 2. Mr Tale-Yax. "Dozens Ignored a Man Dying on a Sidewalk in Queens", *New York Times*, April 24, 2010

Should fear of crime be one of the situational factors for bystander intervention in community crime prevention?

physical attractiveness of the victim, I guess it is not difficult for us to understand why a physically attractive woman is more likely to receive intervention. Research on situational factors for bystander intervention has raised strong doubts about whether social norms or personal characteristics are important in predicting bystander intervention in crime or other emergencies.

So I would like to raise this question:
Should fear of crime be one of the situational factors for bystander intervention in community crime prevention?

INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROLS IN CRIME PREVENTION

We now turn to the second perspective of bystander intervention as informal social control. For example, bystander intervention in an ongoing crime like calling the police or assisting the victim is a manifestation of informal social control at the community level. The literature has shown the importance of informal social control at the community level. According to the social disorganisation theory, the amount of informal social control at the neighbourhood level is associated with the degree of crime and violence in the community. Samson and colleagues have also conducted a very influential study in Chicago to demonstrate that collective efficacy is related to the reduction of violence at the neighbourhood level. In their study they defined collective effi-

cacy as neighbours' willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good in combination with social cohesion among neighbours. Therefore, collective efficacy also manifests a form of informal social control.

Now let us look at bystander intervention or non-intervention in China. In fact, active intervention by bystanders in crime and other emergencies is highly commended in communist China. But the economic reform era since the 1980s has seen widespread reports of bystanders' apathy to crime and other emergencies. This kind of bystanders' apathy or indifference has been cast as corrupted morality, conflicting values and even ideological crises in transitional China. Legal scholars in China even debated the possibility of holding people criminally liable when they fail to act in emergencies. In 31 provinces in China, ordinances or regulations have been made to encourage "good Samaritans". But at this stage it is very difficult to operationalise the ordinances or regulations. Media and newspaper reports have shown that those who dare to intervene, whether by alerting the victim of impending danger or by stopping the offender, have suffered brutal retaliation by offenders and their accomplices. At the same time, since the 1980s China has witnessed a soaring level of crime and a heightened level of fear of crime.

For this study, a survey was carried out in two contrasting communities in Shenzhen.¹ Why do I regard the two communities as contrasting? Community A was rated excellent in a local community crime prevention program of the BLSCC, which stands for Building Little Safe and Civilized Communities. Community A is also a middle-class community and it has a very low level of crime. In contrast, community B was rated pass in BLSCC. It is a low-class community with a very high level of crime.

The most important measure – bystander intervention was measured by asking what actions a

1 This paper is based on research conducted by the author and published in the International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. See Zhong (2010).

respondent would take if she or she is a witness to a pickpocketing event. The respondent will be given a vignette. Here is the vignette:

You are walking in your community in the afternoon. A man is walking slowly, in front of you. He is in his twenties, of a small stature, and dressed like a construction worker. There is an old lady in front of him. Suddenly you see the man steal a purse from the old lady. There is no one else around. What will you do?

Here we remove any bystander effect by emphasising that the respondent is the only witness to this incident ("there is no one else around").

We have two hypotheses. The first is respondents with higher fear of crime are less likely to report intervention when they witness a crime. The second hypothesis is respondents from community A would be more likely to intervene than those from community B. We also control three demographic variables including age, sex and education. We included education because it

has a strong emphasis on moral education and indoctrination of doing good deeds in China. Thus education can be used as a gauge for the level of moral education in China.

Table 2 shows the results. Fear of crime and type of community stands at 1%. Gender and age are comparatively insignificant, while education has no significant effect. From these results, we can conclude that those who have higher fear of crime are less likely to intervene should they witness a crime. On the other hand, those from community A are more likely to intervene if they were to witness the same crime. Females and those above the age of 55 are physically weak and thus less likely to intervene. But we have to interpret the results with caution because the two variables are only of slight significance. We cannot use education level to predict bystander intervention.

Table 2 Regression Analyses of Bystander intervention

	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	2.77** (0.79)	2.67** (0.87)
fear of crime	-0.86** (0.32)	-0.93** (0.33)
Type of Community	1.16* (0.46)	1.40** (0.53)
Gender		0.70 †(0.40)
Age above 55		-1.26 †(0.70)
Education		-0.14(0.50)
Observation	211	211
LR statistic	28.66	34.70
McFadden R-squared	0.14	0.17
HL test (1989)	9.33	4.05
p-value	0.32	0.85

The results can be discussed in terms of the two perspectives of bystander intervention. The first one is bystander intervention as prosocial behavior. Fear of crime is an important situational factor in predicting bystander intervention. It is because of bystander's fear of crime that inhibits their tendency to intervene in crime. This is in consistent with media and newspaper reports which show the price that interveners had to pay for their actions, e.g. retaliation from the criminals or their accomplices. The slight significant effects of age and gender suggest that intervention in crime, as a form of prosocial behavior, might be different from other types of prosocial behaviors. It is because intervention in crime incurs social risk and also requires a certain level of physical strength. The insignificant effect of education questions the use of moral education and ideological indoctrination in China. It also questions the use of simply casting bystander non-intervention as corrupted morality in China.

The second perspective is bystander intervention as informal social control. In community A, it has a lower crime rate and a higher level of informal social control. For community B, it has a higher crime rate and a lower level of informal social control. So the results support the theories on the relationship between the level of crime and informal social control at the community level. Skogan (1986) used a flow chart to show the importance of fear of crime and informal social control at the neighbourhood level. Fear of crime can cause individuals to withdraw from community life (both psychologically and physically). Then it stimulates and accelerates neighbourhood decline. By doing so, the informal social control at the community level is being weakened. Finally, it produces a decline in organisational life and business conditions in the neighbourhood. This is why it is important to look at fear of crime and informal social control at neighbourhood level.

But we have to conduct further studies. For example, we should include more communities instead of only two as in this study; we should investigate alternative explanations for the community differences regarding informal social control in general and bystander intervention in particular. In terms of methodology, future studies should use a multilevel approach to include both community and individual level factors, in order to be more comprehensive.

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9. THE CHANGING NATURE OF COMMUNITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY POLICING IN JAPAN

TAISUKE KANAYAMA



INTRODUCTION

As Bayley (1991) described in his classic book, *Forces of Order: Policing Modern Japan*, the Japanese people have long enjoyed one of the safest societies in the world. One contributing factor has been a community-oriented policing based on *Koban* police box system. In recent years, however, social changes have undermined some of the conditions that sustained safe communities, such as the strong bonds among citizens and the spirit of reciprocal help and public service. Urbanisation, motorisation, and the rapid development of information technology have also had negative effects in some communities. As a consequence, the “myth of safety” in Japan burst at the end of the 20th century. Beginning in 1995, crime increased for seven consecutive years, and in 2002 the number of recorded penal code crimes peaked at more than 2.8 million, more than twice the number for 1980. The Japanese Police was also strongly criticized for a series of scandals, including some which resulted in the death of crime victims because of improper police responses. In response to these criticisms, the Japanese police undertook several major reforms to include a change in policing strategy in many communities. This paper briefly describes traditional community policing in Japan, the subsequent process of transforming the strategy for policing in communities into a strategy to build safe communities, and the outcomes based on statistical reviews of the current crime situation.

JAPANESE POLICING IN COMMUNITIES: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Until 1992, the Japanese police did not officially use the expression *Chiiki Keisatsu* (“community policing”) but instead used the term *Gaikin Keisatsu*¹ to describe its strategy for policing in communities. Japanese policing in communities is characterised by its *Koban* or police box and *Chuzaisho*, wherein local officers actually reside with their families in a small, local police station. Police officers staff the *Koban* around the clock, 24 hours a day. On the other hand, an officer deployed to *Chuzaisho* works basically during the daytime but lives with his family at the *Chuzaisho*, always ready to respond to any emergency that might arise in the precinct.

The history of *Koban* and *Chuzais* dates back to the time of the establishment of a modern police system in Japan. In 1874, when *Keishicho*, the Metropolitan Police Department, was established in Tokyo, *Kobansho* (designated places where policemen stood watch shifts) were set up at major intersections and other important locations in Tokyo, and permanent booths were installed at these locations. In 1881, the name of these booths was changed to *Hashutsujo*. Subsequently, this police box system to other prefectures. At that time, 330 police boxes were established, manned by 2,042 officers.

In 1888, the Ministry of the Interior issued an administrative ordinance to all prefectures, requesting that *Chuzaisho* be set up in every town and village. After that, national police officers were permanently deployed throughout the entire country.

1 A literal translation of *Gaikin Keisatsu* is “outside police”, which refers to the police units and their activities in the community.

When an officer visits a house or business, he or she gives advice regarding crime prevention, including information about crimes and accidents in the area. In addition, the officer listens to the opinions and requests of residents.

In 1897, there were 1,255 *Hashutsujo* and 11,047 *Chuzasho*. Thereafter, *Koban* came to be used as a nickname for *Hashutsujo*, and in 1994, it became the official name for police boxes. As of April 2010, there were 6,232 *Koban* and 6,847 *Chuzasho* throughout Japan.

Community police officers carry out various activities delegated to *Koban Chuzasho*: patrols, responses to emergency calls, door-to-door visits, and consultations with community members. All of these help to create good relationships between the police and the community through frequent contact.

Patrols are performed basically on foot or by bicycle, sometimes by motorcycle or car. The main purposes of patrols are law enforcement and other activities to improve community safety. Law enforcement activities include questioning suspicious persons, arrests of criminals, prevention of juvenile delinquency, and traffic control. In 2009, the number of criminal arrests by community police officers, excluding traffic law violators, was 284,277, which represented 85% of the number of total criminal arrests. Other activities to improve community safety are gathering information in the community, contacts with community members, including the exchange of greetings and the dropping of patrol cards into residential mailboxes at night.

All emergency calls are received at the command control centre at each prefectural police headquarters. In turn, the centre dispatches patrol cars or community police officers on duty to places of emergency when appropriate.

The precinct for each *Koban* is divided into several areas. Each area is assigned to a community police officer for door-to-door visits. That is, the community police officer conducts a visit to every house and business in the assigned area. When an officer visits a house or business, he or she gives advice regarding crime prevention, including information about crimes and accidents in the area. In addition, the officer listens to the opinions and requests of residents. For an officer deployed to a station in the *Chuzasho* system, the area for *Shokanku* is basically the same area as for the precinct.

Communication is a key aspect of any contact between community members and community police officers, such as patrols, door-to-door visits, and so on. Community police officers provide all necessary information to members of the public. And when the officer finds a problem affecting the community, he or she brings the problem to the community itself to be resolved locally.

Because sharing of information is an important function of community police officers, every *Koban Chuzasho* publishes a local newsletter to communicate community safety issues, including reports of crimes in the precinct.



Koban in the 1910s



Koban in Tokyo in 2010s




Chusaizho in Tochigi

CHANGES IN SOCIETY AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON COMMUNITIES

After World War II, the Japanese Government promoted industrialisation; rapid urbanisation and motorisation followed. Many labourers moved from agricultural areas to urban areas. As Figure 1 shows, in 1945, there were only six cities that had more than 200,000 inhabitants, and the total number of those urban inhabitants was 7,461,516, about 10.3% of the total national population. By 1970, those numbers had rapidly increased, and the number of urban dwellers reached 43,110,726, about 41.2% of the total national population. According to the latest national census in 2005, that number of urban dwellers had reached 64,710,605, about 50.6% of the national population.

After World War II, the Japanese Government promoted industrialisation; rapid urbanisation and motorisation followed. Many labourers moved from agricultural areas to urban areas.

Figure 1. Number and rate of urban population²



² This graph is based on figures from the 2005 national census of the Statistics Bureau, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication.

The rapid expansion of the commercial distribution system led to an increase in the number of commercial vehicles on the road, and higher incomes from industries enabled employees to own private cars. These phenomena of industrialisation produced many changes in the communities. Urbanisation increased the number of nuclear families and separated large or extended families in suburban areas.

Newly-developed urban communities were much different from traditional communities. First, a new urban community was composed primarily of nuclear families of a similar generation. The **families were more homogeneous** than in traditional communities. Second, most adults in urban families were employees of companies in cities. Human relationships between these adults and their communities were not as firm as those between the adults and their companies. Thus, **human bonds among urban community members were weaker** compared to those in rural communities. Some urban dwellers could not even really be considered members of the community. Motorisation enabled community members to commute to remote offices or factories and accelerated the weakening of human bonds, not only in urban communities, but also in rural communities.³

Another big change in society occurred with the **aging of society**. The percentage of the aged (65 years old and above), which comprised 7.1% of the population in 1970, doubled to 14.5% in 1995. According to criteria established by the United Nations, an aging society is one in which the aged comprise 7.0% of the population, and an aged society is one with an aged population of more than 14%. An increase in the aged population is also considered a negative attribute for sound communities. For example, an aging population often brings about a decline in the number of traditional events, such as festivals, which help to maintain strong human bonds within communities.

3 The National Police Agency (NPA) identified such changes in communities as factors in the collapse of community (White Paper on Police 1974, 1978).

After industrialisation, the **rapid evolution of Information Technology** (IT) brought other changes to the communities – some beneficial and some harmful. In that the Internet and mobile phones enable people to have direct contact with people far distant from themselves, the individualism of the community members may be accelerated. On the other hand, IT enables people to communicate with one another easily, and social networks on the Internet provide a virtual or a real community for people who have similar interests. However, it is still premature to tell whether the Internet communities can provide an alternative to or a support for traditional communities.

As these changes occurred, Japan faced a **sharp increase in crime**. For seven consecutive years between 1996 and 2002, the number of reported penal code crimes increased. In 2002, these crimes numbered over 2.8 million, a 60% increase compared to the seven previous years.

CHALLENGES FOR JAPANESE POLICE IN PROMOTING COMMUNITY SAFETY

(1) Establishment of *Gaikin Keisatsu*

Faced with the rapid urbanisation in the nation, the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) revised the ordinance for *Gaikin Keisatsu*⁴ in 1969 and the National Police Agency (NPA) analysed the situation surrounding *Gaikin Keisatsu* and issued a directive⁵ entitled “Measures to improve the police in urban communities”.

In the ordinance, the mission of *Gaikin Keisatsu* was provided as follows: “The mission of *Gaikin Keisatsu* is to keep safe and sound the daily life of the people by vigilant responses and affirmative services to the people.”

4 *Gaikin Keisatsu Unei Kisoku*, National Public Safety Commission Ordinance 5 June 19, 1969.

5 Direction of Vice Commissioner-General No.13, National Police Agency, 16 September 1970.

In the directive, the NPA pointed out that police in the urban communities lacked the necessary capacity to cope with the rapid upsurge in the number of crimes and accidents. Most police resources were allocated to police affairs, and only a small portion of police resources was assigned to activities that enhanced relationships between the police and the community. Urbanisation had weakened community ties, and community members had become less cooperative with the police.

In response to this situation, the NPA announced the following measures:

- Establishment of an independent role for *Gaikin Keisatsu*
- Enhancement of mobility of *Gaikin Keisatsu* by vehicles
- Improvement of the management of *Gaikin Keisatsu*.

At that time, the most important of these was the establishment of an independent role for *Gaikin Keisatsu* because *Gaikin Keisatsu* had previously been functioning as a support branch to other major sections, such as criminal investigation, drug enforcement, or traffic control. What was the independent role of *Gaikin Keisatsu* be? The guidelines explained that *Gaikin Keisatsu* was to be accountable for police affairs which occurred in the community, such as the entire process for dealing with misdemeanors committed in the community and solving problems in the community.⁶

Bayley's (1991) research focused on the activities of *Gaikin Keisatsu* in the 1970s, defining community policing as follows: "Community policing is regarded as a strategy for improving relations between the police and the public while strengthening police effectiveness in preventing and controlling crime. The four elements of community policing are the organisation of com-

munity-based crime prevention; the reorientation of patrol activities to emphasise non-emergency service; increased police accountability to local communities; and the decentralisation of command." (& Bayley, 1988.)

It is not too much to say that this definition of community policing was derived almost entirely from observation of police activities in Japan. However, at that time no one could have imagined that the Japanese police would reintroduce the concept of "Community Policing" 20 years later.

The enhancement of *Gaikin Keisatsu* was also promoted according to the directive issued in 1970. The number of reported penal code crimes hit bottom in 1973, at less than 1.2 million, and was stable at around 1.2 million until 1979.

(2) **Reintroduction of a Community Policing policy**

In the 1980s, the number of crimes increased, reaching 1.7 million in 1991. On the other hand, the number of apprehended criminals greatly decreased, which meant a significant drop in the "arrest rate", the most important index of police performance. The arrest rate declined from 59.8% in 1980 to 38.3% in 1991. Gravely concerned with this situation, the NPA determined that in addition to urbanisation, aging and internationalisation had undermined crime prevention efforts in rural communities, as well as in urban areas, and decided to execute a drastic reform of *Gaikin Keisatsu* on studies of Community Policing developed overseas.

In 1992 the NPA announced the adoption of *Chiiki Keisastu*, or Community Police, instead of *Gaikinn Keisatsu* and issued guidelines⁷ for reform of the Community Police system. The 1992 guidelines pointed out the lack of affinity between the police and the community and the reduced ability for solving community problems.

⁶ Since the 1960s, problem-solving in the community, which had been traditionally promoted in Japanese Police policies, has been called, "*Ichii shokanku ichi jian kaiketsu undo*" or "One problem solving in one sub-precinct".

⁷ Direction of Vice Commissioner-General No.9, National Police Agency, 23 June 1992.

The stated principles of the new guidelines were as follows:

- Promotion of activities from the point of view of community members
- Enhancement of police capability for problem solving in the field
- Autonomous activities based on the situation within a specific community

In accordance with these principles, the guidelines directed the following measures be taken:

- Establishment of an operational system of community police units based on the situation within a specific community, including personnel deployment.
- Promotion of activities to better understand specific communities and their members through effective door-to-door visits and meetings with community members.
- Enhancement of activities to respond appropriately to the needs of communities such as problem solving and sharing of information about community safety

Notwithstanding these nationwide efforts, the number of reported penal code crimes kept increasing until 2002. Another reform and a decade were necessary for the reintroduced community policing in Japan to achieve fruitful results.

(3) **The Police Reform**

The next reform came as a result of several serious scandals in the police organisation. At the end of the 20th century, there emerged a series of scandals and cases of misconduct involving officers ranking as high as a chief of a local police department, in a dozen police departments, including the NPA.

Seriously concerned about these events, the NPSC established the Police Reform Committee⁸ in March 2000. The Police Reform Committee presented its “Urgent Recommendations for Police Reform” in July 2000:

- The Japanese police, including the community police, failed to gain people’s confidence due to the closed nature and secrecy of the police organisation.
- The Japanese police, including the community police, did not respond adequately to the diversity of the people’s needs and requirements.
- Community police were occupied by increasing crimes and incidents and, therefore, could not devote enough time to the original Community Policing activities to solve problems related to community safety.

In other words, the Police Reform Committee recognised that the reintroduced Community Policing did not serve its primary purposes.

Based on the Urgent Recommendations, the NPSC and the NPA established the Charter of Police Reforms, and all local police forces in Japan developed practical programmes for police reforms in accordance with the Charter, such as enhancement of transparency and so on.

The Charter aimed at improving the accountability of the Japanese police forces through self-assessment and citizen-oriented activities. In particular, the Charter declared the establishment of “Police for the People”, which means that the police should always put priorities on people’s needs before organisational reasons. In order to realise this goal, individual police officers had to change their way of thinking from a self-centred view to a people-oriented one. Specifically, the police were urged to listen to citizens’ needs and

8 The Police Reform Committee (PRC) consisted of six prominent citizens, including a former Vice Prime Minister, the CEO of a television media company, and a former chairman of the Japan National Bar Association.

to genuinely respond to those needs, reinforce activities to ease citizens' fears of crime, and support victims of crime.

The basic ideas of the Police Reform overlapped with the principles of Community Policing; thus, it is not too much to say that the Police Reform in 2000 coincidentally contributed to the establishment of Community Policing policy within an entire police organisation.

(4) **Safe Community Building (SCB)**

At the time of the Police Reform, the NPA also introduced a new initiative⁹ to promote comprehensive measures for community safety, namely, "Safe Community Building" (SCB). Key ideas¹⁰ of the SCB are the promotion of specific activities arising from a community's particular needs for community safety and development of community environments conducive to crime prevention. The announcement that SCB could be achieved,

Minister, included ministers from all branches of government. In December of 2003, this committee adopted "The Action Plan to Create a Crime-resistant Society (APCCS)", whose final aim was stated in the preamble of APCCS as the "revival of Japan as the safest country in the world".

The APCCS emphasised three main points. The first point stressed *initiatives to encourage the public to participate in crime prevention*. The second point endorsed the *development of a crime-resistant social environment*. The third focused on the need to *overcome bureaucratic territorialism* in the course of promoting measures aimed at fighting crime.

In accordance with these three points, the APCCS required participating authorities to take action on 148 individual measures to implement this plan. These included activities such as support for anti-crime volunteers, strengthening of

"The Action Plan to Create a Crime-resistant Society (APCCS)", whose final aim was stated in the preamble of APCCS as the "revival of Japan as the safest country in the world".

not by the police solely, but only through cooperation of all parties concerned in the community was unprecedented.

SCB was backed by a national government plan. In response to the critical decline in public safety, the Japanese Cabinet initiated "the ministerial committee against crime" in September 2003. This meeting, which was chaired by the Prime


police activities at Kobans, promotion of crime prevention through environmental design, an increase in the number of license plate recognition cameras, promotion of juvenile education in communities, enforcement of immigration laws, and a reduction in the number of illegal residents. After the adoption of the APCCS, the ministerial committee also created two more programmes: to promote safe community building and to protect children from crime.

Owing to these various policies and measures, the number of reported penal code crimes has been decreasing since 2003, for eight consecutive years as Figure 2 shows

9 Direction of Director-General of Community Safety Bureau No.47, National Police Agency, 24 February. 2000.

10 Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance No.114, 16 June 2003, *Anzen Anshin Machizukuri* (Safe Community Building).

Figure 2. Number of reported penal code crimes



THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY-POLICE COOPERATION

The reintroduction of Community Policing was not successful during the initial decade especially in regards to crime prevention. However, after the Police Reform of 2000, the number of reported penal code crimes significantly declined. What brought about the success of the reintroduced Community Policing?

Most elements of the Charter substantially overlapped with those in the guidelines for reform of the Community Police in 1992, such as activities to respond correctly to the needs of communities or listening to citizens' needs and genuinely responding to these needs. A major difference was the target of the reform: the community police section and community police officers in 1992; an entire nationwide police force in 2000. Thus, the principles of Community Policing specified in the guidelines in 1992 could potentially

have spread among all police officers as those of the Police Reform in 2000 did.

The Police Reform brought another breakthrough in the way in which police shared information with communities. The promotion of information sharing between the police and communities was clearly stated in the guidelines in 1992, but did not succeed due to the secretiveness of the investigation branch, whose officers believed that information related to crimes should be used only for investigative purposes, not for any other purposes, such as crime prevention.

However, such secretiveness was repudiated in the implementation of the Police Reform, and a new concept of investigation for crime prevention was established.¹¹ That is, because every


¹¹ "Gaito Hanzai oyobi Shinnyu Hanazai wo Yokushi suru tame no Sogo Taisaku no Suishin ni tsuite" [Promotion of comprehensive measures against street crimes and break-in crimes], National Police Agency, November 11, 2002.

police activity was to serve public safety, criminal investigation was likewise to be also conducted for public safety. A similar perception of criminal investigations for crime prevention was introduced in the US. (Braga et al, 2011). Thus, the provision of information about crimes in a community became more specific and timelier through the use of the Internet or mobile phone mail system.

The official announcement of the SCB initiative said: “Safe Community Building will not be achieved by police only.” This emphasis on community-police cooperation also brought significant progress in community policing, namely, the voluntary involvement of community residents in crime prevention efforts. The number of volunteer groups for promoting community safety has grown rapidly as reflected in Figure 3.

The official announcement of the SCB initiative said: “Safe Community Building will not be achieved by police only.”

Figure 3. The number of volunteer groups to promote community safety¹²



¹² A volunteer group for community safety is one with at least five members, who carry out actual activities, such as regular patrols, once a month or more.


The NPA and local police forces have long been engaged in supporting crime prevention activities in the private sector, such as the Japanese Association of Crime Prevention, since the 1960s.¹³ However, the activities of the police in communities were not well received in the 1990s.

According to the SCB initiative, the police shared the responsibility as an equal partner with other entities, such as municipalities, schools, and volunteer groups. In other words, the police conceded that they were not the omnipotent community peacekeepers. Such a change in the attitude of the police led to a positive and pro

ductive exchange of information about crimes, including those occurring in individual communities, and expertise in planning crime prevention activities. All these reasons may have encouraged community members to join in the voluntary activities to enhance community safety.

The benefits of such changes in the attitude of police have been recognised among English-speaking democracies since the 1980s, and community volunteers have been recognised as “co-producers of public safety” (Bayley & Nixon, 2010). As Figure 4 shows, citizens’ willingness to join in the voluntary activities for community safety improved.

Figure 4. Survey on motivation of citizens to join in volunteer activities for community safety¹⁴



¹³ “Citizens’ cooperation for crime prevention”, White Paper on Police, 1973.

¹⁴ The graph is derived from data reported in the following polls and surveys:

National poll on lifetime education and volunteer activities, Cabinet Office, 1993;

Survey on citizens’ fear of crime, Research Foundation for Safe Society, 2004; and

Survey on the safe community station programme, National Police Agency, 2010.

CONCLUSION

Community Policing in Japan originated with its unique *Koban* system, which brought about effective policing through regular contact with community residents and helping to resolve community problems. Faced with rapid urbanisation, the NPA initiated the establishment of self-governing *Gaikin Keisastu* to enhance its capability to cope with the increase in crimes and accidents in 1970s, followed by the reintroduction of a Community Policing policy to regain citizens' trust and cooperation in the 1990s.

However, the reintroduction of the Community Policing policy failed to be effective until the implementation of the Police Reform. The Police Reform changed the essential character of the Japanese police from closed to open, from self-centred to people-oriented, and from the embodiment of omnipotent peacekeeper to partner with the community in public safety. These changes contributed much to revitalise Community Policing and to promote SCB. Consequently, voluntary activities for community safety thrived. In addition, the social capital of communities was enriched by a decrease in crimes, which enabled the police to allocate more resources to Community Policing and SCB. Over the last eight consecutive years, the decrease in crimes was deemed to have been achieved by dint of the aforementioned "virtuous circle".

In order to realise the target of the APCCS – the revival of Japan as the safest country in the world – it is crucial for society to sustain this virtuous circle. To this end, the Japanese police should promote Community Policing and the SCB initiative, which form the axes of the virtuous circle, based on the principles of the Police Reform.

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10. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN TROUBLED TIMES

STEPHEN WHITE



INTRODUCTION

The observations, conclusions and recommendations offered in this paper have a solid foundation in academic research and professional inspection reports. However they are, first and foremost, based on personal experience as a practitioner. The topics they address – police and public relations, collaboration with other agencies, comprehensive police reforms, managing public disorder, countering violent extremism and the nature of international rule of law interventions – are extremely important in these challenging, often troubled times.

Consideration of these themes, along with the conference's main topics, provokes thought and debate about the role and purpose of police in society. This is something which crime prevention strategists and police chiefs should be doing on a regular basis. If we seek to build resilient societies and forge partnerships to address the big problems which police and partner agencies face around the world, we need to consider what the role of police should be and what works best in the performance of that role.

The main message of this paper, in respect of “community policing in troubled times”, is the importance of **treating the subject strategically** and considering all that it implies for policing in terms of its role in society and its relationships with communities, other organisations and individuals. By highlighting some of the big policing problems which strategists face both locally and globally; suitable strategies for dealing with them; critical success factors which support those strategies; and, demonstrating where community policing theories and practices fit into this picture – it is possible to identify major issues, lessons learned and some best practices to follow.

The views expressed here are based on 26 years of police service and a further seven years of international experience designing, planning and delivering rule of law strategies. My specialisations include community policing, conflict

resolution, managing public disorder, countering terrorism, peace processes and political developments, change management and security sector reform, international interventions, and, more recently, research into countering violent extremism.

Having studied and witnessed various styles of policing – from military-led to police-led responses to insurgencies and public unrest; from law enforcement to community service approaches to crime; and, from low level community policing at local level to national, holistic, comprehensive partnership strategies to deal with major challenges such as sectarianism, post conflict reconstruction efforts and violent extremism – I have arrived at some clear conclusions. They may seem simplistic but a key task for leaders is to simplify the complex (as opposed to complicating the simple).

Conclusions offered include recommendations to recognise:

- The importance of properly **defining the role of police in the society** and specific context being addressed.
- The importance of **embedding and reflecting the ethos and principles** of community policing within the culture of police organisations, their policing strategies and in the behaviour of operational officers.
- The importance of **strategic planning processes** that take account of those factors that are critical to the success of any community policing strategy.
- The importance of implementation and delivery plans that employ and enhance the key elements of community policing: consultation, partnership formation and maintenance, collaboration, empowerment, problem solving and accountability. Watchwords should be “**consult and involve**”.

- The importance of understanding that other agencies and community groups are **equal partners** (treated in such a way that mutual trust and respect is maintained) and that programmes do not necessarily need to be police-led.
- The importance of recognising the **different roles performed by police and military** and to ensure that there is never any ambiguity about which organisation has primacy in any given situation.

COMMUNITY POLICING DEFINED

Community policing is the accepted way of policing modern, democratic societies – and has been for at least a couple of decades. On occasions it has been regarded, wrongly, as a soft option only applicable during peaceful times and for “normal” policing, to be discarded and overlooked by strategists and planners when major problems arrive. This is a fundamental flaw because it is those very objectives, principles and practices that define community policing that can solve many of the problems and challenges thrown up during troubled times.

It is important to first define the key terms used in this paper – “community policing” and “troubled times” – before considering how to strategically plan for both and explore some case studies.

Many police and law enforcement agencies around the world aspire to deliver services that are based on the principles of “community policing”. The consensus is that this, of necessity, will broaden the role of police in society – from a *force* which “does policing to the people” to a *service* which “works for and with the people”.

In addition to the traditional objectives of policing (i.e. protection of life and property; prevention and detection of crime; and, preservation of public order), a community policing and service ethos recognises that the enhancement and retention of community support is, in itself, an overriding

priority. The thinking behind this is clear – partnerships and relationships work better when the police and the public respect and support each other’s aspirations and endeavours.

This seemingly straightforward view, however, has not prevented much debate about the term and much has been written in recent years about the problems around properly defining “community policing”. In 1996, Seagrave wrote: “There is debate and confusion over what exactly community policing is. Both academics and practitioners have been content to treat it as an intangible, fluid, nebulous concept and have failed to devise a common definition.”

Some commentators have expressed scepticism that the espoused desire for better, more proactive relationships between the police and the public (usually at the core of community policing strategies) is often simply symbolic and empty rhetoric. However, for the purposes of this paper, the term will be used in its most positive and most practical sense. Bennett (1994) pointed out that community policing can be seen as being “both a philosophy and an organisational strategy that allows the police and community to work closely together in new ways to solve crime, fear of crime, and other problems which threaten the overall quality of life in the community”. He pointed out that “it is not a single police tactic or programme but a collection of strategies that share a common philosophy or set of principles about the desired role of police in society”. This definition recognises that policing is an activity best carried out with the people’s consent and works most effectively when communities trust and support *their* police service.

Community policing is therefore a deliberate, strategic way of doing policing which requires leadership and a planning process which values and recognises the effectiveness of working in partnership with communities and groups, being consultative, being open and accountable, being fair and impartial and being representative of all the people in a society.

It recognises that the role of the police service and individual officers is not just “to enforce the law”, but to serve the people and help to solve problems affecting their lives, including fear of crime. Perhaps a new mission statement to replace the traditional “To Protect and Serve” should be “To Consult and Involve” because policing with the community recognises that consultative, collaborative partnerships produce best results. And, those effective partnerships are built on mutual trust and respect.

Community policing is not just a public relations exercise – it is a complete range of police activities which affect methods of patrolling, the conduct of investigations, personnel and training policies, accountability forums – and much more. It is about bringing the police and the public closer together in order to solidify relationships and make effective partnerships. If a police service is aloof, uncaring and unresponsive to community needs, it can hardly expect members of the public to enthusiastically support it.

In 1997, Bratton claimed that community policing exists only where four key elements are clearly in evidence: partnership; problem solving; prevention; and, consensus. But others claim that the strategy encompasses much more (including human resource management policies) as the following list of good “policing in partnership” practices demonstrate:

- Positive recruiting campaigns to ensure a **representative** work force.
- Training which reinforces the “**service**” aspect of policing and the importance of working with others. Often members of the community and special interest groups (e.g. victims groups, minority groups) are involved in the training sessions – to create community awareness and promote understanding of the people’s expectations of their police service.
- Local/neighbourhood police teams. When people recognise and know “their own” police officers, they are more inclined to approach and interact with them. By allocating **local officers** and opening small local police posts (including mobile police posts) this often helps to promote better relationships which can pay dividends in troubled times.
- Problem solving approaches. Instead of simply reacting to individual incidents, police officers are trained and encouraged to take a more **proactive** approach as to why incidents are happening – by analysing trends and “hot spots” so that responses can be more targeted and intelligence-led. The local public and their representatives can play a major role in these problem-solving exercises.
- Community forums/committees to allow the police to consult with and account to the people. Sometimes these events can be difficult for police to participate in – but to hear at first-hand what it is that the community perceives and expects from its police service is always worthwhile. It gives the police the opportunity to explain its own needs and expectations from the community and account for its actions. This “**openness and transparency**” is at the heart of modern democratic policing.
- Leadership that supports and prioritises support to local communities. **Leading by example** is a key requirement of police chiefs.
- Operational performance which demonstrates the priority afforded to the maintenance of **public trust and respect** – in all matters e.g. use of force, treatment of minorities, victims, suspects and witnesses during investigations, compliance with codes of conduct and rigorous complaints investigation.

- Use of media and other forums to **explain police conduct** – not just a public relations exercise.

The list above is not exhaustive but gives a clear idea of the range and complexity of programmes and policies which go to make up a community policing strategy and attempt to bring the public and the police closer and into more effective relationships.

TRoubLED TIMES DEFINED

The thesis offered in this paper is that community policing is not a soft option suitable only for easy times – rather it is an approach which is equally, if not more, important in troubled and difficult times. The premise is that community policing, a proven method for tackling issues like crime reduction, crime detection and protecting property, is equally valid when it comes to resolving major challenges and minimising risks from serious threats.

A well-planned and comprehensive community policing strategy can play a significant role in **protecting life** (including lives of police officers) and in **resolving community tensions, public disorder and conflict often caused by sectarianism, racism and violent extremism**. Most police officers understand the benefits of the public acting as additional “eyes and ears” and passing on information about suspicious activities. However, community policing places them, i.e. members of the community, in much more active and responsible positions – identifying problems and contributing factors, working with others to find solutions, and, taking responsibility for implementing them – even during (and some would say especially during) “troubled times”.

For the purposes of this paper the term “troubled times” refers to periods when significant challenges are facing police organisations, commanders and individual officers and includes the following: during and after civil conflicts; periods of police reform; public disorder and riots; international interventions; and threats from violent extremism.

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CRITICAL SUCCESS

Already in this paper the word ‘strategy’ has been used frequently. It is therefore necessary to include a short section about strategic planning and those factors that have been identified as critical to successful implementation.

Suffice to say that research and practical experience have both demonstrated that strategies are most likely to be implemented successfully when proven methods of strategic planning are followed. Much has been written on the subject and many models are offered for example by McKinsey, Kakabadze, Bryson and Eden. All have merit but some common elements for successful strategic planning have been identified which have led to the following **checklist of critical success factors**. When planning and implementing a community policing strategy (or indeed any major initiative), these elements are all worthy of attention (White, 2010):

- An agreed vision of success. (What will success look like? What is the overall objective?)
- A strategic plan with clear priorities.
- Appropriate resources to achieve the plan. (Human, financial and technical skills).
- Political will.
- Enabling legislation.
- Adequate security.
- Community Involvement.
- Leadership.

All the factors have great importance but the penultimate two deserve special mention at this point. Without adequate community involvement in terms of identifying needs, problems, solutions and agreeing to the division of labour, a community policing strategy is unlikely to succeed. Similarly, without appropriate leadership to inspire and guide the mission (especially in troubled times), the strategy will face great difficulty.

CASE STUDIES AND EXAMPLES DURING AND AFTER CONFLICT

The **Northern Ireland conflict** and eventual peace process during the past 30 to 40 years is probably a classic case study of how community policing can be developed not only as a method for dealing with conflict, but also as a solution to the causes of conflict and a means of peace-building.

Since the creation of the country in 1922, Northern Ireland's police have been the subject of much controversy. Until the peace process of 1998, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) held two very distinct roles – normal policing and protection of the state itself. Since the status of the country itself was a cause of conflict, during several terrorist campaigns seeking to win independence from the UK, the police were often placed literally in 'the firing line' and caught between two warring sectarian communities. To most Catholic nationalists, particularly republicans, they represented the state and all they opposed politically. From that section of Northern Irish society, support for the police was limited; distrust was the norm and few joined the organisation.

On the other hand, to many Protestant, pro-British unionists, the police were seen as courageous professionals and labelled as "their" police. The RUC workforce was 92% Protestant and by the early 1970s had evolved into a mainly male, macho, semi military force as whole scale terrorism and bloody conflict were played out in the cities and countryside of the small province, leaving more than 3000 dead – including over 300 police officers. The force was the only armed UK police constabulary and worked alongside 30,000 military personnel deployed during the height of the "troubles".

It was difficult for police serving at the time to realise that for some in the community, they, the police, were part of the problem and therefore changes had to be made if a solution was to be found. But that premise became the accepted

wisdom – with political settlement and police reform becoming synonymous. During the years leading up to the historic Belfast Agreement of 1998, a number of strategic reforms and policing developments were implemented which paved the way to peace. Firstly, a clear distinction was made between the role of the police and that of the army. Terrorism was deemed as a crime and police primacy, with army in support, was the chosen way forward. Community policing was seen as the answer to both the short term and longer-term problems. Neighbourhood policing was introduced (albeit with great difficulty at times) and as far back as 1992, community awareness training was introduced to police training.

After terrorist ceasefires and political discussions, the peace process was agreed to by an overwhelming majority of voters who participated in a referendum on the Belfast Agreement. The settlement involved such elements as the creation of a power-sharing executive, an early release scheme for political prisoners, and a series of police reforms, which placed community policing at the very core of political settlement, conflict resolution and peace building in Northern Ireland.

The "troubled issue" of policing could not be settled during the original peace talks and became subject to a 15 month review by an independent international commission who researched, consulted and involved communities and representatives from all sections of Northern Ireland society. The result brought about the most comprehensive package of police reforms in UK history. At its core was community policing and everything in the resultant strategic plan, policing structures, legislation and change management programmes which were geared towards the objective of creating a new Police Service for Northern Ireland (PSNI) acceptable to all the people. The reform package was set out in a report which contained 175 separate recommendations

(Patten et al, 1999) and there then followed years of strategic planning, legislative changes and implementation programmes.

The comprehensive police reform programme was centred on “policing in partnership” and in addition to the establishment of the PSNI created a range of representative bodies to oversee and work in partnership with the police. These included the Northern Ireland Policing Board, District Policing Partnerships, a Police Ombudsman and an Office of the Oversight Commissioner – to enable consultations, partnerships, accountability and independent investigation capabilities. At the core of the police reform programme was the aspiration to take the politics out of policing and to create a service that had a community policing ethos. The aim has been to deliver a police service which is:

- Representative of the community it serves
- Accountable to the law and to the community
- Open, transparent and impartial
- Protective of human rights, and,
- Effective and efficient in its operations.

The legislation that created the new police organisation specifically charges all its officers with community policing obligations. “Police officers shall, so far as practicable, carry out their functions in cooperation with, and with the aim of securing the support of the local community”, Section 32 (5) Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000.

The PSNI came into being in November 2001 and since then, despite episodic occurrences of terrorism and violent extremism, the “peace process” has continued and the police service has carried out a full range of police functions in a manner which tackles crime and enhances community resilience. It does this in partnership with many other groupings (and often the police are not the lead organisation).

Given the troubled history of policing in Northern Ireland few would have been confident that the reforms would have been as successful as they have so far turned out to be.

Statistics and measures of success are impressive. The PSNI despite being now much smaller in number than its predecessor, is witnessing the 12th year in a row of reducing crime figures. Public confidence is higher and community partnerships are growing. Most significantly, all military resources were withdrawn from the Province several years ago, the organisation has a 30% Catholic workforce and the main republican political party (for so long affiliated to the terrorist group which killed the vast majority of murdered police officers) now accepts and supports policing arrangements and sits on all the various police committees and partnership boards at local and national levels.

In truth the Northern Ireland scenario is an inspirational example of community policing and the importance of its impact in troubled times. By using the strategic planning checklist mentioned earlier, it is clear that all the main factors to ensure success were addressed. Local communities were involved at all times. During the preparatory stages and throughout the implementation of the reforms, community policing principles were followed, namely, consultation and partnership. The vision of success was agreed and achieved – a new, more representative and accountable police service with community policing at its core. Security was improved following terrorist ceasefires and there was clear political will to drive it forward along with enabling legislation and appropriate resources. Leadership at community level and within the police organisation made sure it happened and now community policing is embedded in the culture and practices of the PSNI.

In essence the Northern Ireland case study, although based in the context of conflict resolution and political settlement, is an example of community policing being used to improve

the service's acceptability and deal with legacy issues. However not all police reform programmes arise from conflict. Some are prompted by peaceful regime change or the desire by an administration to promote the primacy of rule of law and introduce security sector reforms that protect and respect human rights. Such reforms are laudable but nevertheless can still be defined as "troubled times" in that the scale of reforms and the pace of the change management process can be overwhelming. This is more likely to be the case if reforms are not managed properly. Change management processes should take account of recognised strategic planning practices and critical success factors that include community involvement (and, in the case of rule of law reforms, principles of community policing).

POLICE REFORM IN MONGOLIA

For several years, between 1998 and 2001, the Northern Ireland Police (RUC) assisted the ***Mongolian Police*** to research, design and deliver its first community policing strategy. It makes an interesting case study, not only of community policing in challenging times, but also of the transferability of community policing principles and practices between two seemingly very different cultures.

In the mid-1990s, Mongolia was emerging from a long period of socialism and aided by foreign donors and interventions, sought to reform its criminal justice system in line with universal human rights protections and modern democratic rule of law principles. For example, a comprehensive review was carried out of their prison system and as the then head of the Northern Ireland Police community policing programme, I was asked to review policing throughout Mongolia and submit draft proposals for a national community policing strategy. The subsequent report led to a three-year support programme that included exchange visits between the two police departments and a number of training and development interventions (White, 1999).

Despite cultural, language and other barriers, the programme was a success and many community policing initiatives based on best practice were adapted and applied to the Mongolian context. These included the formation of public safety committees and crime prevention campaigns, e.g. involving university students patrolling their campuses and businesses distributing crime prevention advice with their products. More comprehensive, multi-agency approaches were introduced to deal with a myriad of social and policing problems including public drunkenness, domestic violence and even traffic management. Police chiefs and commanders began using the media and other methods to reach out to their communities and to be more consultative and accountable.

There are always specific issues to address and pay particular attention to when introducing a national or local community policing strategy. Based on the historical or cultural context within which policing exists, the strategist must be mindful of the range of challenges such a change presents and not expect overnight success. Change takes time and leaders must be visionary, strong in their beliefs and values, patient and resilient. For example, police commanders may get worried when the number of reports of crimes goes up (especially for certain types of offences – such as minor crimes and crimes against minorities, women and children). However, it has been proven many times that such trends are common when communities become more trusting of their police service and confident that they will take matters seriously and professionally. These were some of the issues Mongolian authorities had to face.

The work was recognised on the international stage as being a major contribution to the democratisation of policing in a former socialist regime with no history of community policing. It was hailed as an example of the importance of community policing in challenging circumstances. The strategic planning template offered earlier in this paper was used to ensure that

major factors critical to success were addressed. All the main elements were present, including an agreed vision for the future policing of Mongolia; the political will to change; community involvement from the earliest stages of research to implementation; resources (which included skills and experience from a partner police service – the Northern Ireland police); and a committed leadership to ensure success.

PUBLIC ORDER MANAGEMENT

Community tensions and the serious public disorder which can occur during parades, protests and riots can clearly be described as “troubled times”. This paper proposes that public order management strategies that follow community principles and employ community policing practices can minimise the type of problems often associated with such events.

Riots are not unique to Northern Ireland as recent examples in London and Greece demonstrate, but the RUC and PSNI have much experience in this field not least because of the history, politics and nature of the divided society they have to police. There is a long history (over 300 years old) of parades, processions and protest and although most take place peacefully some can explode into serious violence which in the past have led to massive public unrest with lives lost (including police officers) and tens of millions of pounds worth of damage. Over the years a style of public order management has developed which has community policing principles at its heart – including public consultation, joint problem solving, openness and accountability from police and use of media to explain actions. This is extremely important when uniformed public order units come into contact with protestors. The police rationale for use of legal force (if necessary) and the main principles that relate to its use must be openly and clearly communicated. These include its legality, proportionality, appropriateness, justification and necessity and the graduated responses that police can and do use.

Police priorities when managing public order include careful planning and the need to “consult and involve” community representatives. Importantly community policing principles (such as communication and sharing of responsibilities with others) include the duty of police to point out to parade organisers and community leaders their respective responsibilities before, during and after any disorder.

This paper does not intend to examine in detail the public order duties for police commanders at all three levels: tactical (bronze), operational (silver) and strategic (gold). However, it is important to note that the following strategies must be included in all police plans. The aim is to reduce risks and ensure professional best practice is followed - including community policing practices:

- Command & control strategy, including use of joint command centres and decision logs.
- Community policing strategy including *community impact assessment* and use of local neighbourhood officers.
- Human rights compliance and complaints strategy.
- Use of force strategy including use of firearms and non-lethal options such as warnings.
- Officer safety, use of self-defence equipment and medical aid strategy.
- Public relations and media strategy.
- Intelligence, information and evidence gathering strategies.
- Training and rehearsal strategy.

There are elements and principles of community policing running throughout most of these strategies (such as consultation, problem-solving and community relations) but it is worth noting that contained within the community policing strategy is the important requirement to conduct a mandatory “**Community Impact Assessment**”.

This ensures that consultation with residents, community representatives, parade and protest organisers, and all those affected by an event, and the policing of it, have an opportunity to inform commanders about how it might be policed to best effect. Smart police commanders have invited community representatives and media to attend training sessions for “set pieces”. This has many benefits above and beyond being an illustration of openness. Not every tactic needs to be revealed but being open demonstrates the thorough preparation that the police have devoted to an operation and shows potential trouble-makers that responses will be appropriate and robust when necessary.

Even when spontaneous public disorder occurs in Northern Ireland, the police dealing with it, regardless of their rank, are expected to make efforts to engage with community leaders about ways to solve the problems being presented and with the aftermath following trouble.

In conclusion, experience has shown that by adopting community policing philosophies and employing appropriate practices even in troubled times of rioting and public disorder, risks can be mitigated and damage to police and public relationships kept to the minimum. By following the strategic planning checklist offered in this paper, those charged with planning and commanding police responses to public disorder and protests will be reminded of the benefits of community involvement and the use of community policing assets and practices.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

Another area where community policing (both its ethos and practice) has proved to be important is in the realm of international interventions. There has been much criticism of interventions where there has been a lack of planning and no clear vision for the future – especially for policing.

In particular the 15-month period in *Iraq*, following the removal of Saddam Hussein, when a

US-led Coalition Provisional Authority “ruled” the country and was responsible for police and security sector reform is an example often quoted.

Perusal of the checklist for planned strategic changes, as recommended in this paper, highlights some of the problems that have been recorded by many observers and commentators. There was no agreed vision of what a new Iraqi Police Service (IPS) would look like, little community involvement, and, leadership was fragmented and switched between military and civilian authorities. Community policing was not a priority and civilian police resources (in terms of numbers and skills) were sadly absent. The role of police in society inevitably became skewed and confused in the face of a vicious insurgency and sectarian murder campaigns. This was not helped by the fact that Iraqi police were inexperienced and ill trained; carried with them the organisational and cultural legacy of mistrust from the past; and, were trained, deployed and supervised by mostly military personnel.

After regime change, little thought was given to the end goal – the eventual role of police in society - where the IPS would provide a service to all Iraqis, while paying attention to community needs and sensitivities. There was no clear understanding and agreement about what the role of police service would be in the future when, eventually, the military would take less of a leading role in Iraq’s efforts to protect communities and tackle crime.

Time should have been taken to ensure that the IPS had a clear and agreed vision of the type of service it was to provide and the type of organisational structures, systems and leadership that would enable this.

The legacy of the past meant that the Iraq police had no recent experience of being accountable to the public, to the law and to the media or of independent scrutiny and oversight. These are key elements in a truly effective community policing. Very little police training, if any, reinforced these points as, in the aftermath of “Operation

If public trust for, and confidence in, policing is the “great prize” so often sought by police services around the world, then international interventions must from the very first moment (i.e. the planning stages and first contacts with the recipients of aid) put community policing at the top of the agenda.

Iraqi Freedom”, there was a massive recruitment and training programme which literally saw hundreds of thousands of new IPS officers deployed into communities after a mere eight week training course.

At supervisory and management level, few training courses and mentoring interventions concentrated on respect for Iraqi law, international instruments & best practices to protect human rights and create effective partnerships. The priority was more in the line of “fire-fighting” with the IPS performing mostly security duties, little if any investigations and no community policing. Matters such as appropriate responses and treatment for victims of crime, witnesses, suspects, interest groups, minorities and the media were rarely addressed.

Much has been written and does not need repetition in this paper about missed opportunities to reconstruct and reform the Iraqi criminal justice system in a way which (while being culturally and socially appropriate to the local context) would have valued and instilled the philosophy and practices which make up effective “policing with the community”. If public trust for, and confidence in, policing is the “great prize” so often sought by police services around the world, then international interventions must from the very first moment (i.e. the planning stages and first contacts with the recipients of aid) put community policing at the top of the agenda. Failing to do so, at the very least, creates ambiguity about the role of police in society.

Currently, in the UK, the Iraq Inquiry is attempting to record views about British interventions

and lessons that need to be learned. The former Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his evidence to the Inquiry on 21st January 2011, said: “Civil policing is a vital part of the picture, I think far more so than we realised at the time, and I would certainly say that going into any such situation in the future, you have to have a fully and comprehensively worked out plan for that, because you will almost certainly find that the police resources that are there are corrupt or useless.” This is a sad indictment about the state of planning for reform of the IPS post Saddam.

In his book “Bad Days in Basra”, Hilary Synnott, the British Ambassador in Southern Iraq from 2003 to 2004, recalled many failures and mistakes in both London and Washington in what he described as “spectacular misjudgements” in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. He clearly identified the absence of the critical factors necessary for success when he recorded:

The situation in 2003... was that there was simply a mismatch between policy imperatives and the ability to deliver on the ground... There was insufficient grip, leadership and knowledge of the conditions... and not enough understanding of what was needed.

In the USA a number of reviews and reports have been written about policing reforms in Iraq once interventions commenced. In 2005 The Iraq Study Group (Baker Hamilton) concluded, among other things, that the IPS was in a poor state lacking investigation skills and not loyal to democratic policing principles. In 2007 the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded similar dysfunctionality, noted a

very high wastage rate (40 – 70%) of trainees, and, identified the fact that many recruits were not trained at all. Both reports recommended civilian police expert training – not military.

Without rehearsing all the problems and failures of this intervention, it is clear that community policing principles and practices were not high on the agenda for reconstruction in Iraq. This may be due to a combination of factors that include poor planning, lack of civilian police advisers and trainers, and, poor coordination of the international community.

Key questions that should have been asked were not; for example about the main role of the IPS and the predominant style of future policing. Would it be counter- terrorism, community policing, or both? Had this been done, perhaps a clearer picture would have emerged about the training needs and other reforms required to underpin police developments such as legislation, oversight and relationships with the military.

What has become clear in Iraq and elsewhere (including Northern Ireland) is that police effectiveness and public support for policing is an essential part of political settlement and conflict resolution. Well-planned interventions, reforms and developments are essential in order to facilitate police improvements including organisational effectiveness and acceptability.

In one sense, Northern Ireland is a classic example of what needs to happen to policing post conflict, while Iraq is a classic case of “what not to do”. By failing to prioritise police primacy and the rule of law and by failing to make the link between efficient policing and public support, community policing (or core policing as Bayley and Perito described in 2010) has been side-lined. More efforts should have been made to train new IPS officers to serve local people in a manner consistent with modern community policing and democratic values. As Bayley and Perito have stated, “it is more effective to train and deploy local police to do core policing than to train them to be ‘little soldiers’”.

To conclude:

Any plan for future international police interventions should focus on a comprehensive list of critical success factors – all of which must be addressed immediately after a request or decision is made to deploy. The list is as follows: an agreed vision of success; political will; a strategic plan with clear priorities and core guiding principles; local community involvement at every stage; legislation; sufficient quantities of appropriate resources (funds, skills, staff); leadership; and security. These are all enablers. (White, 2010)

If community policing was high on the agenda of every planning team preparing for international rule of law interventions, it is likely that at least some mistakes of the past would not be repeated.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY CIVILIAN CRISIS MISSIONS (EUJUST LEX- THE INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ)

One example of an international intervention (also for Iraq) which did follow community policing and strategic planning principles is the ‘EUJUST LEX’ integrated rule of law mission for Iraq which was launched by the European Union in March 2005 after a lengthy period of research and consultation.

It is an EU “Civilian Crisis Management” Mission under the European Security and Defence Policy. It addresses senior level Iraqi criminal justice professionals in a “cross sector approach” providing training and development opportunities for Iraqi police, judiciary and penitentiary officials throughout many of the 27 member states of the EU and in various locations in Iraq.

The mission’s main objectives are:

- to promote collaboration, mutual understanding & respect between Iraqi criminal justice practitioners;

- to provide professional development opportunities (which include short work experiences and a range of technical courses including community policing, general crime and specialist investigations, public order management, management of training and other topics);
- to form strategic and technical partnerships with Iraqi authorities, ministries and senior practitioners within Iraq's police, penitentiary and judicial services; and,
- to co-ordinate with, and add value to, other international efforts.

It can be seen from this list of objectives that the mission adopts a consultative, partnership and multi-disciplinary approach.

At its core is the aim of promoting rule of law and respect for human rights and, specifically for police, it promotes best practices in all aspects of police leadership and delivery of democratic policing services to the communities of Iraq. The mission's objectives and its main principles demonstrate how community policing is a key theme running throughout all its activities.

The principles are as follows:

- Security is paramount
- Iraqi involvement at every stage, and
- Flexibility and responsiveness to Iraqi needs (White 2005)

Iraqi ownership and support for the programme, its content and style, at all stages, have ensured its success. Instead of "foreign experts" telling Iraqis what their criminal justice system should look like and how their system must work, the ethos behind the mission is to show Iraqi leaders and professionals how things work elsewhere and to facilitate and support them in their efforts to create and manage systems which work for them and are most appropriate in a liberated, modern democracy.

The scheme has received international recognition, has had its mandate renewed five times by the EU with the support of three different Iraqi regimes and several different Prime Ministers and Ministers of Interior and is being emulated elsewhere as an example of good practice. It supports the need for more community policing services as Iraq moves forward and continues to support rule of law reforms in partnership with Iraqi authorities. An examination of how the mission was designed and implemented since its inception will show that it adhered to both strategic planning and community policing principles.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE)

Finally, when we consider "troubled times" and how community policing can assist, there are the severe global problems associated with violent extremism. Many national and international counter-terrorism strategies include a particular series of objectives and activities designed to prevent terrorism and the crimes associated with it. A key objective of the Council of Europe Convention on Prevention of Terrorism is "to increase opportunities for intervention before terrorist acts are committed".

The European Union member states have a comprehensive strategy that has four main strands designed to prepare for, protect against, and prevent terrorism as well as pursue offenders. This approach is reflected in individual nation's strategies. By way of example, both the UK and Swedish strategies illustrate the importance of community approaches to prevention of terrorism.

In **mainland Britain** a new PREVENT strategy (2011) has been introduced. It advocates a multi-strand approach that combines government-sponsorship and funding with NGO and other agency activities. While no one single objective or priority is labelled as "community policing", in fact much of the approach demands

Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention

that “policing in partnership”, with all its attendant principles, is a central theme.

Community Partnerships are clearly what the new strategy intends as it states that “a wide range of sectors in this country are helping to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The way Government works with particular sectors will vary. Priority areas include education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. Some sectors (like faith) have been at the forefront of work to tackle radicalisation in this country. But more can and must be done. We engage with these sectors because they are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges we face.” (p. 63)

The new strategy states: “Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention.” (p. 55)

This explains why much of the UK’s PREVENT efforts are focused on persons “at risk” rather than those who are convicted or detained and why UK police have formed new partnerships with academics, local authorities, religious leaders, and former militants and prisoners.

The UK police play an important role in the development and delivery of the PREVENT strategy but the government is keen to point out that it is not a police programme; it depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of government. This is based on the sound community policing

principle that some solutions can be found within the community and police do not always need to be in the lead. Research quoted in the strategy indicates that consulting and involving Muslim communities has resulted in British Police, at the very least, improving their understanding of the culture – a necessary prerequisite for effective working relationships.

In **Sweden**, the most recent counter-terrorism strategy was published three years ago: Swedish Government 3.43 Communication 2007/08:64 “National Responsibility and international commitment: A national strategy to meet the threat of terrorism” presented to Parliament on 7 February 2008. It reflects the EU’s four-strand approach under four main headings: PURSUE, PREVENT, PROTECT and MANAGE (as opposed to ‘prepare’). Although incidents in Sweden have been few, the country is making deliberate efforts to learn from other countries how best to combat terrorism. Under its Counter Terrorism Cooperative Council, led by the Swedish Security Service, its stated aim is to develop and strengthen Sweden’s *collective ability* to combat terrorism. There is a multi-dimensional approach which includes law changes but central to it are *community policing* principles and practices such as the promotion of open dialogue (preventive diplomacy) and support to individuals and schemes based in communities which are engaged in a variety of activities which counter the narrative of the violent extremists.

National preventive activities as set out in the Swedish government strategy include consul-

Recently a number of studies have examined ways of countering violent extremism and countering those narratives that radicalise and motivate young men to commit acts of terrorism.

tation and involvement of the community to address the threat. “Wider use will be made of dialogue as a means of creating more opportunities for representatives of civil society to give their view of threat pictures and possible measures. Local authorities, schools, community police, religious communities, associations and political parties have important roles to play in debate and discussion about what can be accommodated within democratic society and what limits to apply.” (pp. 15-16)

Worth noting also is Sweden’s commitment to “cooperation and exchange of experience” with other EU countries especially those who “have many years of experience of integration work and measures to prevent radicalisation”. Such collaboration at the international level demonstrates the importance of sharing best practices in community policing approaches and the potential transferability of both principles and practices.

Community based approaches to countering violent extremism raise significant challenges especially when establishing and maintaining partnerships in so called “hard-to-reach communities” and in areas where support for police is not traditionally strong. Among the challenges is the necessity to change attitudes and values held within security services in order to ensure the acceptance of the key principles of community policing. The notion of community empowerment that is at the core of community policing is often problematic for authorities because it often implies that the balance of power (between citizen and police) is inverted. Communities are no longer passive participants in these new relationships.

Community policing implies a new contract between police and the citizens they serve based on mutual trust and respect – not based simply on legality but on an ethical foundation. It expands the police mandate, adding a vital proactive element to the traditional reactive role and explores new ways to protect and enhance the lives of citizens. As Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux pointed out in 1994:

Community policing promotes the judicious use of technology but it also rests on the belief that nothing surpasses what dedicated human beings, talking and working together, can achieve.

In the case of CVE this can sometimes include people who have been previously involved in violent extremism and terrorism. The idea of partnerships between police, and other statutory agencies, with former combatants and ex-prisoners, has taken some time to become embedded into the psyche of security agencies – and is still problematic. However, such partnerships pay real dividends and some CVE efforts, which follow true community policing principles, are recognising the need to be more inclusive of all those who have a role to play.

Recently a number of studies have examined ways of countering violent extremism and countering those narratives that radicalise and motivate young men to commit acts of terrorism. Recent research undertaken by the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (2010) identified a number of locations around the world, including Singapore, where strategies that contain community policing principles and practices are employed to counter violent extremism.

From Northern Ireland, Great Britain and Sweden in Europe to Singapore and Indonesia in South East Asia, there are schemes to be found where police and other state agencies work collaboratively with community representatives and charismatic individuals in efforts to prevent crimes being committed and to prevent vulnerable persons from engaging (and in some cases re-engaging) in radical extremism leading to criminality.

The relationships between the police, the public and key individuals can be critical to identifying causes of violent extremism, those at risk of becoming involved and methods of prevention. This is extremely important at the local, neighbourhood level because community policing concentrates on local issues. Research has shown that the initial recruiting factors (for those vulnerable to radicalisation) are most often local not global. The link is a clear one: local police, working with local communities can detect and address local factors. Since motivations and reasons for engaging in radical violence are often initiated by local grievances, not global politics, it follows that possible solutions will also be found at the grassroots, local, level within host communities.

Host community 'partners' may include: mosques and religious leaders; schools, universities and education authorities; health professionals and organisations; prisoner support groups; families; and importantly, former activists.

This final grouping poses particular challenges for police officers and security services, especially when terrorist campaigns are ongoing. Scepticism and distrust can be obstacles (on both sides) but research has shown that individuals (including former prisoners) with "street credibility" within their own communities can be very effective in preventing recruitment and engagement with violent extremism. For example, many non-governmental organisations in Sweden (dealing with organised gangs and right wing extremists), in Northern Ireland (dealing

with young people targeted for recruitment by dissident republican paramilitaries opposed to the peace process) and in England (dealing with groups promoting the ideology of jihad) are led by or employ former prisoners and members of gangs and organisations such as the IRA, the UVF, al Qaida and like-minded associates.

In Singapore, there is a very specific and comprehensive multi-agency and community based approach to countering violent extremism and preventing terrorism. This strategy focuses particularly on detainees released back into society. In Indonesia there are other examples of community-based schemes that involve former combatants. This is also the case in UK – both in Northern Ireland and in parts of England where schemes (such as STREET and Active Change Foundation in England and restorative justice schemes in Northern Ireland such as Community Restorative Justice Ireland and Northern Ireland Alternatives) have as their key managers, people who have been active members of terrorist groups and in some cases convicted killers. One key lesson to learn is not to underestimate the importance of key individuals. It is important that their current contributions are not negated by prejudices about their previous activities. This can be a challenge, but in these troubled times, a community policing philosophy can help to overcome this problem.

By recognising the important role that these community-based individuals and groups play, and how police actions have the potential to be obstacles or enablers, it is possible to maximise their effect. This can require quite a shift in thinking by police and security officials who, among other things, need to recognise that intelligence gathering (while an important part of policing) should not always be the first priority when dealing with communities. If communities perceive that this is the only objective for police working with communities (as opposed to helping them solve local grievances), cooperation will, at best, be limited.

It should be noted that by consulting and involving cooperative former combatants, any new strategy, policy or programme to counter violent extremism is more likely to succeed. For example, by engaging them and listening to their suggestions, it is more likely that any “counter narrative strategy” will be effective. If we take into account those factors which prompted their engagement with the ideology and practices of violent extremism; why they disengaged; and, what the state can do to minimise the risks of others engaging or re-engaging, then such a CVE programme will at least start from a more informed and educated baseline.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been written for, and presented at, the 2011 International Crime Prevention Conference, Singapore, which has as its twin themes the aims of “building resilience in societies and forging global partnerships”. Community policing can, without doubt, contribute to the first objective and, in terms of sharing best practices, play a part in the achievement of the second.

The conference has been advertised as a “celebration of the spirit of community involvement” which enables society to stay resilient, keeps crime rates low and reflects the importance of international collaboration. If community involvement not just in spirit, but in actuality and in practice, is placed at the core of policing plans and strategies, which are then mobilised in meaningful ways, there is no doubt that society will benefit – both locally and globally.

Community policing as defined particularly in terms of its main objectives has much to offer – not just in peaceful, normal societies but also in the most challenging of circumstances and troubled times.

By adopting a reflective, strategic position when faced with challenges and the responsibility of planning for them, leaders should:

- consider the **role** of police in society
- identify **opportunities** for community involvement at all stages, and
- be mindful of the critical **success factors** which best enable a community policing approach.

Even in the most troubled times, policing in partnership - with communities and other agencies – is most likely to produce solutions much better and longer lasting than the alternative. The message is clear: police should not act in isolation. They should at all times consult and involve those who are affected by the problems which police are tasked to address. Troubles shared are troubles halved – and, hopefully, troubles solved!

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Even when there's **NOBODY**
around, it doesn't mean
no one is watching.




- Being alone in an aisle doesn't mean you're not being observed.
- Don't take a chance.
- Don't steal:
 - Because you won't get away with it.
 - Because you can be imprisoned up to 7 years and fined.
 - Because a criminal record can never be erased.



Together

IT'S EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS

Answer someone's call for help
by alerting the Police



- Be alert for suspicious persons in your neighbourhood.
- Call the Police at '999' if you witness a crime.
- Note the criminal, e.g. distinctive features such as moles and scars, complexion, clothing, or physical details.



Crime Prevention: A Shared Responsibility

For more information, visit our website www.ncpc.gov.sg

**LOW CRIME
DOESN'T
MEAN
NO CRIME**

Don't Hide From
the Fact...
Be ALERT!



Giving Hope. Improving Lives.

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THE SINGAPORE STORY

11. SINGAPORE'S 30-YEAR EXPERIENCE WITH COMMUNITY POLICING

Ng Joo Hee
SINGAPORE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE



Ng Joo Hee (right) with NCPCC Council Chairman Tan Kian Hoon

THE SINGAPORE POLICE FORCE

More than 5 million people call this little city-state home. The Singapore Police Force is about 14,000 strong, consisting of 13,000 sworn officers of all ranks, and about a thousand civilians. The numbers work out to a very lean ratio of 1 police officer for every 400 people. And this leanness is the reason why I consider our officers to be the greatest strength of our Force, and our most scarce and most precious asset.

The Singapore Police Force is nothing without our people. The dedication, commitment and hard work of our policeman and women is the reason why we are able to deliver our mission day in and day out, 365 days a year, year after year.

Everyone will agree that being a police officer is not the most pleasant of professions. Violence and exploitation, death and injury, conflict and disaster, wickedness and evil-doing, deceit and dishonesty – these are the currencies of our trade. Our operations are 24/7, the shifts are long, and working conditions can be harsh.

That as it may, I believe every police officer knows that his labour contributes directly to a safer Singapore, and is sustained by what is inherently meaningful work.

The Singapore Police Force is as old as Singapore, and one of the most venerable in Asia, having been established shortly after Raffles claimed this island for the British in 1819. As a result, our history as a police force is also intimately intertwined with that of our nation, and we are, collectively, the guardians of a near 200-year-old tradition.

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
CRIME IN SINGAPORE

First the good news. And it is this: Singapore is about the safest place in the world as far as crime and criminal wrongdoing are concerned.

The overall level of crime in Singapore is low.

Some 31,400 crimes were reported in 2011 in Singapore. This works out to just about 606 cases of crime per 100,000 population, which must be one of the lowest crime rates in the developed world.

Incidents of violent crime are rare in Singapore. In 2011, there were only 16 murders. Conscientious law enforcement together with very strict drug and gun laws, which include capital punishment, mean that drug abuse and firearms are limited in Singapore.



This is a chart comparing the number of crimes that were reported to the police in Singapore and five other world cities. The numbers are for 2010, except for Sydney and New York, which are from 2009.

Hong Kong, Tokyo, Sydney, New York and London are familiar to many of us, and also places which we like to benchmark ourselves against, not just for crime, but also for many other things, so I think the comparison is an instructive one.

Looking at this chart at first glance, the keen observer would point out that these are absolute numbers and therefore not a fair comparison, as the cities are of differing sizes. And you would be right.

The red line tracks the crime rate, calculated as the number of crimes per 100,000 population.

The story, surprisingly or not, remains a similar one.

There are three immediate observations we can make from this chart.


One is that there is, comparatively, very little crime in Singapore. In fact, half as much as in some cities and ten times as little as some others.

A **second** observation is that Tokyo, widely regarded as one of, if not the safest city in the world, reported a crime rate three times ours.

Third, New York City and London, favourite destinations for Singaporean tourists, are, by comparison, very dangerous places. The Big Apple reported a crime rate that is more than 11 times ours and London, 16 times more.

Of course, we must be very careful with comparing crime numbers and crime rates, because different places count them in slightly different ways.

So let us look at a few more specific types of crime, which are probably of greater concern to the public, no matter where you happen to live.




This is a chart of homicides in the same six cities.

There were only 19 murders in Singapore in 2010; 35 in Hong Kong; 100 in Tokyo; and more than 530 in New York City.

The yellow line indicates the rate of homicides per 100,000 population in the six cities. It becomes very apparent that Singapore has an exceedingly low homicide rate, and that the New York City one is an order of magnitude higher.

In other words, you would be 16 times more likely to be murdered in New York City than in Singapore; and twice more likely in Tokyo, and four times more in London.


There were only 19 murders in Singapore in 2010; 35 in Hong Kong; 100 in Tokyo; and more than 530 in New York City.



This chart compares the absolute number of robberies that were reported in our six cities. Again, very low numbers in Asia, and significantly more robberies were committed in Western cities.

The robbery rate tells what is by now a familiar story. Interestingly, your chance of getting robbed in Tokyo is half of that in Singapore. But the incidences of robberies in Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo are exceedingly low when compared to the West.

Interestingly, your chance of getting robbed in Tokyo is half of that in Singapore. But the incidences of robberies in Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo are exceedingly low when compared to the West.




The last category of crime I want to compare is burglary. Here the differences are not so stark, although we in Singapore enjoy the lowest burglary rate by far.

Comparing Singapore and London, we see that the average Londoner is a whopping 57 times more likely to have his home broken into when compared with his Singaporean cousin.

Just in case you think that 2011 was an exceptional year for crime, let me show you the 20-year crime chart for Singapore. The yellow bars indicate the absolute numbers of crimes of all types reported to the Police, and the blue line the rate per 100,000 population.

Comparing Singapore and London, we see that the average Londoner is a whopping 57 times more likely to have his home broken into when compared with his Singaporean cousin.

20-YEAR CRIME AND CRIME RATES



It is fairly apparent that that crime in Singapore is on a long-term declining trend, and perhaps showing signs of stabilising.

POLICING & GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS

Some of us may not realise it, but policing effectiveness confers direct and significant competitive advantage to our country.

The World Economic Forum, in its 2011-12 Global Competitiveness Report, ranks Singapore as the second most competitive economy in the world, behind Switzerland. In preparing the Report, the World Economic Forum had asked respondents to rank 15 factors according to their impact on doing business.

In the case of Singapore, the least problematic factor was crime and theft.

The Global Competitiveness Report also collected data on areas specifically related to crime and

public order. In terms of the extent to which the Police can be relied on to enforce law and order, Singapore ranks second in the world, behind only Finland. In terms of whether organised crime imposed costs on doing business, Singapore ranks 6th out of 142 countries surveyed.

COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP

A direct consequence created by the relative scarcity of police officers in Singapore is that active involvement of the community becomes central to the successful policing of Singapore.

Without public confidence in the Police, and community participation in crime prevention, Singapore cannot hope to be even half as safe as it is.

There are now close to 800 Neighbourhood Watch Groups in Singapore. Added to these are numerous Community Safety and Security Programmes, and many Safety and Security Watch Groups in the various business sectors.



All are formed and led by citizens and volunteers determined to keep their local neighbourhoods, estates and businesses free from crime.

Year after year, we are heartened by the assistance that the general public gives to the Police. In 2010, fully 43% of all arrests made by the Police are, directly or indirectly, a result of such assistance.

Year after year, we harp on the message that “Low Crime Does Not Mean No Crime”.

That it is every individual's responsibility to, first, safeguard his own person and property, and then, to join with his fellows in keeping our communities hostile to offending and disorder.

Year after year,
we harp on the
message that
“Low Crime Does
Not Mean
No Crime”.

DIVERSITY & PAST TROUBLES

Another driver behind our obsession with gaining the trust of the communities that we police has to do with the varied makeup of Singapore's population and the turbulent history we share as a result of Singapore's diversity.

Modern Singapore is, and has always been, a melting pot of cultures and ethnicities. We are, primarily, a nation made up of immigrants and the descendents of immigrants.

Singapore was a British colony for over 100 years before achieving independence in 1965. The decades immediately before independence were difficult ones, marked by social upheaval, political unrest, ethnic strife and religious tension.

The breakdown of public order, including rioting in the streets, were common occurrences. This is, of course, a far cry from the Singapore of today.

On 11 December 1950 a Singapore court decided that a child who had been raised by Muslims should be returned to her biological Catholic parents. A protest by outraged Muslims escalated into a riot when images were published in the newspapers showing 13-year-old Maria Hertogh kneeling before a statue of the Virgin Mary. Rioting in Singapore lasted for three days. In total 18 people were killed and 173 injured. Many properties were also damaged.



In May 1955, workers who were members of the Singapore Bus Workers' Union, which had been commandeered by communist agents, protested against poor working conditions and low pay. The strike at the Hock Lee Bus Depot turned violent and escalated into rioting. Four people were killed and 31 injured in rioting of exceptional viciousness.

The Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots were a series of racial clashes between Chinese and Malay groups on 21 July 1964 during a Malay procession that marked the Prophet Muhammad's birthday. These riots were the worst and most prolonged in Singapore's post-war history. In total, the violence killed 36 people and injured another 556 in 10 days of chaos. About 3,000 people were arrested.

As you can see, modern Singapore was birthed in an era of ethnic, religious and political strife.

Indeed, the unrest and disorder before independence have deeply conditioned the wariness and caution that Singapore's Government continues to hold in regards to public protest and street demonstrations.

And it explains the obsessive zeal of my police force in garnering the trust and comfort of the many different communities that we police.

It is absolutely crucial for Singapore's continued security and stability that the various communities trust in the fairness of law enforcement, keep faith with a competent and neutral police force, and have full confidence that we will protect all groups with a firm but even hand.

An Honest Force

The third driver for community policing also has historical roots. Lest we forget, it is not ancient history that corruption was rife in the Singapore Police Force. There was a time, not so very long ago, that the Force was riddled with crooked cops.

In 1879, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to find out why the Singapore Police Force was inefficient. This Commission found that corruption existed among both European inspectors and local policemen. Similarly, the 1886 Commission appointed to investigate public gambling in the Straits Settlements confirmed that police corruption was rampant.

In April 1846, a European Constable, Charles Cashin, was convicted of receiving bribes from illicit gambling dens and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Constable Cashin reported that

Today, Singaporeans treat the honest and friendly police officer as a given, and have absolutely no reservation about reporting crimes or cooperating with the police.

for the past three years all the constables in the Force had received S\$20 each monthly, and that the constable who had brought the charge against him had also received bribes himself.

One of my early predecessors, Commissioner Thomas Dunman, admitted in court that the police were in the regular pay of gambling promoters and that it was difficult to rectify the situation.

This prevalence of police corruption in colonial Singapore persisted for a long time. In his 1950 Annual Report, another predecessor, Commissioner Foulger, indicated that graft was rife in government departments in Singapore, including his own police force.

It was only after self-government in 1959 that the PAP government took determined and draconian steps to stamp out corrupt practices in the public service, starting with the police force.

Today, Singaporeans treat the honest and friendly police officer as a given, and have absolutely no reservation about reporting crimes or cooperating with the police. But wind back the clock 50 years, and you would find that the policeman is the last person you would want to deal with when misfortune struck.

Today, frequent and regular interactions with residents, businesses, schools and other community groups are part and parcel of our work. Indeed, Singaporean communities demand that the Police become a fixture in their midst, and are most welcoming of our men and women in blue.

The Police cannot fight crime unless we are also a trusted member of the communities that we protect. That trust is hard earned, and should not be taken for granted.

We have learnt from our own history and from bitter experience that the trust our communities keep with us must never be breached again.

OUR COMMUNITIES

The Singapore Police Force's work is to protect the people who live in Singapore from crime and all manner of criminal harm.

We achieve this either through detection, or by deterrence and prevention.

Detection, which would include investigation, apprehension and prosecution, is, of course, most familiar and the most publicly visible.

But it is the latter combination of deterrence and prevention that is actually the more effective, and therefore the more preferred.

In crime and public safety, as in public health, prevention is always better than cure.

Singaporean communities possess an in-built ability to discourage deviance and to maintain order. Certainly, our communities with their shared values, established norms of behaviour, and bonds of cooperation and trust built over many years are the best vaccine against crime and wrong doing.

Partnering with the community is central to the successful policing of Singapore. Without public confidence in the Police and pervasive community participation in crime prevention, Singapore cannot hope to be even half as safe as it is.

THE TERRORIST THREAT

Sadly, we no longer just fight crime. In my view, the single biggest security threat that confronts Singapore today is that posed by “Jihadist Terrorism”.

It is, by now, common knowledge, that Singapore is a favoured target for terrorists inspired by al-Qaeda. Like it or not, this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Police forces all over the world find ourselves having to deal with a new enemy in the form of the terrorist who claims his cause is Jihad. The terrorist is a formidable adversary, much more so than the regular-flavoured criminals we are more familiar with.

Police forces
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rorist who claims
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But the terrorist must not be allowed to succeed, for he is intent on extracting catastrophic consequence. The terrorist can only be successful if he is able to plot and plan while hiding undetected within our communities.

This is his Achilles Heel, and a weakness that we as public protectors have to exploit to the fullest extent. And so, it is only through winning the trust of the communities we police, and enlisting their help and assistance, can we ever hope to uncover the terrorist and stop him in his tracks.

As such, it is the case that, in the age of terrorism, community policing is not just the best inoculation against crime, but also our best bet against the madness that is terrorism.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN SINGAPORE

The Singapore Police Force moved to a neighbourhood policing model in a big way in mid 1980s. Taking inspiration from the ubiquitous Koban police box system in Japan, we gradually established a network of Neighbourhood Police Posts in Singapore.

By 1994, a total of 91 such NPPs dotted Singapore.

The NPP system was meant to embed permanent touch points in our neighbourhoods, provide easy public access to the Police and to project police presence at the lowest local level.

This strategy worked generally well, but as Singapore's population increased and housing types diversified, we found the NPP system, as originally configured, inefficient and ultimately unsustainable. The small size of the posts, the need to keep them open 24/7, and vastly varying service loads across times and locations, together with severe constraints on manpower availability, led to a rethink of our community police strategy that was centred on the NPP.



In 1997, we called an end to the expansion of the NPP network, and introduced the Neighbourhood Police Centre, or the NPC. There are now 33 NPCs all over Singapore, and we continue to open new ones in tandem with population growth and movements. Together, our 30+ NPCs now provide the underlying structure for uniformed policing in Singapore.

Our NPCs are ubiquitous, are sited at strategic locations nationwide, and provide the communities that they serve with a one-stop service point for a full range of police services.

Compared to the tiny NPP, the typical NPC has much better scale, and is home to a more complete gamut of crime-fighting capabilities, from fast response, to beat policing, to community liaison, to investigations, to targeted anti-crime operations.

The commander of the NPC, together with his crew of 100, have complete ground responsibil-

ity for crime and public safety in their particular patch of Singapore. And they are expected to be fully engaged with the local communities that reside within their area of control.

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

Let me now describe the two main platforms that we use to join with residents and communities in the fight against local crime and terrorism.

The first is the Neighbourhood Watch Zones and Watch Groups, and the related Community Safety and Security Programme.

Today, there are about 600 Neighbourhood Watch Zones, and within them 800 Neighbourhood Watch Groups, in Singapore. These are residents getting together to safeguard their own immediate neighbourhoods, to look out for each other, to conduct Citizens-on-Patrol, and to alert the Police should something be amiss.

The Police support the Watch Groups with timely crime information, simple training, and also frequently organise residents to go on joint patrols.

The Community Safety and Security Programme, CSSP for short, is the means through which the Police rally the local community to address a localised safety or security concern.

The typical CSSP project is a joint action plan that is created in consultation with grassroots activists, residents and other interested agencies, and aimed at solving a specific safety issue or problem in the community. Numerous CSSP projects are being rolled out all over Singapore every day, all with the goal of making our neighbourhoods and communities that much safer for everyone.

SAFETY & SECURITY WATCH GROUPS

The Safety and Security Watch Group, SSWG in short, is the second of our two community engagement schemes. The SSWG is aimed squarely at the terrorist threat.

A mainstay of the SSWG Programme is the numerous building watch groups that have been formed. Today, we have more than 100 SSWG clusters which group together more than 800 commercial buildings that help to protect each other.

Security personnel of buildings in the same SSWG cluster share security information provided by the Police, run joint exercises, and coordinate their safety and security plans. Police also work with the SSWGs to implement the necessary target-hardening measures for their respective premises.

The Industry Safety and Security Watch Group is another variant of the SSWG format. Here, the Police systematically engage selected industries, like the petrochemical and the logistics industries, on safety and security issues at a more holistic level.

Similar links and agreements between the Police and business associations and guilds ensure that robust anti-crime and terrorism measures are in place all across commerce and industry in Singapore.

COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE

As if policing the real world is not enough, modernity delivers another challenge, that which is posed by the Internet.

Communities are no longer just a physical phenomenon; they also exist in cyberspace. Increasingly, virtual communities are as real and as significant as the brick and mortar variety. For a growing number, the virtual communities that they inhabit may actually be of greater importance.

Unfortunately, there are also criminals and crime in the virtual world. Unfortunately too, the harm caused by crime committed online is all too real, and comes in the form of loss of life and the misappropriation and destruction of property in the physical world.

The Police are still infants at replicating the success that we have enjoyed with community policing, in the communities in cyberspace.

For sure, online communities are also fertile ground for deploying many of the community-centred policing strategies that have been proven to be so successful in the physical world. And as a police force, we will have to establish the same kind of trust and cooperation we share with real-world communities within communities that exist online.

This will be the next great challenge for those of us who believe in the great power of community policing to make our world, both here and in the ether, a safer place for all.

WHAT WE KNOW

The Singapore Police Force's love affair with community policing has lasted 30 years, and this romance grows stronger by the day.

Since opening our first neighbourhood police post in 1983, we have witnessed a long period of sustained reduction in crime in Singapore. The crime rate of 650 cases per 100,000 population achieved in 2010 was less than half of what was experienced 20 years ago. And the crime rates continued to fall in 2011, to 606 per 100,000 population, a 20-year low. This means that for 13 consecutive years, the crime rate in Singapore has been below 1,000 cases per 100,000 population.

Although this long-term decline in crime cannot be entirely attributed to proactive policing and preventive strategies, I am nevertheless convinced that our perseverance in working hand-in-hand with our communities is a main reason we continue to live in a low-crime environment.

And by any measure, we in Singapore are fortunate to live in a very safe country. Indeed, in terms of the absence of crime and personal safety from crime, there are few safer places in the world than here.

This is, of course, not an accident, or entirely due to good fortune. A crime-free and orderly Singapore requires a police force that is clean, diligent and committed to her mission.

It requires police officers who believe that their work is both noble and significant, and that it makes a real difference to the lives of many others.

And, most important of all, it requires that the communities we police trust us to do a good job, and want to help us, and to join with us, to do an even better job.

12.

TOWARDS A SAFER AND MORE RESILIENT COMMUNITY: THE SINGAPORE GRASSROOTS EXPERIENCE

CHIA TZE YEE

GROUP DIRECTOR (ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMME CLUSTER)

PEOPLE'S ASSOCIATION



THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

As we learn how different communities around the world have reaped the value of social capital, especially in their efforts to overcome community problems or national crises, it reinforces our belief that a society rich in social capital is one whose people experience mutual trust and understanding, and are willing to help one another in ways that cut across all social barriers. This paper shares the People's Association's 'Community 2015 Vision' to build social capital, in the form of trust, confidence, networking and reciprocity.

The 1950s and early 60s were turbulent times for Singapore. Racial riots and political strife made Singapore a poor and divided society with communal groups pulling in different directions. To help forge national unity, the government formed

the People's Association on 1 July 1960. Widely referred to by Singaporeans as PA, its role, then and now, remains as follows: to foster racial harmony and social cohesion, promote active citizenry and civic responsibility, and serve as a bridge between the people and the government.

PA has a network of about 1,800 grassroots organisations managed by volunteers and supported by 83 Corporate Members representing different societal sectors including Service Organisations, Trade and Students' Unions etc. Through the various collaborations, PA and its Corporate Members and volunteers have been working closely together in many projects and initiatives aimed at bringing more people together to promote friendships and community bonding.




Figure 1. The People's Association's network of 1800 grassroots organisations are managed by volunteers who organise activities catering to the diverse needs and interests of Singaporeans.

Today, PA is moving towards a 2015 Vision of “A Great Home and A Caring Community, where we share our values, pursue our passion, fulfill our hopes, and treasure our memories”. This Vision describes a Singapore that is a Great Home for all residents, and where they feel a great sense of belonging to and pride in Singapore. Residents Care about the community, coming together to take ownership of community issues, taking initiative to organise meaningful activities for the community. People actively participate and volunteer to help make the community a great home for all. Neighbours and families Care and look out for one another, leaving no one behind.

BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE AND CAPABILITIES

An integral part of the grassroots network at the divisional level is the Community Emergency and Engagement Committee (C2E). The C2E comprises Grassroots Leaders, as well as key representatives from Community Club Management Committee, Residents’ Committees and Neighbourhood Committees. Personnel from the Singapore Police Force and Singapore Civil Defence Force are also represented to lend their expert opinion and guidance to the grassroots network. C2E helps to strengthen community resilience and enhance capability by involving residents, grassroots leaders, educational institutions, businesses, and civic, religious and welfare organisations in Emergency Preparedness programmes and activities.

The programmes developed by the C2E are designed to enhance emergency response capabilities, and build social capital through outreach strategies. By equipping our residents with the confidence and courage to respond to an emergency situation, these programmes sow the seeds of resilience and build trust in our multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.

(1) CERT PA Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) is a group of volunteers formed at the Residents’ Committee/Neighbourhood Committee Zone level to help prepare the resi-

dents for emergencies, assist the emergency services and affected residents during an emergency. During peacetime, the CERT members are expected to participate in emergency exercises to generate greater public awareness on community safety and security programmes, disseminate critical information to residents and identify residents who require special assistance during emergencies and enhance the safety and security of the neighbourhood through regular patrolling. Our pool of CERT members are trained in fire fighting and first aid, and increasingly, have been called upon to assist with crowd control at national level events such as National Day Parade and Singapore Formula One races.

To date, PA has a total CERT membership of 13,500, with 655 CERT Teams formed island wide. PA targets to train 2,000 members yearly, and by 2015, we aim to reach out to 22,000 CERT members, deployed in every constituency, Residents’ Committee and Neighbourhood Committee Zones.

C2E helps to strengthen community resilience and enhance capability by involving residents, grassroots leaders, educational institutions, businesses, and civic, religious and welfare organisations in Emergency Preparedness programmes and activities.



Figure 2. Programmes to help enhance emergency response capabilities and build social capital

(2) Citizens on Patrol (COP) The COP programme is a way of engaging our community and encouraging them to invest in the safety and wellbeing of the estate in which they reside. This is done by encouraging residents to patrol their estate and keep a lookout for suspicious behaviour, signs of tampering of security installations in the estate, and places where the safety of the residents can be compromised.

In some neighbourhoods, residents face the problem of harassment by unlicensed money lenders. This harassment is not limited to the debtor but affects innocent parties as well. In some cases, neighbours are also targeted by the unlicensed money lenders, and the harassment comes in the form of paint being splashed on the victims' doors, or even fires started outside their apartment units, while the victims are trapped

inside. Grassroots leaders from Clementi, Bukit Timah and Ayer-Rajah West Coast constituencies have been working closely with the police to involve more residents and domestic helpers to act as the eyes and ears of the police.

In setting up the COP groups, our partnership with the Singapore Police Force is key. Through the training provided, our CERT members and residents are equipped with the skills necessary to carry out patrols in a safe manner, and be the eyes and ears of the community. Towards this aim, PA aims to work closely with Police to form COPs in all Residents' Committee/Neighbourhood Committee zones, which will translate to 680 COPs island-wide.




Figure 3. This map from the Clementi Police Division shows how the precinct is divided into zones and the number of residents who participate in the patrolling of their neighbourhood.

(3) Community Safety and Security Programme (CSSP) The CSSP provides a platform for the community and grassroots groups to work together with the law enforcement and civil defence agencies and other relevant organisations in identifying their safety and security concerns in the neighbourhood and devise solutions to tackle these problems.

Grassroots leaders play an active role in CSSP; they coordinate, and together with residents, execute the ideas and solutions. Grassroots embarking on a CSSP project first identify key concerns and needs of the community, narrow down the root causes of the community's concerns and finally deploy an action plan they feel is able to address the concerns of the community.

CSSP - COP (Train) An example of how the community works closely with the Police in keeping vigilance over our train networks, which was a target of a terrorist conspiracy, is the Citizens on Train Patrol. It is an ongoing patrol conducted on a weekly basis, and this willingness by residents to step forward to volunteer and keep our trains safe is a prime example of social capital in action. One such example is South West Community Development Council, which recruited volunteers to conduct regular patrols with the Police to keep a look-out for suspicious character and packages at MRT stations. Training was also provided to prepare volunteers for such terrorist attacks. To promote vigilance and test the readiness of the volunteers, about 1,000 residents recently participated in a train exercise that simulated a terrorist attack.

(4) School Outreach When dealing with safety and security issues, and building community bonds, the C2Es work closely with our educational institutions to steer our youths away from troubled paths. The youths attend training on crime prevention and fire safety, and they are engaged in house visits to spread messages on crime prevention or fire safety. Through this scheme, the students gain a deeper appreciation of the safety and security issues facing their community, and a greater understanding of the roles of the police and grassroots leaders in building social capital.

(5) CEP The Community Engagement Programme (CEP) aims to build a resilient community, so that in times of emergency, people from the different segments of the community understand and trust each other, and are not easily swayed by incidents that may disrupt the current harmonious community relations in Singapore. In Geylang Serai Division, which has a cluster of more than 100 religious clans and associations, the community bonds between these religious groups and the community groups are strong, with the C2E encouraging the religious groups to undertake emergency preparedness training and exercises with the local residential community.

CONCLUSION

Living in a society which has not seen social unrest for some 40 years has made some Singaporeans complacent and laid back about their safety. However, our racial harmony and social stability are constantly under threat, either from external sources such as terrorism, or internal sources such as lack of cultural understanding.

Through a wide range of programmes, PA hopes that the social capital generated will help to further build a resilient community, based on mutual trust and understanding. Hence, by expanding the role of the grassroots leaders and the community, we will be able to effectively engage

Anti-loan shark groups see results

Since they were formed, some areas have seen dip in harassment cases

By KIMBERLY SPYKEMAN

HEARTLANDERS from Serangoon and Yishun to Jurong East are forming neighbourhood watch groups to meet head-on the problems caused by unlicensed moneylenders.

At least 10 neighbourhoods are watched over by these task forces, which rally residents into monitoring loan-shark activity, so the police have extra pairs of eyes looking out for loan-shark runners.

Last year, the number of cases of harassment perpetrated by these runners rose to more than 17,000 from 11,400 the year before.

But since the task forces have been formed, some of these neighbourhoods have reported a dip in cases of harassment by loan-shark runners, who are hired by syndicates to bully debtors into keeping up with their repayments.

The efforts of some of the more effective task forces were honoured yesterday with National Community Safety and Security Programme Awards.

Senior Minister of State for Law and Home Affairs Ho Peng Kee, noting in his speech that eight of the 29 grassroots groups that received the award were those set up to tamp down loan-shark activity, said he was heartened by the partnership between the police and these watch groups.

"While the police have enhanced their operations and enforcement against loan-sharking activities, marshalling community resources and getting the public on board are also vital to help stamp out this scourge," he said.

These watch groups have been patrolling problematic areas, educating residents through house visits, training them to recognise loan-shark runners and telling them whom to call when they spot them.

These groups have also harnessed technology by installing closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and motion detectors



Members of Nee Soon East's neighbourhood watch group on patrol. Last year, eight of 35 loan shark-related arrests resulted from the group's tip-offs.
PHOTO: NEE SOON EAST NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH GROUP

outside units hit by loan-shark runners.

Some groups have even educated teenagers on the consequences of becoming runners.

Having eyes on the ground is necessary, especially in a tougher economic climate.

Mr Michael Tan, the vice-chairman of the Nee Soon East Citizens' Consultative Committee (CCC), said: "Loan sharks have been around for years, but with the economic downturn, a lot more cases have surfaced."

He noted that in his area, an average of two to three cases of loan-shark harassment are reported each month. The victims include those who have unknowingly bought flats from those who owe money to loan sharks.

Tip-offs from his watch group have led to a significant number

of arrests in the area; eight of 35 loan shark-related arrests last year resulted from tip-offs.

Clementi CCC vice-chairman Justin Foo said his watch group's efforts paid off when a resident could give such a detailed description of a loan-shark runner that the police nabbed him in less than half an hour.

Another group recognised yesterday was the watch group under Canberra CCC, the first grassroots group to have a comprehensive package called the "Anti-Shark" programme.

It includes installing five CCTV cameras in the stairwells of blocks occupied by residents who have reported harassment by loan sharks, and activating the cameras in the lifts of those blocks.

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Source: The Straits Times

residents and community partners in strengthening the social fabric of our community during peacetime, which is a vital component of Emergency Preparedness and the strengthening of our social capital.

13.

CYBERONIA: TEACHING SCHOOL CHILDREN TO PROTECT THEMSELVES ONLINE

LUM HON FYE

CHAIRMAN, INFOCOMM TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL



PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE

About three years ago, the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) conducted some research on the habits of youth when they are using computers. We found that they have a very low awareness of cyber wellness. Although they are very computer savvy, they are still rather ignorant when it comes to protecting themselves when they are using the Internet.

We commissioned a survey on youths aged between 13 to 15 years old. 1500 students took part in this survey. It showed that:

- 70% of students are on Social Network Sites
- 70% of them did not know they could restrict applications from accessing their personal information
- 50% accepted total strangers as friends
- 25% were victims of cyber bullying more than once within that year
- 25% downloaded files from unknown people or websites
- 20% did not install computer protection programmes and had no idea what a fire-wall was

We decided to do something to address this issue. We wanted a programme that could be launched to schools immediately upon development, and at the same time be scalable to many thousands of youths. We also realized that our target audience, the young people – have a short attention span. But they love games. And we realized one important constraint, which is that schools in Singapore have a very heavy curriculum. The teachers are already busy teaching their own topics, and have no time to teach topics such as cyber wellness. As students and teachers are very busy, there was a need for us to come up with something that the students can learn by themselves and at the same time find fun and engaging, something that they would

Although they are very computer savvy, they are still rather ignorant when it comes to protecting themselves when they are using the Internet.

want to prolong their learning experience. It also had to be something that did not take up too much of the school's resources and the teacher's time. Therefore, we decided to develop a game and Cyberonia was born. It took us a year to develop the game, from conceptualisation to actual launch.

We set ourselves several learning outcomes when we developed the game.

Firstly, our aim is to educate the children on how they can **prevent cyber bullying** and what they should do if they encounter cyber bullying on the Internet.

Secondly, we want to **prevent gaming addiction**.

Thirdly, we want them to **practise online security**, to use strong passwords and to understand how computer viruses, Trojans and other malware work.

Last but not least, we also need to educate them on the importance of **safeguarding private information** and general Internet security and etiquette.

DEVELOPING CYBERONIA

According to a survey conducted by the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore in 2010, 82% of households in Singapore have Internet access at home and 97% of respondents, some from as young as 7 years old, access the Internet at least once in 12 months.¹

We thus decided our target group would be the 11-years old, or the fifth graders. Generally, by the time they are 11, many are on the Internet and we assessed that at this age, they are mature enough to understand the message we are trying to bring across.

The NCPC is made up of a group of volunteers, not all of whom have the whole range of domain expertise required to explain cyber wellness. Since we are targeting the students, we decided to partner with the Ministry of Education, Singapore Police Force, Infocom Development Authority and Touch Community. We also engaged the help of the Gaming Association,

the Law Society and a commercial partner called Gemalto.

What we developed is a multimedia game that students access over the Internet. We call it Cyberonia. It complements the existing cyber wellness education in the schools. It is modular and allows the teachers to go into the game to experience it for themselves. At the end of the game, a report is also generated for the teachers so that they can see how much time their students have spent on it and what lessons the students have taken from it. We also have a parent's resource page that shares information about the game with parents, because we realized our target audience might be able to access the computer only with permissions from their parents.

The following screen grab shows the interface page of Cyberonia, and the various games and learning tools.



¹ Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (2011). *Annual Survey on Infocomm Usage in Households and by Individuals for 2010*.

There is a tutorial to guide the students at the beginning. Subsequently, as they play the various mini-games, the students will build a city and all the students in the same class will develop their own district and the various districts will combine together in the same school to form a city. They can take a look at what other schools are doing and how well they develop their cities. This serves as a competition for the children, pushing them to want to build a better and more sophisticated city. There is also a theme park where they can meet each other and chat.

The mini games in Cyberonia educate the children on the various aspects of cyber wellness, like how to protect private information, how to get rid of malware, how to identify different types of malware, and how to produce a strong password. When they are playing the game, their city will come under attack and they will have to neutralise the attack. This is to introduce to the children the concept that while they are on the Internet, there could be malicious people around trying to attack them.

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INITIAL IMPACT

We conducted trials in the schools and learnt that more than 90% of the students found the game exciting and interesting and they will recommend it to their friends. This feedback is very important to us because we need the children to be attracted to the game and be keen to play it, as the Ministry of Education will not mandate that all students in schools have to play Cyberonia. The schools will not be required to introduce their students to Cybreonia, but will be encouraged to get them to play it. Cyberonia thus has to be interesting enough to capture the students' attention, and provide self-learning, so that the children imbibe the lessons we are trying to teach while playing the games.


We launched Cyberonia in April 2011. All the children need to is register at the website and they can start playing the game. In the first six months of the launch, we were able to out to 90 schools. As of 27 March 2012, almost 12,000 students from 120 schools have signed up to play Cyberonia. NCPC is encouraged by the progress so far and will be intensifying its efforts to create awareness about Cyberonia among schools.

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NCPC POSTER CAMPAIGNS TO EDUCATE CHILDREN ON CYBER SAFETY



From a series on Internet safety distributed in 2001



From a 2008 campaign for children

The background of the slide features a light gray world map at the top. Below the map is a large graphic consisting of several concentric circles. A thick white line runs vertically through the center of these circles, dividing them into two halves. A horizontal white line intersects the circles at the level of the main text. The text "USING 'OLD' AND NEW MEDIA" is written in a bold, red, sans-serif font, centered horizontally and partially overlaid by the horizontal white line.

USING "OLD" AND NEW MEDIA

14. DETERRING ORGANISED CRIME: WHY WRITING LETTERS WORK

PAUL EVANS



THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANISED CRIME

We are entering the strange world of organised crime and what I would like to talk to you about today is the contemporary picture that we currently see. And what organised crime means not just to you and law enforcement but also to our families and to our communities

I first began to consider organised crime in the late nineties when I became the Chief of Criminal Investigations in UK Customs. What was the dilemma? Well the government was expending more money on law enforcement to fight organised crime. And year on year the problem got worse. The gap between where we needed to be to protect society was growing. And the reason? It was because for the past 30 years law enforcement was very pleased with itself and the delivery tactical operations designed to capture the next criminal.

Putting away the next bad person was the objective. And when we remembered, seizing some assets. As it turns out I had a fantastic time. But I had to reflect on what I had achieved after 37 years in public service.

The first phenomena – the number of people involved who were engaged in organised crime in the UK (the ones we know about) comes to a total of 38,000. Our national capacity to deal with that problem every year is around 2000. That is fantastic. In 29 years the problem will be over! Therein lies the first clue to what the gap between resource and what we were able to achieve was too great.

The second phenomena – the incredible diversification of organised crime. Organised crime had diversified. Take, for example, mass marketing fraud. How was it that organised crime realises that this was a risk free zone? How did it decide to target the elderly and vulnerable?

As a result, I suddenly realised what was going on. I decided to work on how organised crime

had diversified. How could it be that in the beginning of 2011 when the European carbon trading registry went live, it suffered a soup to nuts attack – everything from phishing to theft. And how could it be that the same kind of attack, same architecture of attack, was repeated only three months later in New Zealand?

Diversification is mutant capitalism, is really clever and will go to places where law enforcement is not. We are still looking at serious problems of drugs, people smuggling, extortion, theft and product contamination and they are thinking I am going to do mass marketing of carbon trading and I am going to get into fake goods and stealing. If only because that is where they will not be.

I am discovering that that is smart and we need to understand it is a kind of a business model that we are just beginning to understand.

And its **third characteristic** – resilience. I began to understand the need for a different approach because nothing stops these people much and the only thing that they get really exercised about is losing their money and assets. Incarceration can often be a mere inconvenience. Even when we think of asset recovery in crime prevention and protecting the public, it still is not enough because if you put big numbers on the side of diversification next to resilience, you have got a whole new problem. So the last five years have been very challenging, for international law enforcement agencies.

ASSEMBLING THE PANOPTICON

There are some things I like you to consider. Perhaps when you are considering them, think about whether you believe this, think it is right, whether you think it applies to you and your case work.

I thought the most important thing we had was secret information. How vain is that? Secret information is probably the least important thing we hold. You know what the most important information in law enforcement is across the globe? It is information collected as part of a criminal investigation using coercive and criminal powers. It is evidence that is never used in prosecution; it gets filed away in prosecution papers and contains the absolute crown jewels. And in the world of technology over the last five years, the science of data analytics has been developed.

With a lot of help to get a budget, we assembled the data into a large pot on the 38,000+ people – personal data plus the feeds on their movement and other data such as travel patterns, data from the passport office, data from the benefits office, data from the suspicious activity reports. They show you a set of criminal networks that are extensive, incredibly vibrant and different from what the investigators think they might be investigating.

And then once you get the machine working, you can ask clever questions, like, what do these people do for a living? We never asked that question before.

Only a small proportion fit the traditional definition of the ‘organised criminal’. The rest are people like you and me. People who have a Janus personality, people who face the state and look compliant and face the criminals and look useful. And there is a massively long tail of criminality. Individuals who are prepared to facilitate, to turn a blind eye, to engage professional services, to engage in other professions, to facilitate the business of crime and to facilitate the conversion of criminal profit into something useable by the criminal.

And so it was in the segmentation of the data and the cutting of the data by geography and by profession that we were able to dive down into a number of things that organised crime was using to facilitate its growth and perpetuate its role in society.

This takes me to the story of garden centres. We ask the data, tell us what do these criminals do – nail bars, cafeterias, car washers, ground works, scaffolding, maritime transportation, garden centres. What was that all about? I remembered we had convicted someone working in a garden centre. A garden centre is where you buy plants and pots to put them in and stuff to put in the garden.

Why would you want to be an organised criminal owning a garden centre? I went to the HM Prison Whitehall to speak to the person who was found with 140 kilogrammes of heroin and he said you people are very stupid.

I had two garden centres leading from a motorway near Dover, where all the boats came from and then we get the lorries coming from Holland day and night. I was at a site where there was a 15 metre perimeter fence and labour were asking no questions on what they were loading and unloading. The only time when I saw the police was when they were on the highway. I lived 10 miles out of town and I had 15 tills to put in the cash from the sale of the drugs. Why are you people so stupid?

I think we were in fact stupid because we had no concept of verification, which we do now.

We also compared the organised crime data set against those people who held private pilot licences and found 72 private pilots with convictions or close associations with people engaged in drug trafficking. There are not too many rules on becoming pilots in the world. One is you have to pass the exam; two, you have not to be drunk and third, not to carry drugs in the plane.

There are 76,000 people in the UK who hold pilot licences. Getting rid of 72 is not a big deal but it is a big deal if you are one of the pilots who have lost the licence. And that carries a message to criminal communities about the ability of the state to fight back. When you look at all the jurisdictions in the area, where organised crime is highly prevalent is in security guards, night-clubs, bouncers and private investigators. 450 of those lost their licences, starting a conversation in many professions in the UK.

And even then, even though the number of interventions started to reach thousands, it still was not enough.

An Englishman named Jeremy Bentham postulated in a pamphlet in 1783 a device called the Panopticon for the attenuation of criminal behaviour. He postulated that you would be forced to make a different choice if you were being watched. In the US they actually built them. This is a prison (Figure. 1) and the panopticon is a cylinder containing cells. Around the cell walls, there are lights that come from the back of the cells into the centre of the prison. At the centre of the prison is the observation platform. The platform is screened from observation.

For cops, this is profoundly challenging, the idea of different approaches that you might use to reveal to organised crime your interest, intelligence or evidence about their propensity to engage in criminal activity.



Figure. 1 *The Panopticon*

Source: Doug DuBois & Jim Goldberg, *New York Times*, September 22, 2002

THE WRITE APPROACH




Figure 2. Article in *The Sun* (13 August 2009) about efforts by Chief Insp Andy Boyd of Thames Valley Police to encourage villains in the area to stay out of trouble. Boyd would send them birthday greetings that said: "On your birthday, we wish you well, We would hate to see you in a cell, Time to change your ways, Go straight. If you don't, you know your fate!"

I have got to say that Jeremy Bentham was right. This is best illustrated by the story of the cocaine trade in the United Kingdom. Most cocaine that you can purchase in the UK is not cocaine at all. It is cutting agent, because there has been such an attack on the supply chain to Western Europe. Over the last eight years the criminal gangs, in order to have enough to sell, had to mix cocaine with other chemicals. These are largely agricultural chemicals – they mimic the effects of cocaine. I do believe in the slogan "Just don't do it". Nonetheless people do it. For the last four years we had a major attack in the UK on the suppliers of these cutting agents, most of whom are legitimate. The agents themselves are legal. But we established in some big important cases that as a nation we were importing more of these agricultural anaesthetics than required to kill every cow in Europe. It is enough to show criminal conspiracy to supply the cocaine market.

At the bottom end of the market we have a whole lot of people importing in low chaotic amounts. And so you will really now think I have lost my senses. We have been writing to these people and I found some very scary psychologists and psychiatrists to help us to construct the letters.

So imagine, put yourself in the shoes of the criminals who for 15 years have gotten away with

money laundering, importing cutting agents etc. Imagine all of a sudden a letter arrives at your front door. It does not just arrive. It is hand delivered by a law enforcement official in uniform and you have to sign for it.

It is a highly threatening letter.

I had not appreciated what would happen next. We did not receive any complaints. After a thousand letters delivered, not a single complaint. But up to 60% of the criminals we wrote to ceased their activities and 11 % left the jurisdiction.

I leave you with the thought of how agencies can use the data they have to leverage the activity of others to do what they should be doing about regulating certain activities. And I put to you this – you cannot go on being the kinds of people we have been. The problem is too deep seated and closely linked with new society for us to be complacent. The other thing we cannot do is to throw up our hands and say it is all too difficult.

The challenge for you now is this: That there are great stories, there is a great history but actually only you can make the transformation. Because the challenge we face is deep seated and is amongst us everyday of the week. That is the challenge I leave you with.

15. DISRUPTING THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD EXPLOITATION ON THE INTERNET

BINDU SHARMA



Bindu Sharma with NCPC Council Chairman Tan Kian Hoon (left) and Vice-Chairman Geoffrey Singham (right)

THE INTERNET AND CHILD SEX ABUSE

I represent the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC). I will speak briefly on ICMEC's work in the child protection space, and our partnerships with industry, governments, academia and civil society groups around the issue of child protection and increasingly online child safety.

Public-private partnerships and corporate social responsibility (CSR) are now the new buzz words in the international business lexicon. CSR has always existed in some shape or form throughout the history of private enterprise. Just like the visionary industrial philanthropists of yesteryears, who saw the well-being of the wider community as a corner-stone to a successful business, CSR is similarly the enlightened self-interest on the part of corporations. Moreover, the current social, environmental and economic challenges the world faces today cannot be solved by governments alone. Governments the world over have acknowledged as much and require the active contribution of other sectors of society.

What is the issue at hand? In this age of technological connectivity, online safety and child protection have become of paramount importance.

In 2006, when the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Children, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, presented his report "The Study on Violence against Children" to the UN General Assembly, he noted:

... the Internet and other developments of communication technologies ... appear to be associated with an increased risk of sexual exploitation of children as well as other forms of violence against children.

Prior to the arrival of the Internet, it was extremely difficult to obtain child pornography or child sexual abuse images, as they are now increasingly referred to. A person interested in acquiring child sexual abuse images either had

to know someone who had such images or take considerable personal risk to obtain or produce such images.

In 2006, when the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Children, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, presented his report "The Study on Violence against Children" to the UN General Assembly, he noted: "The Internet and other developments of communication technologies ... appear to be associated with an increased risk of sexual exploitation of children as well as other forms of violence against children."

Two reports throw light on the situation today. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in a June 2010 report titled *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, estimated that the commercial child sexual exploitation industry globally generates an estimated 50,000 new child sexual abuse images each year and is worth about US\$250 million globally.¹ The UNODC report goes on to say that such material is available in both the commercial and non-commercial domains, but the ratio between the two remains unclear. In a joint report by ICMEC and the Children's Charities Coalition on Internet Safety, presented at the Internet Governance Forum in June 2010, the data suggested that in 2010 the number of known unique images was around 1 million and the number of children being abused to make the images ran into the tens of thousands.

We have to keep in mind these are figures based solely on successful police action in countries where there is adequate legislation and law enforcement is proactively investigating such behaviour. The true volume is likely to be higher.

1 UNODC, June 2010:http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf
Executive Summary:http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/Executive_summary.pdf

In Asia, at this point, few governments and law enforcement agencies collate such data and fewer still make it available in the public domain. The biggest challenge for ICMEC is creating the awareness around the issue of online child exploitation and abuse in the absence of data and how we can make Internet safety a part of mainstream child protection efforts. Policing the online environment is still in its early stages. In the case of online commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse, the “criminal” activity can be hosted in one country, the victims can be in another country, while the offender accessing or purchasing such illegal images could be in yet another country.

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the primary international instrument for protecting child rights has been signed by all but two UN member countries. The CRC is the most ratified convention of all. Yet, some say it suffers from benign neglect in many countries of the world.

Speaking recently at the Singapore Management University’s Law School on The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – A Global Social Contract, Prof. Eugene Verhellen of Belgium – who has an illustrious background in teaching human rights law and as an active practitioner – held the view that the CRC is still a “baby”. Much has to change in the social, cultural and traditional customs of nation-states both developed and developing for the CRC to achieve its founding goals.

WORKING TO PROTECTING CHILDREN

In ICMEC’s work, public-private partnerships are key. Several of ICMEC’s programmes, you will see, are successful partnerships. We work to protect the world’s children from sexual exploitation and abduction. How do we work in the child protection space? Each programme is a collaborative effort – be it government, academia, industry or law enforcement.

ICMEC’s core programmes comprise:

- Assisting with the Creation of National Centres around the world
- Leading a global financial coalition to eradicate commercial child pornography to address the link between child pornography and the financial system
- Providing training and working to catalyse the development of technology tools through industry partnerships to protect children globally
- Conducting research for policy reform
- Fostering an international network to disseminate images of and information on missing and exploited children.

In the United States, we work closely with our sister organisation, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). The National Center serves as a clearing house of information on missing and sexually exploited children – they run a national hot-line 24/7, and work on the whole range of issues surrounding missing, abducted, runaway, throwaway/abandoned, abused and exploited children. NCMEC also provides support to families that are living with the tragedy of a missing or abused child.

NCMEC is unique in that it has federal law enforcement agencies detailed to the Center. It works in cooperation with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. NCMEC has representatives from the FBI, ICE, Secret Service, US Marshal Service, US Postal Inspection Service, and a Military Liaison officer – all seconded to the organisation. NCMEC also works with law enforcement overseas.

THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

The Internet has created an exciting new world of information and communication for anyone with access to online services. While this technology offers unparalleled opportunities for children

People are now able to form virtual communities, endorse each other's behaviour and further normalise such behaviour

and adults alike to learn about the universe in which we live, it has also had an immeasurable impact on child safety online. The development of and increased accessibility and use of home-computer technology has revolutionised the distribution of child abuse images by increasing the ease of possession and dissemination and decreasing the cost of production and distribution, especially across international borders. As leading child protection advocate Zoe Hilton, Head of Safeguarding and Child Protection of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Agency in the UK, puts it:

*The Internet hasn't created abuse, but it has created more opportunities for like-minded individuals to contact each other and interact in dangerous and inappropriate ways.*²

People are now able to form virtual communities, endorse each other's behaviour and further normalise such behaviour. Ms Hilton adds: "The online risks to children are very real, but often the information needed to safeguard them seems very hidden."³

In Asia, with the exception of Japan, Singapore and South Korea, the use of computers takes place less in the home or school environment, but rather the young surf the net without adult supervision in Internet cafes.

In Africa and parts of Asia, the growing use of mobile digital technology is leap-frogging fixed-line Internet usage, where tracking and tracing is even harder.

Child pornography is a lucrative worldwide industry. Children have unfortunately become a commodity in this insidious crime. While there is no empirical research on the scope of the problem, there are estimates:

- Cyberspace is home to more than one million images of tens of thousands of children being subjected to sexual abuse and exploitation. (ECPAT International, *Violence Against Children in Cyberspace*, 2005)
- 200 new images of child pornography are posted daily. (Wortley and Smallbone, *Child Pornography on the Internet*, 2006)
- The industry generates an estimated 50,000 new child sexual abuse images each year globally. (UNODC, *The Globalization of Crime: ATtransnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, June 2010)

As can be seen, even in countries where data is collated or where international agencies have attempted to throw light on this issue, data is not readily available. Most are only estimates. Often times we have to depend on anecdotal evidence and case studies. Estimates thus change over time as more and new information becomes available. A culture of silence among authorities and adults only perpetuates the suffering of children if they are targets of such abuse.

2 Zoe Hilton interview – 'Someone to Watch Over Me' <http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/29/01/2010/113679/ceops-safeguarding-head-zoe-hilton.htm>

3 Ibid.

In Asia, the lack of exact numbers or research does not diminish the need to “sound the alarm bells” now. The Internet Watch Foundation, UK, in its 2010 Annual Report reported that Europe (including Russia) and North America are each responsible for around 40 per cent of the world’s child sex abuse URLs while Asia accounts for 17 percent.⁴


Asia leads in Internet usage in absolute numbers. Seven Asian countries rank in the top 20 in the world, with three ASEAN countries - Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam - in the mix. The others in the East Asia region are China, Japan and South Korea.⁵

In terms of “Internet penetration”, or the percentage of population with access to the Internet, it

varies from 82.7% in South Korea, 77.2% in Singapore to 22.4% in Indonesia as of March 2012 – keeping in mind that the world average is only 32.7%, and Asia’s is 26.2%.⁶

Within Asia, of the top 10 Internet usage countries, 5 are ASEAN countries– Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. And the numbers have changed dramatically. For example, from a mere 2 million users in Indonesia in 2000, today there are close to 55 million users. And in Vietnam there has been an increase from just 200,000 users to close to 31 million users today. These are the two countries with the largest increase in Internet users. Even in Singapore, in 2000 there were 1.2 million users and today there are 3.7 million – a three-fold increase.

Figure 1 . Top 20 Internet Countries as at 2012



4 Internet Watch Foundation, Annual and Charity Report 2010, page 9: <http://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/annual-reports/Internet%20Watch%20Foundation%20Annual%20Report%202010%20web.pdf>

5 Internet World Stats: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm>

6 Internet World Stats – Asia Internet Usage: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm>
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>

GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

ICMEC's Global Campaign Against Child Pornography has several key components:

- The Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP)
- Technology and Training Tools and
- The Koons Family Institute - the research arm of ICMEC

Why child pornography? Suffice to say that it is a multi-million dollar commercial enterprise – an e-business - that people profit from and is among the fastest growing businesses on the Internet.

FINANCIAL COALITION AGAINST CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

The Internet has enabled instant access to child pornography by thousands and possibly millions of individuals around the world. In addition, consumers are able to use traditional payment methods, such as credit cards, as well as new, alternative payment schemes, to buy and sell child pornography on the Internet. The mission of the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography(FCACP) is to follow the flow of funds and shut down the payments accounts used by these illicit enterprises, thereby disrupting the profitability of this trade.

Secondly, technology today facilitates this trade. Through the use of digital and mobile devices, child pornography has become easier and less expensive to produce. Moreover, the dissemination - via ordinary email, chat groups, peer-to-peer exchange and technologies like, Skype and web-cams live-streaming – is no longer limited by national boundaries.

A greater number of child molesters are now using computer technology to organise, maintain, and increase the size of their collections. Personally-manufactured illegal images of child

Why child pornography? Suffice to say that it is a multi-million dollar commercial enterprise – an e-business - that people profit from and is among the fastest growing businesses on the Internet.

abuse are especially valuable on the Internet, and oftentimes molesters will trade images of their own sexual exploits. When these images reach cyberspace, they are irretrievable and can circulate forever, consequently re-victimizing the child. Children are not incidental purchasing power agents; they have continued to be targeted by sexual offenders who are equally aware of the latest technology trends and are quick to acquire the necessary skills that enable them to access, prey on, and ultimately victimise children.

Today in the United States, there are 35 major industry players that account for 90% of the payments industry in the US who are participating in the FCACP and in Asia the participation is growing.

An integral resource in the fight against online child pornography is NCMEC's CyberTipline. It is essentially an Internet hotline, often referred to as the 911 for the Internet. We need, however, to keep in mind that the Internet knows no geographic boundaries and the CyberTipline receives referrals from around the world.

The CyberTipline was launched in March of 1998, and it provides a simple way for individuals to report child sexual exploitation to a central agency. This online reporting resource bridges the gap between those who wish to report crimes online and the law-enforcement agencies that need this information. From 1998 to 2012, there have been more than 1 million reports to the CyberTipline.⁷

Table 1. Data from the CyberTipline, www.cybertipline.com

Reports Received on CyberTipline as Classified by Individual Filing Report	Project Total (March 9, 1998 -March 2012)
Child Pornography	1,271,374
Child Prostitution	11,462
Child Sex Tourism	3,921
Child Sexual Molestation (Not in the Family)	21,332
Misleading Domain Name	10,344
Misleading Words or Digital Images on the Internet	7,724
Online Enticement of Children for Sexual Acts	56,209
Unsolicited Obscene Material Sent to a Child	9,468
Submitted Without Incident Type	866
Total	1,392,700

The CyberTipline also receives reports regarding child sex exploitation from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The US is one of eight countries in the world that require ISPs to report illegal content on their sites, the others being Australia, Belgium, Colombia, France, Italy, the Philip-

pines and South Africa. NCMEC proactively reaches out to US based Electronic Service Providers (ESPs) in an effort to enroll them with the CyberTipline. Once enrolled, ESPs can access the secure reporting page, which allows them to make reports that include uploaded images of apparent child pornography.

⁷ NCMEC's CyberTipline Fact Sheet: http://www.ncmec.org/en_US/documents/CyberTiplineFactSheet.pdf

In the US, ESPs are not legally required to proactively search for illegal content, but must report it to the CyberTipline if they become aware of child pornography on their servers. The CyberTipline programme also liaises with law enforcement in other countries and provides them with information on referrals that have been received from their country.

Elsewhere in the world, in Europe, Europol leads the European Financial Coalition with ICMEC on the Steering Committee. In Sweden, ECPAT Sweden, the Swedish bank Skandiabanken and the national law enforcement agency came together to form the Coalition that is now supported by the Swedish Bankers' Association.

TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY TOOLS

In 2003, with generous **support of Microsoft** and in **partnership with Interpol**, ICMEC launched a 5-year international training initiative focused on training law enforcement, prosecutors, and other professionals from all around the world to investigate Internet-related child exploitation cases. Designed to provide law enforcement with tools and techniques needed to investigate Internet-related child exploitation cases, the programme has trained over 3,000 participants from 115 countries. Today, ICMEC continues to provide similar training with support from Microsoft in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The **Virtual Global Taskforce** (VGT) established in 2003 is an international child protection taskforce, with a handful of member countries and today comprises a coalition of nine country law enforcement agencies. The VGT was established with a specific mandate to fight online child abuse. ICMEC is an industry partner of the VGT, along with only three other NGOs worldwide.

THE KOONS FAMILY INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY

As the International Centre's in-house research arm, The Koons Family Institute conducts and commissions research into the status of child sexual exploitation and child protection legislation around the world and collaborates with other partners in the field to identify and measure threats to children and ways the International Centre can support and promote change to help make children safer.

The Koons Family Institute's work helps ICMEC build a truly global movement by creating replicable legal tools, building international coalitions, bringing together great thinkers and opinion leaders to combat child abduction and child sexual exploitation on multiple fronts.

One of the ongoing projects of the Koons Family Institute is the **Child Protection Project**. In partnership with The Protection Project of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, ICMEC is working to draft a comprehensive model law on protecting children from all forms of neglect, abuse, maltreatment, and exploitation, following a preventative policy approach and providing child victims with the necessary remedies.

The Model Law is based on the special protection measures of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and its two optional protocols- the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Pornography and the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. The Model Law, now in its fifth draft, consists of 66 articles based on international legal standards and best practices from 65 countries and 117 national laws on child protection.

Model Child Pornography Legislation Given the above statistics and social trends, the question that arises is: How do governments view the use of the Internet and developing technologies through the lens of child protection? ICMEC's model child pornography legislation project

seeks to provide insight into this question. The *Child Pornography: Model Legislation & Global Review*, a research publication, aims to assist countries worldwide with taking the necessary steps to combat child pornography offences. In 2006, the 1st edition of the report included information on the then 184 Interpol Member Countries, with subsequent editions reviewing all 196 UN countries. The 6th edition of the report was published in 2010. The research for the 7th edition is well underway.

Once again this is an effort that has been possible through partnerships with academic institutions and law firms. On this and many other research projects, we partner with universities and law schools in the Washington, DC area, utilising graduate and legal interns to assist with research under the supervision of ICMEC staff. In addition, a law firm in the DC area is also providing pro-bono research as well as legal guidance on the research.

CONCLUSION

Every programme is clearly a partnership across sectors.

To conclude, it is clear that there is no easy, single solution to this problem. The current accessibility of the Internet and the emergence of various online technologies have provided offenders with the means to view, trade, download, and sustain commercial enterprises based on child exploitation images. And the problem likely will continue to grow as offenders discover new online avenues with lower risk of detection.

No country is immune, and it will take a concerted effort by governments, law enforcement, industry and civil society to ensure that the world's children are protected.

Developing and championing consistent and harmonized legislation and policies among nations is critical to a successful outcome in the fight against child sexual exploitation. Local efforts

are key to fighting this crime, but a coordinated approach across countries is essential to eliminate the option of “forum shopping”. Offenders are always looking for the region, country, geographic territory that has the most lenient legal framework where they can find “safe harbour”.

While strong legislation is crucial, it is equally, if not more, important to train key personnel, encourage industry responsibility, and foster cross-sectoral collaboration as essential elements of a comprehensive and pro-active approach to international child protection efforts.

There is no choice but to tackle these problems at the scale on which they have emerged: globally. Let me refer back to the UNODC report that I started with, which states in its concluding remarks:

To deal with these markets, creative solutions are needed, drawing on techniques not necessarily found in the law enforcement toolkit.

Non-traditional regulatory coalitions are hence the key to success going forward.

16. CRIME PREVENTION, SOCIAL NETWORKING AND COVERT OPERATIONS

NICK O' BRIEN & MICK KEELTY



Mick Keelty

THE CHALLENGE OF UNDERCOVER POLICING

Organised crime during the 1980s and 1990s in Australia and other countries resulted in the introduction of several crime prevention strategies through government policies aimed at improving certainty of a person's identity. Money laundering of the proceeds of crime was often facilitated through multiple identities and taxation fraud. The 1990s through to the present day has seen the growth of terrorism around the globe. Strategies introduced to be more effective in dealing with this crime type included undercover policing and operations using police with "assumed identities" obtained lawfully.

This type of covert operation by police required new legislation, at both State and Federal level, to allow police to legally adopt a false identity.

Infiltrating organised crime groups using a false identity and enticing criminals to turn against their co-accused and give evidence for the prosecution are very effective methodologies. These tactics can reduce the cost of prosecutions by providing compelling admissible evidence from witnesses who are agents of the prosecution.

Moves were also made to require higher degrees of scrutiny to verify identity documents to reduce fraud. Reducing the opportunity for multiple identities, fraud against the government revenue through the introduction of photographic licences, tax file numbers and social security identification became a priority for the government. The undercover police were inadvertently caught up in the system that required a legislative framework to enable them to verify their "false identity".

These crime reduction strategies were supplemented by the introduction of sophisticated "witness protection" programmes.

These methodologies require the covert operative or the protected witness, to remain unable to be identified by organised crime or terrorist groups for

the rest of their lives. Various strategies have been used in the case of police, to ensure that their identity is never known to the criminal element.

Sometimes, new police recruits, not yet exposed to criminals or terrorists are engaged as undercover operatives. The idea is premised on the fact that these "new police" are not yet known to criminal elements and this genre of police officer is less likely to have been exposed to the perils of corruption. Corruption is considered an enabler for some forms of organised crime.

Another strategy has been to use trained undercover police from other police forces either interstate or overseas, who are not known in the jurisdiction where the undercover operation is to be conducted.

In the case of a witness protection matter, it is possible that the person has already been part of an organised crime gang and may have lived and worked with the accused so masking their identity is problematic. Witnesses for the prosecution requiring to be 'hidden' from their jurisdictions have often found themselves in another part of the country or indeed, placed overseas until they are required to give evidence after which they are 'resettled' in another place and encouraged to get on with their lives with a new 'assumed identity'.

This type of strategy to infiltrate crime or terrorist groups is extremely expensive. A UK undercover officer revealed in 2011 that the cost per annum for each officer was in the region of UKP 250,000 per annum (Graham, 2011). It is also extraordinarily dangerous for the individuals should they be discovered as being an 'agent for the prosecution'. Equally, the families of these agents could be at risk should an agent's true identity be discovered.

THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA


The introduction of Social Networking Sites (SNS), particularly over the past five years since the introduction of Facebook has seen a change in social attitudes about what people keep private. The exponential growth of SNS has seen Facebook grow to over 800 million users as at December 2011. If it were a country, Facebook would be the third largest in the world behind China with a population in the region of 1.3 billion and India with a population in the region of 1.2 billion.

By way of example, out of 71.15% of all Singapore's Internet users, 55.37% or over two and a half million are Facebook users. The profile of Singapore's Facebook users is evenly split between males and females (*Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Facebook Information, 2011*).

The growth of SNS has seen a commensurate growth in the uploading of photographs to accompany social networking events. Facebook statistics estimate that up to 250 million photographs are uploaded onto Facebook every day, with a reported 750 million photographs being uploaded during the 2010/11 New Year weekend (Kincaid, 2011).

Given these developments, our research set about attempting to quantify the level of exposure of new police recruits at the time of embarking on their careers. The researchers were interested in the impact of the convergence of technologies in an environment where it is estimated that smart phones will outnumber other handsets by 2014 in Western Europe and will have captured 72% of that market by 2016 (Analysys Mason, 2011). Significantly, at the end of 2011, there were 6 billion mobile subscriptions with "smartphones showing the strongest growth" (*Global mobile statistics 2012*).

Added to the convergence of technologies, both facial recognition and photo tagging have become freely available. Access to cloud com-



If it were a country, Facebook would be the third largest in the world behind China with a population in the region of 1.3 billion and India with a population in the region of 1.2 billion.

puting, thought to be new technology but in reality, simply a new term for old technology where banks of computers are pooled together to provide extra computing power will make cross referencing and searching of photos and facial features accessible to many more people, including organised crime.

The capability to search so many images can be facilitated by purchasing computing power from service providers such as Amazon Web Services, which provides capacity on a "pay by hour" basis (Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, 2011).

In short, the researchers are attempting to find out whether we are witnessing the "death" of undercover policing and witness protection programmes used so effectively in the past three decades.

THE RISE AND RISE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING

Most observers would probably agree that the modern form of social networking commenced with the introduction of Facebook to the general public in 2006 (Kirkpatrick, 2010).

As of December 2011, Facebook reports that it has over 800 million active users. The story of Facebook has been the subject of several publications and even a movie, *The Social Network* released in 2010.

In January 2011, the President of the United States of America, made reference to Facebook in his annual State of the Union address. Indeed President Obama has even visited Facebook (Parr, 2011). Another example of the penetration of Facebook into our world was witnessed during the overthrow of the Mubarak Government in Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011.

Another Arab country Libya, which also faced major civil unrest and the unseating and death of their controversial leader, Colonel Muammar Ghadaffi, was thought to be influenced by a civilian movement generated through social networking. This outcome was predicted in a speech delivered by Ghadaffi's son, Seif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi, at the peak of the Arab uprising in Egypt when he said, "Libya has oppositionists. They began to imitate what happened in Egypt, using the so-called Facebook Revolution".

This raises the question as to whether Facebook or other SNS will in time have more influence than the ballot box in modern democracies.

It is interesting when you look at the globe and see the countries that have adopted Facebook as their preferred SNS. The maps below compare the take up rate of Facebook in 2009 with 2011.



Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2003679/Amazing-maps-Facebook-taking-world.html>




Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2003679/Amazing-maps-Facebook-taking-world.html>

Of interest is the increased take up rate in South Asia, South East Asia and some African nations. Indonesia reportedly had nearly 39 million Facebook users in June 2011 which makes it the second largest Facebook user behind the United States. Indonesia's Facebook penetration is nearly 16% of the eligible population.

Also of interest is the age profile of Facebook users in Singapore. Rather than being dominated by the younger generation, the largest user group at 32% of total users is aged between 25 years and 34 years. Nearly 60% of all users in Singapore are aged between 18 years and 34 years. As discussed later in this paper, this cohort offers those planning crime prevention strategies with some unique opportunities to deliver positive benefits from social networking.

Also of interest is the age profile of Facebook users in Singapore. Rather than being dominated by the younger generation, the largest user group at 32% of total users is aged between 25 years and 34 years.

Age Profile of Facebook users in Singapore



But other SNS options have emerged as well, such as Twitter, LinkedIn, Foursquare and now, Google+. The question arises as to who will dominate the market. Popular SNS such as MySpace may simply dominate the market for a few years and then seemingly disappear. Google+ has had an extraordinary take up rate since it burst onto the scene in mid-2011 with CEO Larry Page announcing in October 2011 that it had “passed the 40 million user mark”. Twitter has also been widely embraced; in September, it announced that it had 100 million active users. It is also possible to share images on Twitter through third party applications such as Twitpic. Twitter provides the quickest way of distributing information to a large numbers of people.

In today’s world, crowd sourcing, sometimes referred to as crowd journalism, will challenge operational police to maintain the security over their activities. For example, the capture of Osama Bin Laden was first revealed not by officials but on Twitter.

LinkedIn is another SNS that has attracted high growth levels. In November 2011, 135 million people were registered on LinkedIn across 200 countries. More than half of the people who have embraced LinkedIn are located outside the USA and in 2010, LinkedIn saw 2 billion searches carried out on its site and the company estimated that 2011 will see 4 billion searches on the LinkedIn platform.

CONVERGENCE OF TECHNOLOGIES

As of November 2011 there were 3.5 billion mobile subscribers, which represents 77% of the world's population. Mobile telephones now have photographic capabilities that are equal or in some cases surpass the pixel capacity of some cameras. 2012 saw the introduction of the first 41 megapixel camera phone (Segan, 2012).


Capturing images on mobile phones has become commonplace because of the ease and the quality of the technology, not to mention its mobility.

The modern mobile phone or smart phone is also a computer enabling the rapid distribution of photographs around the globe.

Iris scanning technology has now been used as part of security controls in border protection. Air travellers, for example, can use a Nexus pass rather than a passport to cross the USA/Canadian border. This involves an iris scan check (Nexus Iris Scan Locations, 2011).

The intricate structures of the iris have enabled iris scanning to become a key to biometric identification techniques. Some computers rely on a captured image of the eye to allow use of the computer instead of code words or fingerprints.

Once an iris image is captured it lasts a lifetime.



SURVEY ON EXPOSURE LEVEL OF 2010/2011 POLICE RECRUITS

A survey instrument was developed and distributed to police recruits from two Australian police forces and three other Australian agencies that use covert operatives with access to assumed identities.

An introduction to the research was explained to the respondents and respondents retained their anonymity by individually accessing the survey instrument through a URL site established by Charles Sturt University. The Australian Democratic and Social Research Institute based at the Australian National University assisted in the analysis of the survey results. Survey respondents were not identified but their agency was made known to the researchers.

The survey established that 85% of respondents were using a Social Network Site, with Facebook being the most popular site. The percentage of people using social networking sites were much higher in younger age groups – over 90% for all age groups under 36 years – compared with a low of 45% for the 46-50 year age group.

47% of the survey respondents used a social networking site daily and another 24% used a site weekly with an even spread between male and female respondents. A higher percentage of younger people use social networking sites on a daily basis.

It was discovered that over 90% of the respondents aged 36 years or younger were using SNS. 85% of the respondents were aware that their photograph had been uploaded on the Internet by another person. Almost 100% of respondents aged 26 or younger knew that their photograph was available on the internet.

When the research was started in 2010, the only way to have your photograph removed from a Facebook entry was to seek the agreement of the person who uploaded the photograph. More recently, provision has been made for

people to approach Facebook and have their photographs removed.

The survey sought to establish whether it was possible to identify a police recruit through his or her network of friends. In other words, if you were unsure whether someone was a police officer, could you establish that fact by searching his or her friends and acquaintances? 42% of respondents thought that it would be possible to identify their relationships with other people through the Internet.

21% of the respondents said it would be possible to associate their photo with their personal details on the Internet while a higher percentage, 36%, said that they did not know or had never checked. 16% said that they had considered the consequences of facial recognition software when uploading their photos on the Internet whereas 39% of the respondents had not considered the possibility.

37% did not answer this question, giving rise to the suggestion that while they were answering the survey questions, they may have realised the implications of captured images of them on the Internet as they were embarking upon their careers as police or intelligence officers.

Finally, 28% of the survey respondents answered that completing the survey had caused them to be concerned about their profile on the Internet (35% of females, 26% of males).

After the surveys were completed, the researchers began discussing the results with various academic groups, policy makers and others. In discussing the results with operational personnel, issues began to arise which may be considered incidental to the research but they highlight the challenges ahead for any type of secure operation.

For example, police will often delay briefing large numbers of officers about impending operational activity against high priority targets until the last

minute in order to maintain operational security and to maximize the impact. To mitigate the risk of exposure, specific details of the operation are retained by a small number of essential staff on a “need to know” basis. But often, there is a requirement for supplementary staff to be brought in to assist the operation. If the supplementary staff have a well-publicised profile on SNS or frequently use the geolocation feature on their Smartphone, operational security can be rapidly compromised.

USING SOCIAL NETWORKING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

In terms of crime prevention, it needs to be remembered that there is little or no authoritative way to ensure the true identity of entities on the Internet. There is no better recent example than the recent attempt to engage with the heads of defence and intelligence agencies by a group who pretended to be the head of NATO forces. Apparently “friend” requests from Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis appeared on the Facebook sites of significant military and political personnel from the US, UK and allies. However, a newspaper has reported that the profile was created by “foreign spies” (Lewis, 2012).

While the focus of the research has been directed towards the ramifications of inadvertent (as opposed to deliberate) disclosure of a person’s identity when using a social network, there are some positive uses for law enforcement especially when it comes to the intelligence available from trawling through social networking sites.

Equally, recent natural disasters such as the Tsunami in Japan and large floods and cyclones in Queensland, Australia, have highlighted the value of social networking as a law enforcement tool for assisting the community.

In the Queensland flood example from early 2011, the use of Facebook grew exponentially as the disaster was being managed. Prior to the floods, Queensland had 1.4 million Facebook

users. In December 2010, the Queensland Police had only 7,000 friends. This grew to 12,000 by January 10, 2011 and their Facebook page received 39 million hits. By the end of the disaster, Queensland Police had 172,000 friends and it is still growing today.

The Queensland Police established “Terms of Use” for their Facebook page and enabled information from the public to be authenticated and rebadged as a Queensland Police entry on the Facebook page. Some friends on Facebook were “black listed” by the police as they were putting false entries on the Facebook page. The police also used Twitter to keep on top of information being provided by the community and allowing it to be broadcast as an “official tweet”.

Facebook and other social networking sites have enormous capacity to process information. Queensland Police were able to present “live streaming” of flooded areas to warn the public about the dangers they were facing.

CONCLUSION

The growth in both the take up rate of these technologies and advances in the technologies themselves will have an impact upon the ability of anyone to remain anonymous or use an assumed identity.

This has an immediate impact upon the current practices used by undercover police and other national security activities that rely upon assumed identities.

There are other implications for law enforcement. Where a witness has been placed under witness protection and given a new identity, there is now a possibility that previous images of the person will be linked with his or her original name.

In countries where there are Occupational Health and Safety laws governing the obligation of employers to protect their workers from injury or harm, the convergence of technologies presents some immediate challenges. A failure

by employers to understand and recognise the advancement in these technologies could expose someone such as a Commissioner of Police to litigation for failing to protect his/her undercover police from being harmed.

New ways of achieving the same outcome as an undercover police officer will need to be implemented. The most obvious of these is the expanded use of human sources to obtain the intelligence and evidence required to provide vital evidence against organised crime.

The response to the loss of privacy was put to Google's Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt, who said that you should change your name on your sites (Hearn, 2010). But of course, once a photo is tagged with your name, it is recorded forever. The facial recognition scan capability will ignore the name and present identical images of a person regardless of the name.

This research produced an interesting outcome on a question to the police recruits about whether or not the captured image of their face has given them a cause for concern. 45% of the respondents were not concerned. However, 37% of the respondents did not answer that question, giving rise to conjecture that while they were answering the survey questions, they may have realised the implications of captured images of them on the Internet as they were embarking on their new careers.

What is clear is that if our research at the beginning of 2011 showed that nearly 100% of police recruits aged 26 years or younger were already recorded on SNS, the embracement trends in social networking means that we may have seen the end of the ability of a person to take on an assumed identity for undercover police work or other type of covert operation. This research will continue to measure these trends but there is a need for undercover and covert operation strategies to be cognisant of these issues.

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The background features a light gray world map at the top. Below it is a large graphic consisting of several concentric circles. A thick white line forms a semi-circle on the left side of the circles. A vertical white line bisects the circles. A horizontal white line passes through the center of the circles, where the text is located. The text is in a bold, red, sans-serif font.

**SPECIAL FOCUS:
TACKLING YOUTH CRIME**

17. **DEALING WITH YOUTH GANGS: GETTING THE FUNDAMENTALS RIGHT**

MASAGOS ZULKIFLI

MINISTER OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS



TAKING A DEEPER LOOK AT YOUTH GANGS

The context of the Singapore scene is one where youth crime is largely under control. Over the last five years, the average number of youth arrests has remained at a low level of about 4,000 per year, accounting for 22 per cent of total Police arrests. While this represents an overrepresentation of youths and is quite alarming, it is not atypical. Indeed, shoplifting is the most common offence committed by youths arrested.

Given the low youth crime situation, however, there was a public concern when two youth gang-related incidents occurred late last year around November. In the first case, a 19-year old boy was attacked by a group of young gang members over a trivial incident of staring. The boy succumbed to his injuries and he died. In the second case, a group of 15 youths attacked innocent victims with parangs and knives, some of whom were just resting after a game of soccer. Investigations showed that the attack was unprovoked.

The Ministry of Home Affairs and Police took a serious view of both cases. Such brazen acts of violence and flagrant disregard for law in Singapore cannot be condoned.

Following the two cases, Police took swift action, mounted island-wide sweeps and rounded up suspected gang members to demonstrate that we have a zero tolerance policy towards gang activities and will continue with this.

The Ministry formed an inter-ministry Working Group on Youth Gangs to take a deeper look at the issue of youth gangs. I was appointed Chairman of the Working Group. I was mindful that while the two incidents were indeed serious, we should not over-react nor be seized by moral panic and rush into extremes. The two cases were isolated, and did not in any way reflect a worsening crime situation. In some countries incidents like these moved police to act even more aggressively and the outcome is that youths become more alienated. But we should not also

Therefore, we should better understand our youths and what draws them into gangs, and develop upstream measures to deter young people from joining gangs and enhance police powers to disrupt the formation of gangs while the problem is still relatively simple and manageable.

excuse ourselves from action by explaining them away as youth misadventures and we know that allowing youth gangs to flourish will turn members from occasional social misfits to those who are associated with organised crime.

Therefore, we should better understand our youths and what draws them into gangs, and develop upstream measures to deter young people from joining gangs and enhance police powers to disrupt the formation of gangs while the problem is still relatively simple and manageable. What we want to do is to put in place a full range of levers and programmes to deal with youth gangs in Singapore effectively.

Over the past year, the Working Group has held dialogue sessions with educators, social workers, youth workers, police officers, prison officers, parents and reformed young offenders, to understand what the situation is about.

From these dialogue sessions and studies, we established that youth gangs in Singapore are loosely organised street gangs with very fluid membership. Gang members move in and out of different gangs quite easily. Even though some youth gangs adopt the names of secret societies, triads or traditional gangs to gain recognition and “credibility” within the inner circle, they are not part of these traditional gangs. They generally operate without specific aims and often fight over trivial matters such as “staring incidents”, accidental physical contact, or relationship issues, which mean girlfriends crossing over from one gang to another. In many ways they are similar to youth gangs in UK and US, in that most members are not deep into organised criminal activities and are responsive to society’s proactive intervention.

Youths who join gangs are usually drop-outs, and they are not academically inclined. They feel ostracised by their parents, peers and teachers. And in Singapore, the main reasons why young people turn to gangs were: to make friends, and they just need the company and the sense of belonging. The majority said that they would not find it difficult to leave the gang. In one interview, one youth told me that all he needed to do was to ask his mom to go to the gang and say he is not longer in the gang and he can just walk away. This is in contrast with triad members who have sworn loyalty to their gangs and risk injuries to themselves or their family members when they declare that they are leaving the gang. Indeed, most youths grow out of gangs eventually.

However, our concern is with the small percentage who continue to remain in gangs and consequently, over time, become entrenched in a life of crime and drugs. Youths with gang affiliation showed a higher rate of re-offending, and re-offending for violent offences.

The Working Group has completed its work. It has come up with a comprehensive set of measures to address youths at the different stages of being involved with gangs.

GETTING THE FUNDAMENTALS RIGHT

Let me share briefly the key recommendations from the Working Group but before that I want to emphasise that these measures are premised upon getting it right first and working on those that do not. Let me illustrate what I mean:

- (a) We are a society built on strong family ties. It is through families that sound and good values are transmitted and instilled in our youths. Families must therefore continue to be our first line of defense and helping families to become intact through good parenting programmes is our best guarantee that our youths will grow up loved and resilient against adverse influences.
- (b) Secondly, we must ensure that our educational system continues to allow for multiple peaks of excellence and they must cater to young people who come from different abilities and talents. We must continue to keep them engaged in school and school activities, and keep the participation rate high and the attrition rate down at all levels of schooling and get most if not all of them some form of post secondary education that will give them life skills and a career to be proud of. Just for the interest of our international participants, in Singapore only 1% of our students drop out of high school and participation rate at pre-school is about 98%. And 89% of our students have some form of post-secondary education either in the form of certification or diploma in skills, trades or services or they are going further to a degree.

- (c) We must ensure that our nation continues to thrive and be economically vibrant so that opportunities always exist for our young to start a career when they leave school. We must recognise that Singapore is without natural resources. We cannot bestow wealth on our young or anybody by selling our resources, but what we can do is to ensure that we continue to have a thriving and open economy that, with good schooling, we will get them off to become a competent and competitive participant in the global economy.

It is upon getting these fundamentals right that we embark upon measures to intervene, and divert, our youths who have fallen out of the support system that normally exists for most of them, or who somehow are not able to participate as an active and contributing member of our society.

The Working Group's recommendations fall around three major areas.

Firstly, we want to invest more in preventive and diversionary measures, so that we can help youths who are in the early stages of associating with gangs. We have recommended that low-risk youths arrested for gang involvement attend a mandatory intervention programme in lieu of prosecution. These youths who are placed on the programme will undergo compulsory counselling sessions, and together with Police, youth workers, schools and their parents, work out a programme on what works best for them. Among others they will be monitored for attendance at school or the workplace, be subject to curfew hours and to restrictions on places they can visit and people they can associate with. The first run of the programme is targeted for the first half of 2012.

Secondly, we will enhance Police powers to disrupt gang formation, gang recruitment and gang congregation. Enhanced penalties will be introduced for the recruitment of young persons aged 16 and below into gangs, coercion of members to remain in gangs and facilitation of gang activities. We will also impose additional licensing conditions on operators of billiard saloons, computer gaming centres and amusement centres where we know such gang activities may take place.

Thirdly, we will also enhance inter-agency liaison between schools, Police and MCYS, Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports to better coordinate efforts to help youths at risk and help in the rehabilitation of young offenders. Additionally, Police will establish a new Youth Offenders Unit to formulate protocols on dealing with youth offenders and build capacity to deal with youths and youth crime.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH YOUTH GANGS

The Working Group on Measures to Deal with Youth Gangs (WGYG) was formed in December 2010 to formulate measures to deter youths from joining gangs and to disrupt youth gangs. Minister of State for Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs, Mr Masagos Zulkifli, was tasked to head the Working Group, which also comprised representatives from Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Ministry for Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS), Ministry of Education, the Singapore Police Force and the Singapore Prisons Service.

The key recommendations from the WGYG are:

(1) YOUTH-CENTRIC MEASURES ENHANCING THE STREETWISE PROGRAMME

The StreetWise Programme is currently a voluntary programme for youths who are associated with or are members of secret societies and gangs. Participants are required to abide by curfew hours and take part in counselling as well as group activities to deal with peer pressure and anger.

The programme will be enhanced to be a pre-court diversionary programme for youths who are arrested for gang membership or gang-related offences such as rioting. This means that youths who complete the programme successfully could be let off with a warning in lieu of court prosecution.

The enhanced programme will include additional conditions such as physical reporting to Police, close monitoring of attendance at school or work, restrictions on places which the youth can visit to keep them away from gang haunts, and restrictions on the people, such as gang members, that he can associate with.

ENHANCING ANTI-GANG PROGRAMMES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Time spent within the Correctional Institutions (CI) provides the youths with a period of intensive rehabilitation and presents a good opportunity to help youths break their **gang affiliations. We will enhance the anti-gang programmes within the CI to increase the chances of diverting youths from gangs and ensuring that they do not rejoin gangs after release.**

Singapore Boys' Home

The Singapore Boys' Home regime will be enhanced through the implementation of a standardised orientation programme for new residents upon admission; and a tiered and targeted approach in programming based on the level of gang involvement. The upcoming physical expansion of the Singapore Boys' Home will also help to provide effective segregation facilities for higher risk residents.

Reformative Training Centre

More inmates in the Reformative Training Centres will be placed in rehabilitation programmes to help them deal with anger management and related issues. In addition, Singapore Prisons will explore the transfer of Reformative Trainees who are more amenable to rehabilitation to Tanah Merah Prisons School where they would be given more educational opportunities. Prisons will also be implementing a programme-based cohort-system in the Reformative Training Centre to help youths substitute their gang identity with a "cohort" identity, and thereby reduce their affiliation with gangs.

A COMPULSORY COMMUNITY SUPERVISION REGIME FOR YOUTH GANG MEMBERS

A significant proportion of residents within CIs have gang affiliations. Some of these youths continue to be at a high-risk of re-joining gangs after their release. A gradual transition allows the young offender to have increasing levels of freedom when he is assessed to be capable of responsible behaviour and has achieved stable employment. It also facilitates his re-integration in the community and therefore reduces re-offending.

Therefore, we will impose a period of community supervision on youths who are

assessed to be more likely to join gangs upon their release. This community supervision will come with conditions such as curfew hours, and regular reporting to the correctional institutions and Police where necessary. The youth will also be restricted from visiting gang haunts or associating with known gang members, and will be expected to attend compulsory aftercare programmes and school or work.

(2) GANG-CENTRIC MEASURES ENHANCING EXISTING ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION

Currently, the Societies Act and the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act are used to deal with illegal associations, but these are not geared towards dealing with youth gangs. Going forward, MHA will work closely with the Attorney-General's Chambers to enhance the existing anti-gang legislation. We will have a more specific definition of 'gang' and criminalise gang-related activities. Persons who recruit youths to join gangs will also face stiffer penalties.

We will also explore vesting in the Police and the Courts a greater range of powers to deal with youth gangs, including directing premise owners to take reasonable steps to prevent gang activities from taking place within their premises, imposing restriction orders, and powers to direct youths to participate in intervention programmes.

PREVENTING AND DISRUPTING GANG CONGREGATION

Gang congregation and recruitment have been observed in Public Entertainment outlets such as billiard saloons, computer gaming centres and amusements centres. We will tighten our regulations to ensure that operators take reasonable steps to prevent gang activities from taking place in these outlets. The operating hours whereby stu-

dents in uniforms are allowed to patronise the outlets will also be tightened. Stricter conditions, such as tighter age restrictions and installation of security measures such as CCTVs, will be imposed on errant operators.

(3) STRUCTURAL MEASURES ENHANCING INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION

The existing efforts from schools, Police, Prisons, MCYS and other agencies to deal with youth gangs and youth-related crime will be formalised in a Police-Schools-MCYS (PSM) Liaison Framework to provide direction for and to review intervention efforts, including guidelines on incidents to be reported and the identification of at-risk youths for the appropriate intervention programmes. As part of this framework, Police will also be forming a Youth Offenders Unit to formulate protocols on dealing with youth offenders and to build capacity to deal with youths and youth crime.

ENHANCING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT

MCYS and Singapore Prison Service recognise the importance families play in the lives of young offenders. Therefore, family programmes are delivered to provide young offenders with the opportunities to interact with their family members and to build up their family bonds. The programmes also seek to prepare the families to receive the young offenders upon their release. **We need parental and community support to deal with youth gangs more effectively.** Parents should keep tab on their children's activities and who their friends are. Parents should grow together with their children and, adjust the parenting style along the way. This is important because should children go astray, the bonds built with their children will enable parents to bring them back to the fold by working together with society.

Where appropriate, based on individual cases, MCYS and Prisons will involve parents in the various intervention programmes for youths. Parental involvement will feature strongly in the enhanced SWP and post-release supervision programmes.

The government will put in place measures to ensure that when youths go astray, they are given enough chances to reintegrate back into society. Counselling and intervention programmes will be put in place to divert them away from the criminal justice system, so that they are given another chance. However, our streets and neighbourhoods must remain safe. We will come down hard on those who cross the line. We have zero tolerance for any acts of violence and all forms of gang activity.

FAMILY IS KEY

Youth offending and youth gangs are complex problems and the solutions cannot be over-simplified. What is clear is that we must ensure that our society remains strong and healthy, with families playing a key role in transmitting good values to our young. Families can, and should become part of the solution.

When youths go astray, it is the parents who are most effective agents who can bring them back by working together with social workers and the authorities.

The government will augment our existing scaffolds so that wayward youths who want to turn over a new leaf will be embraced and offered a second chance to reintegrate back into society. They will be offered ample opportunities in education and employment for them to make good. But youths who cross the line, and cause hurt, harm and distress to others, will not be tolerated, and must be prepared to face the full brunt of the law

18.

RISK AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS IN YOUTH OFFENDING: WHAT CRIME PREVENTION PRACTITIONERS SHOULD KNOW

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LEUNG HOI TING & NUR IZYAN



Majeed Khader

INTRODUCTION

Criminal behaviour is an area of interest in all societies. Countries devote a substantial amount of resources to prevent crime, to police and to arrest offenders, thus ensuring the safety and security of people, societal institutions and entities. Research has recognised the importance of age in offending behaviour. As society develops and people constantly adapt into new emerging societal arenas, youths grapple with not only this, but also with making the transition from children into adulthood. This transition period of adolescence could also be a period of whereby some youths transit into an 'age-crime curve' (Barry, 2006). It is thus crucial to understand this phenomenon of youth crime and the motivations for youths who persist as well as those who desist in their offending behaviour.

This paper discusses some of the theories of crime, focusing on those that explicate the phenomenon of youth crime. It also looks at risk and protective factors and how they work in concert to ameliorate or enhance youth offending behaviour. An understanding of these factors will be useful for crime prevention practitioners.

THEORIES OF CRIMINAL OFFENDING

An understanding of the theories of crime can elucidate a more in-depth and relevant comprehension of why youths engage in criminal behavior. These theories were postulated to illuminate the phenomenon of crime in general, and did not endeavour to specifically explicate youth offending behavior at the outset. They do however lend themselves in explaining some of the motivations behind youth crime. These crime theories can be categorized into those pertaining to societal structure, relationship to others, individual factors and life course development.

The theories that delineate societal structures as key factors in crime are that of social disorganisation theory and strain theory. In 'Social

Disorganisation' theory, Shaw & McKay (1969) argued that the variation in criminal activity and youth delinquency over time and in different territories occurred due to either the absence or breakdown of communal institutions such as family, school, and other social groups. This breakdown was of significant impact as communal relationships encouraged cooperative relationships among people irrelevant of different demographic strata. Merton (1938), and subsequently Agnew (1992) who extrapolated 'Merton's Initial Strain' theory, posited that the gap between a youth's expectations and failure to achieve valued societal goals had a role to play in criminality. These goals could possibly be unrealised due to opportunities that have been blocked by others or by structures.

The 'Differential Association' theory (Sutherland, 1955) posits that individuals learn the values, attitudes, techniques, and motives for criminal behaviour during their interactions with others. The 'Labelling' theory (Eadie & Morley, 2003), on the other hand, stipulates that other individuals label individuals as 'criminal' and those youths who have been labelled as such are more likely to offend. This is because the individual would have internalised the label and behave in a deviant manner, congregating with others who have been similarly labelled.

The 'General Theory of Crime' (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) conceptualises that people engage in crime due to the lack of controls or lack of barriers to crime. This lack of controls shows up during childhood in personality traits such as the inability to delay gratification or poor frustration tolerance and has six aspects;

- a lack of future orientation,
- high level of self-centeredness,
- high levels of anger,
- a lack of diligence,
- a preference for physical rather than cognitive tasks, and

- risk preference.
- These individuals are thus less concerned with consequences and tend to engage in criminal and reckless behaviours throughout their lifetime.

In 'Social Learning' theory, Bandura (1977) outlined three mechanisms whereby youths learn to engage in crime which are: differential reinforcement, beliefs, and modelling. Firstly, individuals teach other individuals to engage in crime through the reinforcements and punishments they provide for 'appropriate' behaviour. Thus, youth crime is likely to occur when it is frequently reinforced, results in large amounts of reinforcement whether positive or negative and when criminal behaviour is reinforced more than alternative behaviours. Secondly, youths may learn beliefs that are favourable to crime such as thrill seeking through commission of criminal activities. Lastly, youths may imitate criminal models, especially if there is easy access to such models, when these models are admired or respected and if they believe that imitating their behaviour results in their desired reinforcement.

In terms of the 'Rational Choice' theory (Siegel, 1992), criminal behaviour is seen as a choice that comes about when an offender decides to risk violating the law after evaluating the costs and benefits of criminal activity. Hence, the youth offender here is a reasoning criminal who evaluates the risk of apprehension, the seriousness of the expected punishment, the gain of the criminal activity, immediate needs and then makes a rational choice to commit a crime.

Finally, the 'Lifecourse Theory of Crime' (Farrington, 2002), a developmental theory, postulates a causal relationship between early delinquent offending and later adult deviant behaviour, which is an interaction of inherent as well as learnt individual characteristics, social and environmental events. An example of this would be when youths have aggressive, antisocial traits in early childhood and may engage in violent behaviour in adolescence but

due to strong bonds to family, high educational attainment and adequate employment during adulthood, such criminality decreases over their lifespan despite their early childhood propensities. Farrington (2002) in two longitudinal studies, the Pittsburgh Youth Study in predicting violence and the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, found that peer delinquency and poor school attainment were risk factors. However, protective factors such as high intelligence, small family size and parental harmony attenuated these risk factors and thus reduced criminality.



Taken together, all these theories of crime allude to the fact that an understanding of the factors in an individual's life that may lead him or her to engage in criminal behaviour is vital.

Taken together, all these theories of crime allude to the fact that an understanding of the factors in an individual's life that may lead him or her to engage in criminal behaviour is vital. Research has examined a myriad of variables and delineated two categories of factors that may be crucial in that the influence of both these factors will either accentuate or mitigate the individual's propensity for youth offending behaviour.

WHY DO YOUTHS OFFEND?

A LOOK AT RISK FACTORS

Those factors that may enhance the probability that a youth will engage in offending behaviour are known as risk factors (Shader, 2002). The more risk factors a young person is exposed to, the more likely they are to engage in antisocial and/or offending behaviour (Spratt, Jenkins & Doob, 2000).

Risk factors can be static or dynamic (Andrews, Zinger, Bonta, Hoge, Gendreau and Cullen, 1990). Static factors usually relate to an individual's prior history and are inflexible to change since no amount of treatment can change the history. Dynamic factors are those that can be reduced through appropriate treatment such as dysfunctional family communication styles. Meta-analyses of the risk factor literature found a number of factors pertinent in increasing the risk of a youth engaging in crime.

Table 1 shows the list of risk factors according to five domains, namely; individual, family, school, peer, and neighbourhood/community (Hawkins et al, 2000; Lipsey & Derzon 1998; Resnick et al. 2004; Shader, 2002; Vien, 2009).

Bacon et al. (2009) suggest that early onset of criminal behaviour is associated with a greater involvement in delinquent and/or antisocial behaviour. On the contrary, a later onset of delinquent behaviour in adolescence is associated with longer term offending, such as offending in adulthood. Bacon et al. (2009) suggest that a youth's late onset of offending increases the likelihood of future offending in adulthood. Moreover, sanctions become more severe as the young person gets older and thus, he or she may be more being more entrenched in the criminal justice system.

Bacon et al. (2009) suggest that early onset of criminal behaviour is associated with a greater involvement in delinquent and/or antisocial behaviour. On the contrary, a later onset of delinquent behaviour in adolescence is associated with longer term offending, such as offending in adulthood.

Table 1 Risk factor domains for offending (Vien, 2009)

Domains:	Some Associated Risk Factors: (based on international research findings)
Individual domain	Pregnancy complications for mother Hyperactivity, restlessness and risk taking behaviour Aggressiveness Early onset of violent behaviour Involvement in other forms of anti-social behaviour Beliefs and attitudes favourable to deviant or anti-social behaviour
Family domain	Parental criminality Child maltreatment Poor family management practices Low levels of parental involvement Poor family bonding Family conflict Parental attitudes favourable to substance misuse and violence Parent-child separation
School domain	Academic failure or poor school performance Low bonding with others in school Truancy and dropping out of school Frequent school transitions
Peer-related domain	Delinquent siblings Delinquent peers Gang membership
Neighbourhood and community domain	Poverty or low socioeconomic status Community disorganisation Availability of drugs and firearms Neighbourhood adults involved in crime Exposure to violence and racial prejudice

ARE THERE NO BUFFERS FOR THIS?

A LOOK AT PROTECTIVE FACTORS

Protective factors are those factors that mitigate the individual's propensity for youth offending behaviour. These protective factors mediate and/or moderate the effect of risk factors, reducing offending behaviour. They thus act as a buffer between the presence of risk factors and

offending behaviour and the building of resistance to developing such offending behaviour. (Pollard, Hawkins & Arthur, 1999). Table 2 lists a variety of protective factors according to the domains of; individual, family, school, peer and neighbourhood/community.

Table 2 Protective factor domains (Vien, 2009)

Domains:	Some Associated Protective Factors: (based on international research findings)
Individual domain	Intolerant attitude toward crime and deviance High IQ Positive social orientation Perceived sanctions for transgressions Positive response to authority Being withdrawn Cautiousness
Family domain	Warm supportive relationship with parents or other adults Parents' positive evaluation of peers Parental monitoring Good parenting skills High level of family income Good family structure
School domain	Commitment to school Recognition for involvement in conventional activities Positive school experience Educational attainment
Peer-related domain	Friends who engage in conventional behaviour/positive peers Social isolation
Neighbourhood and community domain	Attendance at religious services Area of residence Involvement in extracurricular activities

ARE THERE GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RISK AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS?

The research discussed above has mostly looked at male participants although minority of them included both males and females in their samples. Hence, it is reasonable to wonder if the same risk and protective factors paradigm is as applicable to female young offenders as well as it is to male young offenders. Fagan et al. (2007) and Mullis et al. (2004) demonstrated that the risk and protective factors investigated and listed thus far are largely applicable to male and female offenders. However, a few of the factors within the individual protective factors domain may differ slightly for males and females.

For instance, association with antisocial peers is a strong risk factor for male youth offending, instead peer rejection or isolation from peers is strongly associated with female youth offending (Mullis et al., 2004). Risk factors had a stronger association with serious delinquency for males compared to females while protective factors had a stronger association with delinquency for females than for males (Fagan et al., 2007). Youth offending for males had a stronger relationship with poor attachment to father, pro-delinquency beliefs, pro-substance misuse, moral beliefs, poor social skills, peer drug use, peer delinquency and rewards for delinquency while female youth offending did not (Fagan et al., 2007).

DO RISK AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS BY THEMSELVES DETERMINE OFFENDING IN YOUNG PEOPLE?

The presence of various risk factors do not automatically equate linearly to a proportionate increased risk of offending. Criminal thinking patterns, which are pervasive, consistent cognitive styles, enable youth offenders to negotiate their

behaviours in their offending behaviour (Walters, 1995). Walters (1995) demonstrated that these are not personality traits but styles of interaction that link the individual to his environment.

An in-house study done by the Police Psychological Services Division, Singapore Police Force, compared at-risk youths involved in a supervised diversionary programme and incarcerated youths with age and education matched control sample. The study found that at-risk youths and incarcerated youths were significantly different from the controls on five of the eight criminal thinking patterns. The criminal thinking patterns endorsed by this group were:

- (a) **Mollification** – in which young offenders tend to justify their criminal actions by blaming external factors;
- (b) **Cut-off** – in which young offenders act to eliminate criminal deterrents;
- (c) **Sentimentality** – in which young offenders neglect the harm inflicted on families and victims by believing that the “good” intentions justify their acts;
- (d) **Super-optimism** – in which young offenders believe that they can somehow avoid the negative consequences (e.g. incarceration, injury, death) of a criminal lifestyle; and
- (e) **Discontinuity** – in which young offenders tend to get sidetracked and fail to follow through their goals (e.g. negative peer influence).

Three criminal thinking patterns did not differentiate the at-risk youth and incarcerated youth from the control group. These criminal thinking styles were:

- (a) **Entitlement** – i.e., young offenders did not feel a sense of privilege that allowed them to violate laws and rules;

- (b) **Power orientation** – i.e., young offenders did not feel a need to exert power and control over others or put others down; and
- (c) **Cognitive indolence** – i.e., young offenders did not tend to take the easy way around problems.

CROSS-CULTURAL VALIDITY OF RISK FACTOR RESEARCH

Even though much of the risk factor research is western-based, the risk and protective factors paradigm was found to be applicable to societies outside of western cultures. However, cross-cultural differences could be seen in the way these risk or protective factors play out. For instance, protective factors are manifested different in terms of school achievement, specifically in education systems in western cultures compared to those of eastern cultures. Specifically, in western societies the education system focuses on individual development and individual achievements while the educational system in China focuses upon how an individual can contribute to societal development (Friday, et al., 2005).

WHY DO SOME OFFENDERS CONTINUE TO COMMIT CRIME BUT OTHERS DO NOT?

Having considered the multitude of risk and protective factors that influence youth offenders in engaging in criminal behaviour, we need to examine the reasons why some offenders continue to commit crime but others do not continue to offend. One theory posited is the notion of individual and environmental differences in life-course-persistent offenders compared to adolescent-limited offenders. Moffitt (1993) found that while antisocial behaviour shows continuity across the lifespan, its prevalence changes drastically in certain life stages and sometimes increases temporarily and abundantly dur-

ing adolescence. Moffitt (1993) suggested that delinquency likely has two distinct categories of individuals, each with a unique historical individual characteristics and etiology. A smaller group of youth offenders may engage in antisocial behaviour at every life stage while a larger group engages in antisocial behaviour only during adolescence. This minority group usually indicates neuropsychological problems in childhood which interacts with criminogenic environments across their development till adulthood whereas the majority group learns peer driven 'normal' antisocial behaviour in adolescence.

In recent years, there has been a burgeoning interest in why some offenders desist in their criminal behaviour even though the presence and influence of risk factors still exist in their lives (Farrall & Bowling, 1999; Maruna, 2001). Research work in this area, commonly referred to as desistance research, focuses on offenders' changed values, changed perceptions of consequences of offending and increased opportunities to fit into mainstream society and lifestyles (Barry, 2006). Farrall & Bowling (1999) point to the need to complement personality and structural explanations for offending with the narratives of offenders who subsequently desist in their criminal behaviour and maintain non-criminal behaviour. Maruna (2001) using a narrative theory approach, which was essentially to utilise personal autobiographies in social enquiry, found that desistors (offenders who desist) narrated a 'redemption script' in which there was 'turning points' in their lives, indicating an enduring attitude change. Barry (2006) also employing this methodology found four themes in offenders who stop their criminal activities despite the prevailing influence of existing risk factors. These were;

- (a) **Practical factors**, such as fear of long imprisonment;
- (b) **Monetary factors**, such as ability to gain employment with adequate pay;

- (c) **Relational factors**, such as being unable to develop relationship with own children; and
- (d) **Personal factors**, such as wanting to live 'normal', conventional lives.

WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT?

It is thus important that research findings in the area of risk and protective factors be used in the formulation of programmes. When formulating programmes to mitigate offending behaviour and crime, there is a need to take risk, needs, responsivity factors into consideration (Andrews and Dowden, 2005).

- **Risk factors** are static such as number of prior convictions or dynamic factors such as how much drugs are taken weekly.
- **Criminogenic needs** are those that when met, reduce the youth offenders' propensity to engage in criminal activity. For instance, changing entrenched gang attitudes into pro-social ones.

- **Responsivity factors** refer to those that affect treatment or service delivery efficacy. There are two types of responsivity factors; General responsivity, which is the style and structure of service delivery such as Cognitive Behavioural treatments, and Specific responsivity, which are individuals' own strengths and/or weaknesses, and personality factors such as learning disabilities like dyslexia. Sherman et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of promising and non-promising programmes and these are as listed in Table 3 below.

Table 3 Promising and non-promising programmes in youth offending.

Promising Programmes (based on international research findings)	Non-Promising Programmes (based on international research findings)
Juvenile aftercare	Specific deterrence interventions e.g. shock probation programmes for violent offending
Fines	Non-directive rehabilitation programmes
Drug courts	Intensive supervised probation (ISP)
Drug treatment with urine testing	Home confinement (without other programmes)
Adult basic education	Community residential programmes
Prison-based sex offending treatment	Urine testing alone
Transitional programmes providing individualised employment preparation and services	Boot camps
	Juvenile wilderness programme

POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS IN A LOCAL CONTEXT

A possible application of the research on risk and protective factors is to utilise it in the area of crime prevention in a local context.

In terms of the upcoming programmes for at-risk youths at the various law enforcement units, several measures can be undertaken:

- Risk and protective factors should be shared with programme developers prior to the initial programme design (with school and community agencies).
- Narratives and turning points of known juvenile desistors could be incorporated within programme such as in the form of face-to-face interviews with desistors and programme participants.
- Principles of effective programme design could be shared so as to incorporate more effective programme strategies.
- It is also important to build in from the outset programme evaluation and data collection on programme efficacy for subsequent refining of programmes.
- There is also a need to incorporate programmes that have proven to be more effective than the traditional prevention methods, for instance, employing a Reasoning and Rehabilitation Cognitive Skills Programme in juvenile aftercare (Ross & Fabiano, 1996) instead of boot camps for juvenile offenders.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the findings from risk factor research has proven itself to be an effective ally in the explanation of youth crime, what sustains offending and what reduces it. These findings should be utilised in its fullest capacity by employing it in crime prevention and rehabilitation programmes.

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19. YOUTHS AT RISK: A NEEDS-LED ASSESSMENT APPROACH TO INTERVENTIONS

LOUISE ALMOND



THE POLICY DILEMMA

The treatment and intervention of young offenders is a potential public relations disaster. The public is more concerned with reducing their own and their families' chances of becoming a victim than in the welfare of offenders (Garland, 2001). They want to see offenders punished for their behaviour, not being "rewarded". But it must be remembered that the aim of intervening with offenders is primarily to prevent harm to innocent people; in other words, to reduce risk to the community (Ward, Polaschek, Beech, 2006). Therefore interventions and treatment programmes are deemed successful if they reduce re-offending rates.

In terms of a simple punishment-based treatment approach, there is very little evidence to suggest that this is effective. In fact some researchers argue that punishment and deterrence approaches to the problem of crime may in fact increase rates of re-offending (McGuire, 2000). So policy makers are stuck between a rock and a hard place. If they offer treatment to offenders, they are accused of being soft on crime and may find their funding cut. On the other hand the empirical evidence suggests that simply punishing offenders is unlikely to promote pro-social behaviour.

One proposed solution to this dilemma is to base interventions on the principles of risk and need. There is a whole body of literature that has shown how particular individual and social factors are implicated in the emergence of criminal behaviour and if suitably addressed or modified are likely to reduce re-offending. One such approach is the Risk Needs Responsivity model (RNR) developed in Canada in the 1990s by Don Andrews, James Bonta and Paul Gendreau.

They want to see offenders punished for their behaviour, not being "rewarded". But it must be remembered that the aim of intervening with offenders is primarily to prevent harm to innocent people

A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

The RNR approach to offender treatment and intervention has constituted a revolution in the way criminal conduct is managed in Canada, UK, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. It is now perhaps the most influential model for the assessment and treatment of offenders in these countries.

The RNR approach has three basic principles: Risk, Needs and Responsivity.

Risk Principle There must be a match between an individual's level of risk of re-offending with the amount of treatment they receive. This is based upon the assumption that risk is a rough indicator of clinical need. Therefore, High risk individuals should receive the most treatment, Moderate levels of risk receive a lesser dose and Low risk individuals warrant little if no intervention.

Needs Principle An assessment should be carried out to identify what factors led the individual to be a criminal i.e. what was their criminogenic pathway? Treatment and interventions should

then primarily focus on addressing these needs. This is of course, in addition, to addressing the offence behaviour itself.

Responsivity principle But how can practitioners identify an individual's criminogenic pathway? One way of assessing offenders' pathways was developed by Almond, Canter & Salfati (2006) using a sample of youths who sexually harm (juvenile sex offenders). Research has shown that youths who sexually harm display a wide range of background characteristics, including low self-esteem, poor social skills, peer relationship difficulties, social isolation, emotional problems, educational difficulties, sexual and physical victimisation, alcohol and substance misuse, dysfunctional family backgrounds and previous delinquent behaviour.

EXPLAINING JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS

To talk about a juvenile sex offender suggests that they are a homogenous and coherent group, however research has found that each of the background characteristics listed above are only reported as low to medium frequencies. There is therefore no 'typical' juvenile sex offender. This suggests that there may be identifiable sub-groups that can be differentiated on the basis of their background characteristics. Within the sex offender literature there are three distinct theories which have been proposed to help explain why a youth would sexually harm: Social learning (Abuse), Delinquency and Developmental (Impairment) theories. Almond, Canter & Salfati (2006) examined whether the background characteristics of youths who sexually harm reflected these three explanations.

Using a sample of 300 youths aged 9-18, data was collected as to the presence or absence of 41 background characteristics. The data was then analysed using Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) which examines the relationship each charac-

teristic has with every other characteristic and represent this in a visual space, such that the closer two characteristics are, the more likely they are to occur together, and the further away on the plot, the less likely they are to occur together.

As Figure 1 shows, the SSA plot can be portioned into three distinct areas: Abuse, Delinquency, and Impairment, each containing a subset of background characteristics.

Abuse theme included characteristics such as victim of physical abuse, victim of sexual abuse, neglect, confusion around their sexuality, sexual attraction to children and previous sex offence. This theme is characterised by abuse and maltreatment. Through the cycle of abuse and the resulting attachment difficulties they may seek intimacy through inappropriate sexual behaviours. These youths may also be pre-primed to view situations in sexual terms.

Delinquent theme included characteristics such as previous burglary offence, previous violent offences, antisocial behaviour, bullying of other children, alcohol and/or drug abuse and previous sexual experience. This theme is characterised by an overall pattern of delinquency behaviour. This general delinquency may have promoted macho type attitudes including risk taking, power seeking and overly competitive behaviour expressed in an overtly sexual manner resulting in the coercion of females.

Impaired theme included characteristics such as educational difficulties, learning disabilities, speech or hearing impediments, victim of bullying, social isolation and poor social skills. This theme is characterised by some form of physical, social or psychological impairment. Due to their lack of age appropriate peers, these youths may befriend younger children and inappropriately sexualise those relationships.


Although the SSA indicates that the characteristics of youths who sexually harm can be classified in terms of three psychologically meaningful distinct themes, it does not classify the

individuals. The background of any one individual may contain characteristics from more than one SSA region.

Every youth was given three scores: one for each of the three themes, reflecting the percentage of Abused, Impaired and Delinquent variables that characterised their individual background. The criterion for assigning an individual to a particular theme was that the dominant theme had

a greater score than the sum of the other two themes. Using this criterion 71% of the sample could be classified as displaying a dominant theme in their background: 29% Impaired, 28% Abused and 14% Delinquent. The percentage of youths from each theme would differ depending on where the sample was collated i.e. if all the youths were in a young offenders institute then you would imagine that the percentage of delinquent youths would be much higher.

Figure 1. Data Analysis of 41 Background Characteristics of 300 Youths-at-Risk



TAILORED INTERVENTIONS

This multivariate model allows practitioners to distinguish between three subgroups of youths who sexually harm; each with its own developmental pathway reflecting the dominant psychological processes underlying that behaviour. Each pathway has its own unique intervention and treatment needs allowing an individual's specific needs to be identified instead of a one programme fits all approach that is currently the case in most countries. Treatment and intervention programmes can now be tailored to these distinct criminogenic pathways.

Interventions for Abused youths These youths may be described as 'children in need' themselves: the short and long term effects of their own abuse may be significant and require attention. So interventions should address the issues related to their own victimization, including confusion over their sexuality and sexual attraction to children. The personal and situational factors that increase the likelihood of sexual offending may also need to be addressed as many may have committed previous sexual offences.

Interventions for Delinquent youths These youths do not 'specialise' in sex offences as they have a broader propensity for antisocial behavior. They are also at high risk of general re-offending. Interventions therefore need to target the individual, family and social influences on their antisocial behaviour, i.e. delinquent peers. Interventions may also need to address any alcohol and/or drug problems the youth has.

Interventions for Impaired youths There is enormous variation in the socio-emotional, cognitive and physical development among youths of the same age. Therefore, problems with general literacy, speech and communication deficits, conceptual understanding and suggestibility must be taken into account when designing treatment and intervention programmes.

They also need to address the issue of improving the youth's social skills and self esteem.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, a needs-led assessment approach is central to a young person being viewed holistically as opposed to an exclusive focus on criminal behaviours.

There is a need for services to attend to the diversity of these heterogeneous populations and this model is one approach that allows practitioners to identify an individual's needs based on his characteristics and background. Interventions can now be tailored to the individual as opposed to a one-size-fits all approach.

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20. **YOUTH REHABILITATION IN SINGAPORE: A REVIEW OF PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES**

NANCY NG & NG KOK HOE



Nancy Ng (right) with NCPC Council Chairman Tan Kian Hoon

CHILD WELFARE FIRST

On the balance between child welfare and criminal justice,¹ youth offender rehabilitation in Singapore follows an explicit child welfare orientation. The Children and Young Persons Act (CYPA) that governs the treatment of juveniles, defined as being 7 to below 15 years old, affirms this when it states that “in all matters relating to the administration or application of this Act, the welfare and best interests of the child or young person shall be the first and paramount consideration” (Section 3A). In contrast to the pre-war era when the main youth rehabilitation institution was regarded as “the Boys’ Prison...[run] on stern and retributive lines”,² the management of juvenile offenders today is based on the principle that intervention should be aligned with the child’s interests, rights, and development as set out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Singapore acceded in 1995. That the CYPA also deals with children beyond parental control signals that young offenders are regarded in the same spirit as children with behavioural issues rather than adult offenders.³ Underlying this stance is the historical recognition that most instances of juvenile offending are an adolescent phase and not precursors to a life-long criminal career.⁴

1 Doob, A. & Tonry, M. (2004). Varieties of youth justice. *Crime and Justice*, 31, 1-20.

2 Wee, A. (2004). Where we are coming from: The evolution of social services and social work in Singapore. In A. Wee & K. Mehta (Eds.), *Social work in context: A reader* (p. 39-77). Singapore: Marshall Cavendish

3 In an interview with former Director of Social Welfare, Ms Ang Bee Lian, in October 2011, she observed that what often differentiates a child who is beyond parental control from a juvenile offender is not the social background or nature of behaviour, but whether the first point of contact is the social services or the police. In practice, the two regimes may share similar programmes and residential facilities.

4 Veloo, KV. (2004). *Juvenile delinquency in Singapore 1961-1980. Trends, programmes and outcome of probation and discharges*. Singapore: National University of Singapore.

Although the minimum age definition of juveniles in Singapore is 7 years old, a safeguard in the Penal Code provides that offenders aged between 7 and 12 are held criminally responsible only when they are sufficiently mature to understand the implications of their conduct. In practice, juvenile offenders below 12 are rarely charged in Court.⁵ It is also argued that a low age of criminal responsibility offers an avenue for troubled young persons and their families to access social intervention, particularly community-based programmes. Internationally, the age definition of juveniles may vary widely both over time and across local jurisdictions within the same countries.⁶ While the minimum age of 7 years old in Singapore is young by international standards, these legal demarcations provide only a partial perspective of juvenile justice systems. The treatment of young offenders in different countries also depends on provisions such as the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult criminal courts for serious offences.

Enshrined within the CYPA are fundamental principles that offer protection to juvenile offenders. To prevent exposure to more hardened criminals, the Act states that juveniles should be heard in a Juvenile Court that operates separately from other courts and that juveniles are not to associate with adult offenders. To avoid stigmatisation, the words “conviction” and “sentence” are not used throughout the court process. The privacy of juvenile offenders is also protected by a restriction on persons allowed to attend court sessions and on the publication of information on proceedings. The Magistrate of the Juve-

5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), *Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 44 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Initial reports of States parties due in 1997 - Singapore*, 29 April 2002, /C/51/Add.8, available at: <http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx?Symbol=CRC/C/51/Add.8> [accessed 1 November 2011]

6 Doob & Tonry. Varieties of youth justice

nile Court sits with two members from a panel of advisers nominated by the President, who may advise on matters regarding the treatment of the young offender and the court order to be made. These advisers may have experience with rehabilitation issues or may be respected members of society. A legacy of early post-war arrangements where “lay persons...with an understanding of Singapore cultures” were appointed to assist colonial judicial officers,⁷ the advisers still represent the wider perspective of the community today and reflect the community’s interest in the well-being of the youth population.⁸

Legislation is however only one dimension of the youth justice system. Within a child welfare-oriented legislative framework, offender rehabilitation regimes may vary in terms of the point at which intervention is activated, the availability of pre-court as opposed to formal measures, and the mix of community-based and custodial options. Taking a historical perspective, this study will show that juvenile justice in Singapore has gradually transformed in a number of ways but always in a consistent direction, focusing on juvenile offenders aged between 7 and below 16.

The main developments are:

- Custodial measures have become less punitive.
- Community rehabilitation model has expanded.
- More intervention for first-time offenders through pre-court diversionary options.
- More intervention for pre-delinquents through preventive programmes.

- Family dimension of juvenile rehabilitation has become more formalised and entrenched.
- Restorative justice has grown in importance.

Collectively, these transitions have helped to define an approach towards juveniles that is more interventionist, more differentiated, and more explicitly oriented towards the interests of the child. While there is still an element of deterrence,⁹ the rehabilitative and restorative motivations have become more pronounced. These trends will be discussed following a brief description of the current youth justice system and an outline of recent milestones.

MANAGEMENT OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The present system for managing juvenile delinquency involves a network of agencies including the Police, the courts, the schools, the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS), and voluntary welfare organisations. Upon arrest by the Police, first-time minor offenders may be placed on the Voluntary Guidance Programme to address their offending behaviour or the Streetwise Programme if they are involved in gang activities. These offenders are not charged in court if they complete the programmes successfully. Otherwise, juvenile offenders are charged in the Juvenile Court. The CYPA allows the Magistrate to call for a report on the juvenile offender’s social circumstances, including family background, general conduct, home surroundings, school record, and state of development, before deciding on an order (Section 42). These reports are prepared by the Probation Service at MCYS. The report considers the juvenile offender’s rehabilitation needs and makes recommendations as to the suitability


⁷ Wee. *Social work in context*.

⁸ This is despite an amendment to the CYPA in 1993 to reduce the role of the advisers, from assisting the Magistrate throughout his functions, to that of advising only on treatment and disposal. See Chan, WC. (1994). Changes to the juvenile justice system. *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies*, 448-456.

⁹ Ang, BL. (2002). *Community-based rehabilitation of offenders in Singapore*. http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No61/No61_15VE_Ang1.pdf

ity for probation and the necessary rehabilitation plan. The Juvenile Court, on consideration of the report, then issues orders such as a fine, discharge, probation with a range of conditions, community service, and institutionalisation. This process is outlined in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 Management of juvenile delinquency in Singapore



Source: Adapted from MCYS (2011), **Management of juvenile delinquency in Singapore**. <http://app1.mcys.gov.sg/portals/0/Summary/publication/publications-reports-mgmtJuvenileDelinquency.pdf> accessed on 1 November 2011.

Following the formation of the Inter-Ministry Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (IMJD) in 1995, a series of legislative reforms, policy changes, and programme innovations progressively shaped the youth rehabilitation system into its current form. These developments, outlined in Table 1, form the backdrop to the following discussion. The IMJD, which performs a key role in coordinating the national effort in youth reha-

bilitation, has since been renamed twice and is currently known as the National Committee on Youth Guidance and Rehabilitation (NYGR). The committee was restructured in 2011 to comprise a steering committee of appointment holders and senior officials from the relevant ministries, supported by a resource panel of domain experts who provide operational advice and assist with policy implementation.

Table 1 Milestones in managing juvenile delinquency and delivering youth rehabilitation

1995	Inter-Ministry Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (IMJD) formed
1996	Community service introduced as condition of juvenile probation
1997	Guidance Programme introduced
1998	Community service is made available for adult offenders as a condition of probation IMJD renamed the Inter-Ministry Committee on Youth Crime (IMYC) to extend focus to young offenders up to the age of 19
2000	National Standards for the Probation of Offenders and their Rehabilitation in the Community launched
2001	CYP A amendments, e.g. introduction of parental bond, mandatory counselling for parents, weekend detention, short detention orders with probation, standalone community service orders, family conferencing
2004	National school social work programme, STEP-UP, introduced
2006	Youth Hanging Out Late programme started by Police
2007	Community Court established IMYC renamed the National Committee on Youth Guidance and Rehabilitation (NYGR) to emphasise upstream developmental efforts
2008	Inter-Ministry Committee on Dysfunctional Families formed
2010	Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code Central Youth Guidance Office (CYGO) formed
2011	CYP A amendments, e.g. approved school orders replaced by juvenile rehabilitation centre orders with no minimum period, maximum duration of weekend detention halved

Source: Compiled by authors.

(1) Less punitive custodial regime

The first transition in the youth justice system is that the nature of the custodial regime for young offenders has changed. Institutionalisation as the last resort, where appropriateness must be carefully considered, is a long-held principle in working with juveniles.¹⁰ The CYPA makes special mention that as a general rule, juveniles below 10 years old are not to be sent to residential facilities. But over time the structure of custodial sanctions has also become more graduated, giving the court greater flexibility to mete out orders that address the particular needs of the individual offender. The high-level Inter-Ministry Committee on Dysfunctional Families, Juvenile Delinquency and Drug Abuse recommended in 1995 that a wider range of options be made available to the court in dealing with young offenders.¹¹ Some of these recommendations were later implemented in the amendments to the CYPA in 2001, such as the introduction of weekend detention and the combination of short detention orders below 6 months with probation. The punitive edge of residential rehabilitation has also been softened with reductions in the length of orders. The duration of placement in the Approved Schools was reduced from 3 to 5 years in the 1980s, to 2 to 3 years in the 2000s. Then in the most recent 2011 amendments to the CYPA, the Approved School regime was replaced by detention in juvenile rehabilitation centres with no minimum period. The maximum duration of weekend detention, first introduced in 2001, was also halved from 52 to 26 weekends in 2011.

These changes took place within a broader transformation in the justice system as a whole towards a more rehabilitative and less deter-

rent approach.¹² This transformation is best seen in a series of reforms in the management of adult offenders initiated by the Singapore Prison Service from the late 1990s.¹³ Then faced with organisational problems such as understaffing and overcrowding of facilities, a new leadership rebranded the career of prison officers as “Captains of Lives”, established a dedicated prison school to centralise the educational programme for inmates, and launched a public campaign called the “Yellow Ribbon Project” to create public awareness of the barriers between the prisons and the community and to promote the acceptance of ex-offenders into mainstream society. Underlying these initiatives were the messages of rehabilitation and reintegration. Although there are clear legislative and institutional boundaries between the juvenile and adult offender rehabilitation systems, there was frequent sharing of ideas during this period through interagency networks, collaboration in information-sharing and research, and staff exchanges. As the largest custodial institution in Singapore, the Prison Service’s reforms redefined the motives and substance of custodial sentencing, which has traditionally been identified with deterrence, and created repercussions on the rest of the justice system.¹⁴

(2) Expansion of the community rehabilitation model

The expansion of community-based rehabilitation is clearly seen from data on the court outcomes for juvenile offenders. From the mid-1990s onwards, probation with various conditions accounted for an increasing proportion of all Juvenile Court orders issued, while residential orders became less common (Figure 2). In the

10 Kamal, C. (2001). *Directions of juvenile justice reforms in Singapore*. http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No59/No59_14VE_Kamal.pdf

11 Inter-Ministry Committee. (1995). *Report of the Inter-Ministry Committee on Dysfunctional Families, Juvenile Delinquency and Drug Abuse*. Singapore: Ministry for Community Development.

12 Reddy, B. (2009). *Community-based alternatives in sentencing*. http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No79/No79_28VE_Reddy.pdf


13 Interview with former Director of Prisons, Mr Chua Chin Kiat, October 2011. Cheong, S. (2011, October 8). *Inside the big house*. Straits Times, Saturday Special Report.

14 Reddy. *Community-based alternatives in sentencing*


first half of this period during 1994 to 2002, probation orders represented 70% of all court orders issued, on average. This rose to 81% for 2003 to 2010. Across the same periods, the proportion of residential orders declined from 28% to 19%. But taking a longer historical perspective reveals that the expansion of community rehabilitation has not taken place at the expense of residential rehabilitation. Instead, it represents an extension of formal intervention to address offending behaviour where previously other orders such as fines and discharge were issued. During the

1960s, roughly equal shares of Juvenile Court orders were for probation as compared to other orders involving no intervention programmes, about 40% each (Figure 3). By the 1970s, the share of probation orders had risen to 47%, while that of other orders had decreased to 35%. This continues into the 2000s, when 79% of court outcomes were community-based rehabilitation while only 1% was non-intervention orders. Across the three decades, residential orders as a percentage of total court outcomes remained relatively stable at 18% to 20%.

Figure 2 Court outcomes for Juvenile Court cases, 1994-2010



Source: MCYS. Based on cases for which the Juvenile Court called for a social report.

Figure 3 Court outcomes for Juvenile Court cases, 1960s, 1970s, and 2000s

Source: MCYS; Veloo (2004).

Like the prison reforms, several major influences on the recent expansion of community rehabilitation did not take place strictly within the juvenile justice system. The first is the establishment of the Community Court as a specialist court within the Subordinate Courts in 2006. When plans for the Community Court were first announced by the Chief Justice, he explained that one of the aims was that “in appropriate cases, offenders who would ordinarily be prison-bound would be linked to long-term community-based treatment...that combines criminal justice and community resources”.¹⁵ The Court caters for young offenders aged 16 to 18 and youths aged below 21 in certain offence categories. This initiative was followed by amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code in 2010 that created a range

of new community-based sentences such as short detention, day reporting, and standalone community service. Some of the considerations underlying these amendments were that traditional sentences such as imprisonment and fines may not be appropriate for all types of offences, and that community-based sentences minimise the challenges of reintegration often associated with incarceration.¹⁶ Together, these reforms established the legislative basis for greater use of community rehabilitation for younger adult offenders and changed the tone of the justice system.

Even though adult and juvenile cases are heard by different courts, the establishment of the Community Court was an important factor

¹⁵ Keynote address by Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong at the 15th Subordinate Courts Workplan, 18 May 2006.

¹⁶ Ministry of Law. (2010). *Factsheet on the Criminal Procedure Code and community-based sentences*. <http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/204/Default.aspx?ItemId=471>

behind the growth of community-based rehabilitation for juvenile and younger adult offenders. One of the reasons is that despite the legal distinction between adults and juveniles at Court, programmes such as probation and community service are delivered by the same Probation Service within MCYS. In fact, younger adult offenders take part in some activities together with juvenile offenders. The shift in legal philosophy towards younger adult offenders therefore permeated the community rehabilitation system as a whole, across the age boundary. For the Probation Service, the legal reforms since 2006 signaled greater readiness in the justice system to rehabilitate younger adult offenders within the community and raised the confidence to recommend probation even for juvenile offenders. An experienced adviser to the Juvenile Court, when explaining this trend, felt that “the Probation Service had become more confident and more ready to recognise that you’re not aiming at a hundred percent success because that would mean you are too cautious and not taking enough risk” as opposed to the safer option of institutional rehabilitation.¹⁷

The increase in the rate of placement on probation among juvenile offenders also reflects greater confidence in probation as a rehabilitation regime and advances within the Probation Service over the years. The publication of the “National Standards for the Probation of Offenders and their Rehabilitation in the Community” in 2000 marked the formalisation of service standards and best practices in probation. Earlier, probation activities had been restructured into core and elective programmes so that the regime could be more responsive to the needs of individual offenders. The community partnership built over many years between the Probation Service and the schools, the courts, and the community organisations had paved the way for the integration of youth offenders into the community. The Probation Service adopted locally validated

risk assessment tools to guide the calibration of intervention levels. There are ongoing initiatives to develop the capabilities of voluntary welfare organisations so that probationers can be supported by a network of services.¹⁸

(3) More intervention for first-time offenders and pre-delinquents

One of the most prominent trends in the recent history of youth justice has been the expansion of intervention. This is the result of an overt strategy that began with the IMJD’s drive to provide more programmes for juvenile delinquents.¹⁹ Many of these initiatives target two groups: first-time offenders and pre-delinquents.

The **Guidance Programme** was implemented in 1997 for first-time minor offenders. It is a voluntary six-month programme for young offenders to take responsibility for their actions and acquire life skills. Parents are also involved. Although it is usually referred to as a pre-court diversionary measure that gives young offenders a chance to undergo rehabilitation without first going through the formal court process, it is more important as an alternative to letting off young offenders with just a police caution. One of the motivations for starting the programme was that many young offenders who were let off with a caution had gone on to reoffend.²⁰ This group, even without the Guidance Programme, would not have been charged in court previously and so cannot be said to have been diverted from court. Even discounting the first two years after the programme’s introduction when there was a sharp drop in the proportion of cases let off with police caution possibly as the programme stabilised, the percentage of arrested juveniles who were charged in the Juvenile Court actually increased

¹⁷ Interview with former adviser to the Juvenile Court, Mrs Ann Wee, October 2011.


¹⁸ Interview with Assistant Director/Probation Services Branch, Ms Aileen Tan, October 2011.

¹⁹ Choi, A & Lo, TW. (2004). *Fighting youth crime: A comparative study of two little dragons in Asia*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.

²⁰ Ibid.

slightly from 22% before the Guidance Programme existed (1994-1997) to 27% after it was implemented (2000-2010, see Figure 4). But between these two periods, the proportion of juveniles who were let off by the police without further intervention declined from 78% to 48%. The chief effect of the Guidance Programme has therefore been to extend intervention to juvenile offenders who otherwise would not have had further contact with the rehabilitation system.

Figure 4 Outcomes of juvenile arrests, 1994-2010



Source: MCYS; National Committee on Youth Guidance and Rehabilitation; Choi & Lo (2004).

Families, in particular parents, have long been recognised by policymakers as a critical factor in the development of delinquent behavior and the rehabilitation of young offenders.

The increase in programming is even more apparent for pre-delinquents. In the late 1990s, the IMJD rolled out a series of preventive education projects, such as crime prevention road-shows and prison visits. In 2004, a national school work programme called **STEP-UP** was launched by MCYS, partly to reduce anti-social behaviour and juvenile delinquency.²¹ In 2006, the police started the **Youths Hanging Out Late** (YHOL) programme, under which parents are sent letters if their children are found to be engaging in at-risk activities in crime-prone areas after 11pm. In 2010, the Central Youth Guidance Office (CYGO) was established to coordinate intervention for youth-at-risk across related government departments. CYGO is planning to pilot a street outreach and casework service for at-risk youth, targeting those who have dropped out of STEP-UP or have received YHOL letters.²² The trend has therefore been to progressively extend the coverage and raise the intensity of intervention for pre-delinquent youths.

²¹ MCYS press release. *More schools participating in MCYS' early intervention programme that helps students who need support and assistance*, 27 January 2005.

²² MCYS press release. *New youth guidance programme and support system to combat youth delinquency*, 08 March 2011.

(4) Entrenching the family dimension of youth rehabilitation

Families, in particular parents, have long been recognised by policymakers as a critical factor in the development of delinquent behavior and the rehabilitation of young offenders.²³ More recently, when an inter-ministry committee was convened in 2008 to look into helping dysfunctional families, it included families with youth-at-risk or juvenile offenders within its remit, reflecting recognition of the family dimension in youth rehabilitation. The committee observed that apart from offending, these families often faced other problems such as low earnings or single parenthood, and proposed family-centric intervention through intensive case management services.²⁴ At the practice level, it has been customary for rehabilitation staff and social service practitioners to work with young offenders' parents as part of programmes ranging from school social work and the Guidance Programme to probation and residential rehabilitation. A recent study by MCYS found that the statutory services including probation and the juvenile institutions make more frequent contact with parents than children and youth services in the voluntary sector.²⁵

²³ Choi & Lo. *Fighting youth crime*.

²⁴ MCYS media releases, *Assurance and hope for needy: New measures to help dysfunctional families*, 11 February 2009; *Fact sheet: IMC on Dysfunctional Families*, 10 March 2010.

²⁵ Dads for Life, unpublished report from a study on fatherhood and social services, October 2011.

In the legislative domain, amendments to the CYPA in 2001 introduced several landmark clauses that reasserted parental ownership and accountability.²⁶ The Juvenile Court can now order parents to execute a bond to exercise proper guardianship over the young offender or to abide by other orders made in relation to the child's rehabilitation. The court may also order the parents to attend counselling to address parent-child relationship problems or other programmes that will help in the rehabilitation process. Although parental responsibility has always been socially recognised, it can now be insisted upon by law. The style of the judicial process in the Juvenile Court has also changed over time. The appointment of magistrates for longer stints enabled familiarisation with the family dynamics of youth offending and gave rise on occasion to a more direct style of communication from magistrates to parents regarding the meaning of parental responsibility.²⁷

(5) Extending restorative justice

Whereas community-based rehabilitation emphasises community as resource in the rehabilitation process, restorative justice approaches community with two additional perspectives – as victim to whom reparations are due, and as the destination of the rehabilitation process that young offenders must eventually rejoin. The main principle underlying restorative justice is that offenders must be given a chance to repair the harm both to the individual victims of their crimes as well as to the community and social order at large.²⁸

The introduction and expansion of community service as a part of juvenile rehabilitation is the clearest indication of the growing influence of restorative justice in Singapore. Although community service orders can also be justified on retributive principles,²⁹ the practice of these orders in Singapore emphasises reparation through service and the fostering of empathy³⁰ – both key elements of restorative justice.

The court may also order the parents to attend counselling to address parent-child relationship problems or other programmes that will help in the rehabilitation process. Although parental responsibility has always been socially recognised, it can now be insisted upon by law.

26 Kamal, C. (2004). *The probation service in Singapore*. www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No67/No67_08VE_Kamal.pdf

27 Interviews with Mr Chua Chin Kiat and Mrs Ann Wee, October 2011.

28 Walgrave, L. (2004). Restoration in youth justice. *Crime and Justice*, 31, 543-597.

29 Reddy, B. (1991). Community service orders: An alternative sentence. *Singapore Academy of Law Journal*, 3, 230-237.

30 Opening address by Yu-Foo Yee Shoon, Minister of State, MCYS, at the Community Service Order 10th Anniversary Celebrations, 30 November 2006.

With reference to community service orders in the United Kingdom, Bala Reddy – later to be the first judge to preside over the Community Court – proposed the adoption of community service orders in Singapore in 1991, on the basis of its proven rehabilitative potential and congruence with our justice philosophy of incarceration as a last resort.³¹ They were eventually implemented as a possible condition of juvenile probation in 1996, extended to adult probationers in 1997, and converted to an additional standalone order option for juveniles in 2001, with the same for adult offenders in 2010. With the increased participation of older offenders in community service, it has become more common for community service officers at MCYS to give ownership of the process to the offenders by asking them to propose and plan their own community service, or even for older participants to guide the younger ones.³² This approach exemplifies the consensus and empowerment aspects of restorative justice, where offenders take responsibility for their own actions and rehabilitation.³³

A separate development was the piloting of family conferencing at the Juvenile Court in 1994, which was later codified in the CYPAs as a juvenile case conference, at which the young offender may be required to apologise or pay compensation to the victim. The Probation Service also conducts programmes along the lines of restorative justice, such as a Victim Impact Programme that helps probationers to reflect on the consequences of their actions on others.

31 Reddy, B. Community service orders: An alternative sentence.

32 Interview with Ms Aileen Tan.

33 Hoyle, C & Zedner, L. (2007). Victims, victimization, and criminal justice. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology* (pp. 461-495). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

Taking all the above developments into account, has youth justice in Singapore remained consistent in substance and tone over the years or has it changed? A comparison of the recommendations of two high-level committees set up by the government to look into juvenile delinquency some 20 years apart provides perspective.³⁴ The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency in the 1970s and the Inter-ministry Committee on Dysfunctional Families, Juvenile Delinquency and Drug Abuse in the mid-1990s are comparable. In both cases, there was a surge in youth crime and increasing public concern before the committees were formed. Their findings therefore provide an indication of the policy approach to similar challenges of juvenile delinquency at different points in time.

The immediate observation from comparing the recommendations of the two committees is that the overarching approach to youth offending has not changed (see Table 2). Both committees focused on the social dimensions of delinquency, namely the family and the school. Even the specific recommendations for family programmes and social services in school are broadly similar. They were also interested in a combination of preventive and rehabilitative measures, and clearly avoided a retributive stance in the management of youth offenders. But there are also important differences between the approach to youth offending in the 1970s and the 1990s.

34 Committee on Crime and Delinquency. (1974). *Report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency*. Singapore. Inter-Ministry Committee. (1995). *Report of the Inter-Ministry Committee on Dysfunctional Families, Juvenile Delinquency and Drug Abuse*. Singapore.

Table 2 Recommendations from two high-level committees on juvenile delinquency, 1970s and 1990s

Committee on Crime and Delinquency, 1974	Inter-ministry Committee on Dysfunctional Families, Juvenile Delinquency and Drug Abuse, 1995
<i>Family</i> - Family planning programmes to educate parents about having smaller families and responsible parenting - Expand family services to support parents and working mothers <i>School</i> - Expand school counselling and social work services - Introduce moral and ethical training in schools <i>Other preventive measures for pre-delinquents</i> - Youth Guidance and Employment Board to provide vocational training and opportunities for school dropouts - Child Guidance Clinic for early detection and proper diagnosis of maladjustment problems - Youth Advisory Bureau to advise on the work of youth organisations, but with no executive powers - More guidance for youth activities and community facilities for wholesome living - More facilities for the training of social workers <i>Formal measures for offenders</i> - Less frequent transfer of magistrates of the Juvenile Court, more powers to deal with parents - Rehabilitation for minor offenders and more deterrent penalty for persistent offenders	<i>Family</i> - Family life programmes for young couples and parents - Provide affordable before-and-after-school care for children of working parents <i>School</i> - Extend pastoral care and career guidance to all primary schools <i>Other preventive measures for pre-delinquents</i> - Expand National Youth Council's role in running programmes for youths - Improve training and service terms of welfare and youth workers - Better coordination among agencies, form a high-level inter-ministry working group <i>Formal measures for offenders</i> - Toughen practice of letting young offenders off with a police caution by introducing counselling programme - Make wider range of punishments available to the Juvenile Court, such as community service and weekend detention - Refer young offenders to voluntary welfare organisations for aftercare services to prevent return to crime

Source: Committee on Crime and Delinquency (1974); Inter-Ministry Committee (1995).

First, the issue of youth offending had risen in importance on the national policy agenda by the 1990s. The recommendation to form an inter-ministry working group to coordinate strategies contrasts with the proposal for an advisory bureau with no executive powers. As the first Chairman of the National Committee on Youth Guidance and Rehabilitation, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, explains, “there was commitment from the highest level, there was no ducking the problem”.³⁵

Second, the approach towards youth rehabilitation had become more interventionist over time. While the 1970s committee set out a broad principle for rehabilitation, the 1990s committee proposed specific measures for engaging young offenders at both ends of the rehabilitation process, by providing a programme for minor offenders who might otherwise be let off with a police caution as well as follow-up services for those who have completed their rehabilitation programmes. This was the beginning of a period of policy innovation that saw the introduction of the Guidance Programme, the Streetwise Programme, STEP-UP, and most recently the proposed outreach and postcare programmes under the Central Youth Guidance Office, and the concurrent decline of non-intervention outcomes both at the stage of police arrest and in terms of Juvenile Court decisions.

Third, formal intervention had become more differentiated. This was an explicit recommendation of the 1990s committee and resulted in the diversification of court order options in 2001 that would allow the Juvenile Court to place offenders on various combinations of community-based and residential rehabilitation. Differentiation led to more sensitive and sophisticated rehabilitation regimes that could be tailored to individual offenders’ needs. At the practice level, rehabilitation professionals deepened treatment differentiation by using risk assessment tools that

could more precisely define the unique rehabilitative profile of individual offenders.

Finally, while the youth justice system in Singapore had long adopted a child welfare orientation, the interpretation of the child’s interests became less narrow and authoritarian, in keeping with the times. The more direct and paternal tone of youth justice in the 1970s can be appreciated from an observation about youths by the Chief Probation and Aftercare Officer in 1975:

*Perhaps one of the most startling features of their pattern of behaviour is the cult of the “uni-sex”. It is fashionable to see male youth in fashions and hairstyles that often beguile their masculinity. The right thing to do for them to be popular and attractive to a growing section of the fairer sex is to subscribe to the cult of unisex and pop culture. They manifest hostile attitudes to existing institutions, hold excessively tolerant views on matters of sexual morality, disobey laws and experiment with drugs.*³⁶

The recommendations of the 1970s committee for programmes to educate parents about family planning and to teach morals and ethics to students are in the same vein. By the 1990s, while parental responsibility and positive guidance for youths remained strong themes, the recommended strategies had become more value-neutral and oriented towards programme effectiveness.

CHALLENGES

With the expansion of the community-based rehabilitation model, several challenges emerge. Legislative options are only the first step in every community-based rehabilitation journey. Its outcome depends chiefly on the expertise and resourcing of key agencies such as the Probation Service, the operational capacity of other rehabilitation service providers in the voluntary sector, and the moral capacity of the community

³⁵ Interview with the former Chairman of the National Committee on Youth Guidance and Rehabilitation, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, October 2011.

³⁶ Veloo, K.V. (2004).

to accept juvenile offenders into its midst and to support the rehabilitation process. The responsiveness of schools and employers, for example, can make a critical difference.³⁷ At the introduction of the Community Court in 2006, the Chief Justice remarked that “the time is right for the establishment of a specialist court that is responsive to the needs of the community”³⁸ and that will increasingly direct young adult offenders to be rehabilitated within the community. The process of enlarging community capacity to support the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders must similarly go on. Research to monitor and demonstrate the benefits of community-based rehabilitation can contribute to this process of engagement between the youth justice system and the general public. In particular, such research can focus on the impact on rehabilitation outcomes of wider community involvement.³⁹

As the youth justice system evolves, so does the social environment of young people. Social trends such as more nuclear and smaller families mean that the process of socialisation for future generations will be significantly different. The opportunity for passing down social values through grandparents, for example, has already declined.⁴⁰ While the parental role is still regarded as key to healthy child development, the nature of parent-child relationships may change as youths have access to increasingly diverse sources of information and influence, such as from social media.⁴¹ The social relational effects of technology will be particularly pronounced in societies such as Singapore’s, where the penetration of Internet and communications technology is extremely high. Youth justice must continue to renew itself in order for rehabilitative

strategies to stay effective and the fundamental principles to remain relevant.

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37 Interview with Ms Aileen Tan.

38 Keynote address by Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong at the 15th Subordinate Courts Workplan.

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